Re: models - branch fromf GM discussion

[John Kineman <***>]

John M.

Yes, I agree that dictionary definitions can be out of date, but I
thought it a good baseline for discussion. Thanks for "reading." Now my
turn to read your definition.

> JM: And in principle I arrived at my definition for "reductionism" as reducing
> the totality to a segment we observe (within set - selected boundaries) and
> disregard further connectivities in this endeavour.
> RR had an expression if you don't di that: a natural system.
> So I drew the line at the "impredicative" and "non computable"
> below (reduced to below) I found the sciences.

JK: The first part is clear, but I'm having trouble getting your meaning
in the second part. Do you mean reducing the totality that is complex in
the sense of impredicative and non-computable, to "a segment we observe"
that is predicative and constitutes the sciences? If I read right, then
I think it is essentially what Blackburn was saying is the physical
tradition because of the identification of reduction with observability
and predicativity. However I think that a modern definition would need
to be looser, and would agree more with his general case of "explaining
one thing in terms of something else." In other words, reducing the
totality to any concept whatsoever, even an impredicative one, would be
a form of modern reduction. In that case reduction to something
observable or predicative, like the chemistry-physics reduction, is just
one choice. That's why I tried to distinguish between reduction"ism" as
the historical tradition documented in philosophy books of reducing to
chemistry & physics, in contrast to a more modern version that would
apply to any theory or thinking at all, obviously including Rosen's ideas.