Re: inequivalent complmentary models

[Tim Gwinn <***>]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Howard
> Pattee
> Sent: Saturday, May 29, 2004 8:13 PM
--snip--
>
> Tim:If modern physics is a program, as you stated in your
> previous post, that
> begins with "epistemic principles" that "support the ideal of objectivity
> which simply means that these aspects or laws do not change when the
> observers change, nor can they be changed by the observer", then
> physics is
> tacitly asserting a world-as-mechanism view, whether it acknowledges it or
> not. And such a world is coincident with one described in
> state-based terms.
>
> HP: I don?t follow your logic here. The symmetry principles and
> the Hertzian correspondence condition lead to no such conclusion.
> This is demonstrated directly by the great variety of physical
> models that are not Newtonian (memoryless, path-independent)
> state-determined and that are also not considered by physicists
> to be conceptually mechanistic in the Newtonian sense.
>

A world in which the laws would rest on "the ideal of objectivity" such that
these laws "do not change when the observers change, nor can they be changed
by the observer" is a world in which there must be the physical ability to
completely and universally fractionate the subjective from the objective.
Such a world is the reductionistic world, which is also a mechanistic world.
If it is not actually possible to completely and universally fractionate the
subjective from the objective, then the laws or epistemic principles for
such a world must forego the aforementioned ideal of objectivity if we
expect these laws to be comprehensive of physical phenomena in such a world.
This would results in the creation of a broader set of fundamental laws to
physics (where current laws become a subset of these). This is a primary
theme and conclusion of Essays ch. 5 "Drawing the Boundary Between Subject
and Object".

Tim