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Re: models - branch fromf GM discussion

John M.
I have a little trouble following the choppy sentences - not intended as
a criticism, just my limitation. But if I read you correctly, I think I
agree on these points and attempted to say as much in other terms.
"Natural systems" is of course a vague reference to "what really is" and
yet even trying to reference such a concept requires some words which
then invoke past concepts of reality. But your point seems to be that
the "reality" is not reductive and not cut epistemically. I agree fully
and also believe that was RR's belief. We must consider nature whole and
self-operative, whatever that means. Then, "below" that, the sciences
introduce reductive concepts to understand what is otherwise whole. This
is also "abstraction" as RR uses the term. The "traditional" reduction
has been syntactica, and I agree the "big" step now would be to bring in
the qualia, or semantic concepts which have been abstracted away in the
traditional views. A relational diagram, taken as a "new" picture of
reality does this.
But there is no reason to "give up" if one then points out that the new
picture is also a reduction of a different sort. Since we are asking
different questions it makes sense to take a different view, and its
limitation is presumably not a limitation on the question we are asking,
but on other questions we are not asking. That was the case of the
traditional view too, and precisely why it is too "impoverished" for our
current questions. So, I think I fully agree, except that one need not
give up unless one is trying for a description or model or metamodel
that does everything. That would seem to be an impossibility, as much as
I realize proving something impossible is itself impossible (don't ask
me to prove that).
JJK

John M wrote:

JohnK,
Let me try to make sense (will I succeed?) I will refer to your post
below, without quoting and I do not interspace my remarks.
^^^^^^^^
The "2nd part (RR....):
RR (IMO) made a differentiation between systems (machines, organizations)
and "natural systems" ie. without boiundary cut (my understanding). Here is
the "line" I drew for reductionism: below that ((in)computability,
(im)predicativity) are the classical sciences.
---(I don't know what did "di" stand instead of in my post.)---

Did you find impredicative and noncomputable sciences (in the conventional
(old) sense)?

I am not principally AGAINST reductionism (mine that is) because that's the
way we can think.
RR's biology and equational explanations are in my sense reductionistic, but
I cannot propose a better way to 'speak'. I define the (my) 'reductionist
objection' at the level of formulating limited models for observation and
explanation by themselves (not as 'natural systems'). ie: When we bow to the
boundaries. This is why I call causality a reductionistic idea - it 'picks'
ONE reason to cause an event while the entire universe is involved - two
ways: influence and response. (I/O)
(Even if the "1" reason is more than one, it is a limited, restricted, cut
cause-concept).
First the 'unlimited' connectivity looked like making grits of the world,
this is why I tried to differentiate between connections beyond the quanti
reductionism: by using qualitative effects in addition to the physical
connections (http://pages.prodigy.net/jamikes/influence.html) - a first
draft. Corrections happily accepted (unless refuted ha ha).
I admit, it only differentiates between boundaries: adding quality to the
quantity, but saves the day for today. There are still boundaries to
observe. Qualia. Would you call it just "another predicative point?" In that
case I give up and transfer a solution to the grandkids of my grandkids.
We need a new language, glossary, way of thinking, another mind. This one
mind is reductive.

Cheers

JohnM

PS. You wrote to HP (among many others):


... RR's question: "What is life?" has to be answered in terms
that explain experience as well as describe it.<<


I thought RR denied the validity (correctness) of this question?
Then again: what experience? religious? personal? biological? in any case
within reductionistic boundary-cut views. - J





----- Original Message -----
From: "John Kineman" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Monday, May 17, 2004 12:48 PM
Subject: Re: models - branch fromf GM discussion




John M.

Yes, I agree that dictionary definitions can be out of date, but I
thought it a good baseline for discussion. Thanks for "reading." Now my
turn to read your definition.



JM: And in principle I arrived at my definition for "reductionism" as


reducing


the totality to a segment we observe (within set - selected boundaries)


and


disregard further connectivities in this endeavour.
RR had an expression if you don't di that: a natural system.
So I drew the line at the "impredicative" and "non computable"
below (reduced to below) I found the sciences.



JK: The first part is clear, but I'm having trouble getting your meaning
in the second part. Do you mean reducing the totality that is complex in
the sense of impredicative and non-computable, to "a segment we observe"
that is predicative and constitutes the sciences? If I read right, then
I think it is essentially what Blackburn was saying is the physical
tradition because of the identification of reduction with observability
and predicativity. However I think that a modern definition would need
to be looser, and would agree more with his general case of "explaining
one thing in terms of something else." In other words, reducing the
totality to any concept whatsoever, even an impredicative one, would be
a form of modern reduction. In that case reduction to something
observable or predicative, like the chemistry-physics reduction, is just
one choice. That's why I tried to distinguish between reduction"ism" as
the historical tradition documented in philosophy books of reducing to
chemistry & physics, in contrast to a more modern version that would
apply to any theory or thinking at all, obviously including Rosen's ideas.




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© 2004 John J. Kineman
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