Re: models, sensory perception

[John M <***>]

JJK(earlier, in medias res - rather as a conclusion to HP):
Then the proper question is more aimed at what causes the middle ground
where things are things in a sensory way, i.e., where do simple systems come
from and why have living systems managed to escape that kind of abstraction
and simplification?
HP: Good luck. I have no answers yet.

If I may volunteer some answer - my way, always open to be corrected -  I
would reply to the 1st part Q: From our reductionist views, including into
our models only that much, (in most cases: what we know, sometimes: what we
select into the model) while disregarding (discarding, excluding) the "rest
of the world" from our consideration. So our model (system) is 'simple'.
To the 2nd part of the Q: in viewving 'living systems' - ourselves - we coul
not cut off aspects of not yet discovered explanations/understanding. They
are "us". Beyond the 'awe' of the - for us - unexplainable "complexity" that
could not go unobserved, there were (are) attempts for such an
abstraction/simplification in modern science: the 'neurons only' psychology
and brain-science, following the (bio)chemistry (later: (bio)physics)
explanations for the part of biology that was abstraacted and simplified to
such domains. Reductionism at its worst, because it implies a total
explanation for a kimitied model's observed features. (Sponge the rest!).

I believe what HP quoted Monday, May 24, 2004 8:34 AM among many others:
>In LI, p. 134, Rosen says about relational models: "As I have developed it
so far, there is no time parameter, no states, no state transition
sequences. There are only components (mappings), and organizations, the
abstract block diagrams that can be built from them." <
describes RR's opinion about 'relational models' as a work of reductionistic
science, a snapshot including topical limitations.
The post concentrated on 'states' so I am not sure which aspect HP wanted to
stress.

Regards

JohnM