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Biology, Physics, and the Rosennean definition of "state"...



It is always a mistake to take one phrase out of one of my father's books, divorce it from his intended context, and then try to defend it as a quote purportedly representing "what Rosen believed".  The definition of "state" (on page 75, actually, not 74) in Anticipatory Systems as "embodies that information about a natural system which must be encoded in order for some kind of prediction about the system to be made." is a case in point.
 
The reason this can almost never be done with any accuracy is because his definitions are very much entailed by their contexts, much like the organization of living systems are. So, if we are to look around for other definitions of "state" in my father's written work, I predict we will come up with some interesting-- and occasionally divergent-- "definitions". There are even occasions, in his work, where he stated the current physics-based definition of some concept, like "state", as a prelude to completely deconstructing it. If that "quote" is pulled out of his book, it could be very misleading, not to mention quite unfair.
 
The first order of business is to look at the context that co-exists with this "quote", on page 75 of Anticipatory Systems. This page is part of chapter two, in a subsection entitled: "Encodings between Natural and Formal Systems". Encoded information about a Natural system is not the same thing as that natural system itself. He would agree that states certainly exist in formal systems that model natural systems.  He also believe that a certain concept of state exists in the "internal predictive models" within organisms (as seen on page 126 and 127). He referred to these as "abstract states". But he did not believe that there is such a thing as a static "moment in time" (a state) that can be referred to in organisms that has much, if any, scientific meaning in the effort to understand why living organisms are alive.
 
In "Life, Itself", my father goes into very detailed discussions of "state" and how it relates to science, generally, and biology, physics, etc, specifically... as well as how difficult language can be in our attempts to employ it to convey ideas. Beginning on page 40 of "Life, Itself", there is a set of subsections; "3B. The First Basic Dualism" and "3C. The Second Basic Dualism"-- which carries over into page 42 and talks about states as follows:
 
Robert Rosen wrote:"The partition of ambience [which he defined on the preceding page as everything outside of the human mind] into system and environment, and even more, the imputation of that partition to the ambience itself as an inherent property thereof, is a basic though fateful step for science. For once the distinction is made, attention focuses on system [which can be anything: in biology it may be "an organism", or a subsystem within an organism, and so on... Here, he defines it, a little farther down on the same page, as: "a system in the ambience is a collection of percepts that seem to us to belong together." ] Systems and environment are thenceforth perceived [by science and scientists] in entirely different ways, represented and described in fundamentally different terms. To anticipate somewhat, system gets described by "states", which are determined by observation; environment is characterized rather by its effects on system. Indeed, it is precisely at this point that, as we shall see, fundamental trouble begins to creep in".
 
The discussion about state continues with an entire chapter devoted to it beginning on pate 67. This chapter is entitled; "The Concept of State". Here, the reader will find a prime example of a statement that might seem to be completely opposite to what my father really believed, and the confusion is due to the subtle way he tended to phrase things:
 
"Central to the notion of natural systems is the attendant notion of state. As I remarked earlier, and as we shall see in more detail in the present chapter, system and state have become essentially coextensive; systems are described in terms of their possible states, while their environments are not (and indeed, cannot be). [The subtlety here is that he presumes the reader will have progressed to this point from page one of the present volume, "Life, Itself", and have seen the earlier discussion. Furthermore, there is his phrasing-- the words "have become coextensive" with its subsequent semicolon... He is illustrating what coextensive means, namely; the manner in which contemporary science describes their definitions of systems and environments; not HIS attitude towards such things, nor his definitions.]
"As is true with all the deep concepts of contemporary science, the idea expressing systems in terms of states, and [describing] everything that happens in systems in terms of state transitions, goes back to Newtonian mechanics."
 
There are four more indexed discussions on the subject of states in this same book; pg 165, 203, 209, and 217. In "Essays on Life, Itself", there are additional discussions that involve the scientific concept of "state" and how it bears on numerous other issues. On page 221, in the midst of the essay "Optimality in Biology and Medicine" (one of my favorites), the issue takes on very serious consequences-- which I alluded to in the Rosennean Modeling project that has been back-burnered, it seems. Then, on page 310, in the essay "Cooperation and Chimera", in a subsection entitled; "Some System Theory", there is another little gem:
 
"The mechanism that most biologists espouse provides definite answers to some of our questions. It stipulates what an individual is and what behavior is, but what survival means does not have any straightforward mechanistic counterpart. Yet, as we have seen, adaptive behavior is linked to survival, and Darwinian evolution depends on adaptation. Biologists, in general, feel that they dare not stray from mechanistic strictures without falling into vitalism. Hence, the conundrums that have always plagued what passes for evolutionary theory (see Life, Itself)."
 
If anyone on the list does not have access to these two books, let me know. I can easily transcribe the various discussions and post them. However, from what is included here, I believe I have thoroughly supported my initial point(s).
 
Judith