Re: modern physics

[Tim Gwinn <***>]

Howard,

There are some large differences between physics as you describe it and - if
I may call it such - Rosennean physics (or the Rosennean view of physics).
In your description you maintain the distinction between physics as a set of
"epistemic principles" which "support the ideal of objectivity which simply
means that these aspects or laws do not change when the observers change,
nor can they be changed by the observer"; and, on the other hand, the actual
acts of measurement, which you say "physical theory has never been about",
although "these measurements in themselves have also proved useful
knowledge...".

Further, you state that:
> It is important to understand why individual acts of
> observation and measurement cannot satisfy these symmetry
> conditions. It is because observation and measurement are
> individual acts that, except for the result itself, are largely
> under the control of the observer and depend explicitly on the
> time, place, and intentions of the observer. That is the basic
> reason why laws cannot usefully describe the process of
> measurement (and why we must make an epistemic cut). In Rosen?s
> terms, coding (measurement) is unentailed by either causal
> natural laws or the inferential models

First, I would argue, that in Rosen's view, the last sentence is incorrect.
In the Modeling Relation, encoding and decoding are unentailed *within the
MR itself*. However, they are not therefore unentailed entirely. Modeling
Relations do occur within the world in which we believe physical laws
operate. It is therefore incumbent upon physics to determine the laws
appropriate to describe that physical situation and those entailments, not
to except them from such laws.

On a larger scale, the notion that "laws cannot usefully describe the
process of  measurement" is a rather pathological position for physics to
take. Yet, it follows almost immediately as a symptom of the "the ideal of
objectivity" that you describe, or the "equation of objectivity with
mechanism" [EL p.94], as Rosen describes it. The idea that physical theory
ought to strive toward an ideal of objectivity is precisely for physical
theory to strive toward mechanism as an ideal, for which the Newtonian
paradigm is coincidentally a perfect encoding format. The interjection of
the observer into the measurement process confounds physical laws written
for entirely objective conditions. This then leaves the entire arena of
'measurement' in a limbo, as far as physical law is concerned, as your
comments indicate.

By contrast, the Rosennean view of physics differs in that it does not
assume a priori an ideal of objectivity that equates with mechanism, nor
does it assume that physical theory is not *also* about individual
measurements, or measurements generally, since surely they are also physical
phenomena subject to some physical law. The treatment of measurement in FM,
for example, shows that the measurement problem in QM follows almost
trivially from some basic considerations of measurement as the interaction
between two (or more) physical systems. In doing so, measurement can become
something that is within the realm of description by physical law, albeit
physical laws which allow impredicativities. [Essays, ch. 5] The original
physics of ideal objectivity is not nullified but rather becomes a subset or
limiting case of this larger physics.

Tim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Howard
> Pattee
> Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2004 9:29 PM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: modern physics
>
>
> I have the feeling  from the comments that have appeared on this
> list that many contributors have simply inherited Rosen's
> opinions about physics without really studying the culture of
> physics that has evolved during the last 50 years. There have
> been great changes that I myself have not kept up with, but
> fortunately I still have colleagues who do, and there are
> excellent popular accounts written by experts.
>
> Let me very briefly outline the "artificial rules that physics
> sets for itself" that Judith says Rosen "deplored." That was his
> emotional response, but I think that is too strong a word to
> represent his rational assessment. Physics is a big field, so I
> will stick to only the most basic ideas that are themselves still
> subject to different interpretations. As I have pointed out,
> Rosen thought more as a mathematician than as an experimental
> physicist and quite understandably he focused on the formalisms
> of physics, specifically on state-determined dynamics that he
> found, quite correctly, to be too narrow to cover complex system,
> especially life. So take note, this is not a criticism of Rosen?s
> relational biology and his many other ideas. It is only about his
> characterization of physics with which most physicists disagree.
>
> First, formal state-determinism is not one of the ?artificial
> rules? physicists set for themselves. Physics today begins with a
> very broad set of  informal "rules" that are better called
> epistemic principles. They are about what it means to make
> contact with those aspects of reality that we cannot escape, or
> that appear to be inexorable. They are those aspects of reality
> over which we have no control. They support the ideal of
> objectivity which simply means that these aspects or laws do not
> change when the observers change, nor can they be changed by the
> observer. These are metaphysical principles that although they
> are supported by rational thought, must ultimately be justified
> by the results of experiments on specific models that satisfy
> these principles.
>
> The most important class were called invariance principles but
> now are now called symmetry principles because the term better
> describes the more formal and abstract aspects of current models.
> Symmetry implies many subsidiary concepts including objectivity,
> universality, conservation laws, as well as limitations on the
> formal expressions in which the laws are expressed. Einstein was
> the first to depend primarily on a symmetry principle to derive a new law.
>
> The one principle remaining of the Newtonian paradigm in modern
> physics (?Newton?s greatest discovery?) is the necessary
> complementary duality of laws and measurements (of initial
> conditions). It is important to understand why individual acts of
> observation and measurement cannot satisfy these symmetry
> conditions. It is because observation and measurement are
> individual acts that, except for the result itself, are largely
> under the control of the observer and depend explicitly on the
> time, place, and intentions of the observer. That is the basic
> reason why laws cannot usefully describe the process of
> measurement (and why we must make an epistemic cut). In Rosen?s
> terms, coding (measurement) is unentailed by either causal
> natural laws or the inferential models.
>
> Physical theory has never been about individual measurements of
> ?parts and particles,? their energy, mass, position, etc., but
> about those invariant relations between such observables that do
> not depend on any actual or conceivable state of the observer.
> The fact that these measurements in themselves have also proved
> useful knowledge for many applied  technologies often gives the
> layperson a distorted concept of physics.
>
> Of course the whole enterprise of science assumes there is an
> empirical test of any model. The physicist?s symmetry principles
> do not provide such a test; they are only the necessary condition
> for a model to be a candidate for further tests. The Hertzian
> correspondence condition, or its equivalent, remains the final
> empirical test of a model. Assuming a model satisfies these
> necessary conditions, many more subjective criteria enter into
> the choice or acceptance of models such as conceptual clarity,
> formal elegance, beauty, unity, simplicity, utility, fecundity, etc.
>
> I have barely scratched the foundations, but I won?t bother you
> with more. Should anyone be interested in more, these books come to mind:
>
> Max Born, Physics in My Generation, Springer-Verlag, 1969. Esp.
> the essay, ?Symbol and Reality? pp. 132-146.
>
> Hallem Stevens, Fundamental physics and its justifications,
> 1945-1993. Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological
> Sciences 34(1), 151-197, 2003. A study of the real struggles of
> physicists, their internal conflicts about what fields are the
> most important and how they fight for grants.
>
> Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe, Vintage Books, 1999
> (paperback) A lot of fundamentals plus string theory in popular
> readable form.
>
> Amir Aczel, Entanglement, Plume (Penguin) 2001. All about the
> bizarre consequences  quantum theory, delayed-choice and
> non-locality experiments. Enough to make you doubt you know
> anything about reality.
>
> Howard