Re: models, sensory perception

[John M <***>]

JohnK,

it is hard to argue when we are on the same platform. I really am not, just
'reflect' - within your text interleaving in lines
started by [JM]: - see below.

JohnM

----- Original Message -----
From: "John Kineman" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2004 9:50 PM
Subject: Re: models, sensory perception


> John M.
> Again, I believe I agree with this entirely. Certainly physics has
> progressed beyond Newton, certainly it has not embraced the >full
complexity idea of Rosen, as such (but perhaps in part via >Von Neumann's
> epistemic cut and other models, including Bohm's implicate >order and many
others to which one can make analogies and >relations with RR's ideas, each
way of approaching it nevertheless >still remaining the unique work of the
author). I also agree that >there should not be discussion of levels of
complexity - that itself >presumes that complexity is constructed, which is
the basic >difference between the traditional approach (with which we have
>rightly or wrongly identified Von Neumann) and Rosen's.-....

[JM]: I never thought that 'complexity constructed' is presumed: I turn it
around and think: "levels" are assumed "constructed" in a complexity that
arose by nature in an unlimitable way - by cutting the scope we observe
within the chosen (used?) boundaries - and
omitting "the rest or the world". It's washing off the 'level' aspect
as a (given) characteristic and turns it into our artifact.

[JJK]: >To say the opposite, however, then becomes necessary, >that there
may be different degrees to which a complex system
> may simplify itself or be simplified by its context in nature. So >then we
get levels of simplification, ending in the extreme case >with the
mechanical. The simplification is thus achieved by >contextual constraint on
complexity, which is itself an infinite >concept. Again, this is analogous
to current hot discussions about >"decoherence" in QM (see Brian Green's
book) where the >explanation for QM wierdness is that contexts are
constraining >otherwise unconstrained (i.e., complex) possibilities.

[JM]:
I don't know Green's book, but your wording seems close to
my identification of reductionism: contexts *constraining* (the total, the
unconstrained ie. impredicative) into topical (indeed cut, limited) models?
I'd not call that 'weird'.  It's the regular way of conventioal science
(never thought it for QM??) .

[JJK]: >This IS  a concept of a larger system providing causal
> definition to a smaller one,  so it is branching into Rosennean
> concepts. We should thus be careful, which arguing that science >SHOULD
adopt some of these ideas, not to overlook those cases >where it may indeed
be beginning to.

[JM]: Am I really distant from RR's thinking when I consider that a
selection of causes ("larger (closed!) system"?) IS reductionistic? It
really cuts off the 'other' effects - beyond that 'larger system', from
contributing to the "causation" (if we must use this word) of that "smaller"
system. QM as far as I know, does not work with RR's "natural systems", in
my translation the ones with unlimited connections all the way to the rest
of nature (wholeness), thus impredicative and not (T-)computable.
Cheers
JM

> JJK
>
> John M wrote:
>
> >JohnK (and Tim),
> >I agree with John's "beyond" physics vs Tim's "enlargement": the physical
> >view is a topical cut and no matter how you 'enlarge' it, you still are
IN
> >IT. Physics (just like biology) has its scope of the observation and
> >explanation. It is part of "nature" (the total existence - I accept the
RR
> >reduction to "this universe", since we have no way to know about the
> >others - just maybe sci-fi guess).
> >Epistemic enrifhment goes stepwise, sometimes with retrograde
corrections,
> >the Newtonian paradigm was a step, Einstein indeed "enlarged" it - still
> >within the same mindset. QM went a step back from Einstein (don't crucify
me
> >for that) into a linear explanatory material-enlargement which was
widened
> >into the Q-cosmological etc. variations. Still physics. Boundaries to
> >observe, formalism to be quantized, equationally and Turing
computationally,
> >within the predications even predictions.
> >Rosen opened the mind into the unknown/able, yet part of the world. The
> >networks are not within boundaries, effects are not restricted to the
> >considered factors. Except when he speaks TO the biologists ABOUT
biology. I
> >stress this point, because it is IMO a fatal disgrace when we take RR's
> >explanatory teachings to the "rest of the world of science" as his proper
> >ideas, without distinction.
> >
> >I agree with what Tim wrote, up to the end of his statement:
> >
> >
> >>>...Therefore, models of organization of
> >>>biological functions, such as Rosen's relational models,
> >>>cannot be reduced to mechanistic models; ...<<
> >>>
> >>>
> >object, however, to the very end of it:
> >
> >
> >>>they represent an enlargement of physics.<<
> >>>
> >>>
> >
> >Just a remark to Jack's 'colimiting etc.' internet-heroes:
> >whoever talks to me about "levels" of complexity, is not IMO speaking
about
> >(RR's and my) complexity within the wholeness of nature, rather about a
> >reductionistically (almost wrote: mechanicly)
> >cut, limited model of such complexity, including only "that much" - so it
> >may be 'more or less', 'higher or lower' than 'another' cut.
> >Biology is a 'level', physics is a 'level'. Does it matter WHICH does
> >explain the other? To look down on the other party, biologists will cut
> >their boundaries wider than physicists and vice versa. Remove the
boundaries
> >and find the fundamental principles governing both.
> >
> >Cheers
> >
> >John M
> >
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "John Kineman" <***>
> >To: <***>
> >Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2004 12:28 PM
> >Subject: Re: models, sensory perception
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>Tim,
> >>This is a very nice, clear statement of the issue. I would suggest only
> >>a minor semantic modification of two words. First, as indicated in the
> >>previous post, I think the word "material" needs careful clarification
> >>of which meaning is being used. I'd suggest saying "realization" here
> >>instead. Second, rather than saying it must necessarily be an
> >>enlargement of physics, I'd leave it open to be something beyond
> >>physics, giving physicists the right to define their own discipline (the
> >>two choices I mentioned in the earlier post). These are not substantive
> >>objections, of course. What you write is quite as I read the situation
> >>
> >>
> >too.
> >
> >
> >>John
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>>Surely, "biological functions" are one of two things: they are either
> >>>1) mere anthropomorphisms, or 2) actual properties in the material
> >>>world. If the former, then they are to be expunged and replaced
> >>>by dynamical descriptions of the matter which comprises them. If the
> >>>latter, then it is the job of biology and physics to come up with
> >>>models that capture those properties. This is the whole point of
> >>>Rosen's relational biology: to capture the organizational properties
> >>>evidenced in the organization of biological functions in organisms.
> >>>
> >>>By doing so, "biological function" is no longer beyond the scope of
> >>>physics and physical models. But biological function is organized
> >>>around what it entails (final cause), rather than what entails it.
> >>>This use of final causation cannot be encoded into a
> >>>mechanistic model. Further, if there are impredicative relational
> >>>models of organisms (such as the (M,R)-system), such a model cannot be
> >>>encoded into a mechanistic model (which is restricted to encoding
> >>>predicative entailments). Therefore, models of organization of
> >>>biological functions, such as Rosen's relational models, cannot be
> >>>reduced to mechanistic models; instead, they represent an enlargement
> >>>of physics.
> >>>
> >>>Regards,
> >>>Tim
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>--
> >>© 2004 John J. Kineman
> >>all rights reserved
> >>
> >>
>
> --
> © 2004 John J. Kineman
> all rights reserved