Re: models - branch fromf GM discussion

[John M <***>]

Hi, JohnK,

I read you. You came back to Blackburn, one of those "philosophical"
definitions (I mentioned that I don't care about)
which I found obsolete in view of the new wholistic thinking which includes
RR I suppose?). Also I touched the 'new physucs' which is way beyond the
observation-based measurement explanations of that 'classical' science. I
would not have called it physics at all, although I appreciate your hint why
RR did so.
I think you read more into RR's "biological base" than I would:
his thinking looks to me as considering the existence (I wonder if he
included the Multiverse-like unlimited universes) in that one tiny little
obscure universe we live in, in that one tiny little milky galaxy - in that
one a tiny little mediocre - outskirt star-system, in
that one smaller planet, in that odd circumstances leading to a "bio" of
carbon-water based processes and THEN take Darwin's route to place this
corner of a segment of a segment of a segment as BASIS for his thinking...
Of course he was a biologist (and so are you?) and he spoke in first range
to biologists.
Reduction of bio to chem is the lowest in wholistic terms. So is chem to
phys, and I agonized, how to escape from such follies.
Not by picking ONE and fighting it, but the principle.
And in principle I arrived at my definition for "reductionism" as reducing
the totality to a segment we observe (within set - selected boundaries) and
disregard further connectivities in this endeavour.
RR had an expression if you don't di that: a natural system.
So I drew the line at the "impredicative" and "non computable"
below (reduced to below) I found the sciences.

Did I answer the main point?

John M



----- Original Message -----
From: "John Kineman" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 7:50 PM
Subject: Re: models - branch fromf GM discussion


> Hi John M.,
>
> You are pointing out that we can mean different things by
> reduction(ism). Certainly that is true.
>
> Rosen, I believe, discussed it in terms of explaining a system in terms
> of its components, i.e., reducing everything the system does to its
> parts and not attributing any causes to its organization.  Since that
> view - that the organization comes from the parts - is essentially the
> mechanical view of nature, Newtonian, etc., that's what I meant by
> "physical reduction:" referring to the common way the term has been
> used/connoted.  An example (from Blackburn Dictionary of Philosophy) is
> "reducing biology to chemistry, supposing that no distinctive biological
> facts exist, or chemistry to physics, supposing that no distinctive
> chemical facts exist." Clearly RR believed that certain distinctive
> facts exist in biology that are not represented in physics.
>
> However, the broader and more technical definition is simply explanation
> of one thing in terms of something else. Again from Blackburn:
> "reductionism (reductivism) A redutionist holds that the facts or
> entities apparently needed to make true the statements of some area of
> discourse are dispensable in favor of some other facts or entities."
> Hence there is a sense where the use of any kind of model is a
> reduction, for working purposes.
>
> Those were the two usages I was referring to -- our own personal
> definitions may be equally interesting, but the "confusion" I was
> referring to is that most people, most scientists anyway, will relate to
> reduction in the physical sense, i.e., as "reductionism," as defined by
> Blackburn, reducing biology to chemistry and physics, and it is that
> sense that RR seemed most opposed to. In the broader sense, however,
> where any model is a kind of reduction, even Rosen theory cannot escape
> it - it is still a way of thinking about nature, i.e., a surrogate for
> nature, but it is not reduction to physics.
>
> For more fun and grins, one can point out another confusion - that
> saying RR theory is not a reduction to physics is incompatible with the
> statement that RR theory implies "new physics" because in the latter
> case we are again saying that what is new would be captured by the
> supposedly improved physics. My personal belief  is that even new
> physics can't do it without ceasing to be physics, and I think at the
> core that was Rosen's belief too, but talking about new physics is a way
> of getting the physicists to be a little more humble about the scope of
> their discipline and to really be saying that some "new science" is
> needed.. The new science in the Rosennean sense is Rosennean biology. If
> one wants to play tit-for-tat, calling it "new physics" is reducing that
> new part of physics to biology, where the "new physics" presumably comes
> from. But unraveling that circularity is unimportant; all I'm saying is
> that we need to distinguish between traditional reductionism and
> modeling in general, which is a more general form of reduction.
>
> JJK
>
> John M wrote:
>
> > Hello, John,
> > do we have a concensus on reductionism? On another list and some years
> > back someone overpoured me with ½ dozen theoretical definitions from
> > diverse philosophers, in which I was not interested. To your remarks:
> > First: I never mentioned "physical reductionism".
> > I don't know about any connection of "ism"s to physical measures or
> > measurablity. Spiritualism comes to mind.
> > Reduction, however, brings to my spiritualism (just for the pun of it)
> > a reduction <G> meaning: to reduce a total view into some part of it,
> > substituting the part for the original (total?). The reduction occurs
> > by selecting aspects to consider, called: boundaries, WITHIN which we
> > observe and visualize. Topical is a broad selection.
> > A second step is "model" formation, we pick (consciously or by
> > occurrence) a limited cut from a topic, call it a name and consider it
> > as a "total" for our observation. All of our sciences are topically
> > identified, - all are reductionistic. That's my stance. \
> > (Except for (pure) math, which is a 'world of its own', with its
> > language and logic. As long as it is not "applied" to sciences, when
> > it runs into (contributes to) difficulties by reductionism.  - the
> > equational formalism of models.)
> >
> > >"I would prefer to state it that way - "best available concept >of
> > nature." - "<
> > Available to us - at what level? The Flat Earth? It changed.
> >
> > >We can take it as given that the way we understand nature >is through
> > models.<
> > Aren't we working on improving our understanding? Can you 'understand'
> > the wholistic interconnectedness, an unlimited impredicativity of a
> > natural system by clean-cut models? Isn't Rosenism a step forward from
> > the "model-view"?
> > Yes, models are useful, practical and usable. Conclusions have been
> > drawn in successful development for technology and the underlying
> > (reductionist?) science (formalism),  in a very complex (complicated)
> > fashion.
> > Models and IMO reductionism:  predicative, T-computable.
> > Wholism (RR-complexity): impredicative,T-non-computable.
> >
> > Your take--------
> >
> > John M
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "John Kineman" <*** <mailto:***>>
> > To: <*** <mailto:***>>
> > Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 4:23 PM
> > Subject: Re: models - branch fromf GM discussion
> >
> > > John M.
> > > Your rewording is OK too. However, I think it is will be confusing to
> > > add the qualifier "in the reductionist sciences" because modeling in
> > > terms of relationships and their organization is also
> > > "non-reductionistic" in the strict sense of physical "reductionism",
> > > which is what most people think of when using the term. "Reductionism"
> > > that is, the "ism" does historically refer to reduction to physically
> > > measurable quantities. The Rosennean model, if used as a picture of
some
> > > aspect of nature, does introduce non-reductionistic elements in this
> > > sense, and hence a kind of  biological uncertainty which is not
> > > reducible. Yet in a broader sense, it is itself a reduction to
> > > relational concepts. So, as I've stressed before (and will again I'm
> > > sure), it is much more a matter of what we are reducing to, than
> > > reduction itself, which arguably all thinking requires.
> > >
> > > Also, a much more minor quibble with the rewording, and my original
> > > wording, is that the goal of science isn't so much to understand
models
> > > or completeness, as I think about it, as to understand nature, so I
> > > suppose I would prefer to state it that way - "best available concept
of
> > > nature." We can take it as given that the way we understand nature is
> > > through models.
> > > John K
> > >
> > >
> > > John M wrote:
> > >
> > > >Hello, John K. and Judith,
> > > >Thanks for John's concurring ideas in the post - except for one
little
> > > >correction I want to point out: Instead of the concluding
> > > >
> > > >>"For the present, however, adding the relational model is
> > > >>such a major step toward a more complete view of nature that >for
> > present
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >working purposes, this addition gives us our best >available concept
of
> > > >completeness."<
> > > >
> > > >Why not turn it around, like (a very scanty re-wording):
> > > >
> > > >"For the present, however, speaking of the relational model is
> > > >such a major step toward a more complete view of nature in the
> > reductionist
> > > >sciences that for present working purposes, this addition gives us
> > our best
> > > >and most complete available concept of a "model"."
> > > >
> > SNIP> >
> > > >I am all for the successfulness of reductionist science-technology,
the
> > > >'mechanistic' models we formed brought us down from the tree and
> > out from
> > > >the cave. I exercised it for ½ century myself. THINKING is
> > different, with
> > > >(in) new vistas, for better (new) understanding.  MR is a good
> > bridge in
> > > >between (I wish I knew what it is).
> > > >I formulated lately the relational aspects as network-extensions
> > > >http://pages.prodigy.net/jamikes/Influence.htm - changing only the
> > format
> > > >(wording) of views.
> > > >It all depends how much we restrict the boundaries in modeling.
> > > >(How much "realtion" fits in).
> > > >
> > > >I think we can talk about "Rosennean models" knowing and keeping in
> > mind,
> > > >how far we have to go to be away from the mechanistically cut
> > limited models
> > > >(this is what my "but close" referred to in my post to Jack -
> > thanks, Jack,
> > > >for you consenting reply to it).
> > > >
> > > >Cheers
> > > >
> > > >John M
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > >From: "John Kineman" <*** <mailto:***>>
> > > >To: <*** <mailto:***>>
> > > >Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 10:42 AM
> > > >Subject: Re: Fw: GM Food & Feed Not Fit for "Man or Beast"
> > > >>Hi John M.
> > > >>You raise a topic that I have and will come back to many times.
> > The idea
> > > >>of a "Rosennean model" -- is there such a thing?
> > > >>
> > > >>Here's how I look at it.
> > > >>
> > > >>RR's statement that there isn't a largest model means there can by
no
> > > >>complete model that can capture all aspects of a complex system.
> > It does
> > > >>not say there can be no useful models.  Mechanistic models are one
> > > >>example of both statements. I accept this argument fully, based on
the
> > > >>explanation he provided in convincing detail and with considerable
> > > >>emphasis and repetition.
> > > >>
> > > >>I also belive there is a kind of model that is not mechanistic in
its
> > > >>foundation, which describes certain aspects of systems that are
> > > >>different than what mechanistic models can describe. These look a
lot
> > > >>like Rosen modeling relationships themselves, and they describe the
> > > >>natural relationship between functional specifications (models) and
> > > >>their realization in material systems. Such models can indeed tell
us
> > > >>something important about nature, particularly biology, because they
> > > >>represent an aspect of nature that is excluded by mechanistic
models.
> > > >>Their incompleteness, in part, is in excluding the mechanistic
> > model. We
> > > >>gain understanding of certain relational aspects, but need to go to
> > > >>mechanistic models for representing non-relational aspects. Hence
> > in my
> > > >>work, for examepe, it is necessary to consider both kinds of models,
> > > >>recognizing that neither is a complete descriptions, and the most
> > likely
> > > >>even the two kinds of models taken together will not provide a
> > complete
> > > >>description. For the present, however, adding the relational model
is
> > > >>such a major step toward a more complete view of nature that for
> > present
> > > >>working purposes, this addition gives us our best available concept
of
> > > >>completeness.
> > > >>
> > > >>John K.
> > > >>>
> > > >>>----- Original Message -----
> > > >>>From: "Jack Park" <*** <mailto:***>>
> > > >>>To: <*** <mailto:***>>
> > > >>>Sent: Saturday, May 08, 2004 10:51 AM
> > > >>>Subject: Re: Fw: GM Food & Feed Not Fit for "Man or Beast"
> > > >>>
> > > >>>>My response would be a simple question:
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>What steps must I take to craft a Rosennean model using their
> > data and
> > > >>>>anything else I might need, such that I gain the ability to
> > study their
> > > >>>>results with a different model than the one(s) they presumably
> > applied
> > > >>>>to get those results?
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>Jack
> > > SNIP the rest
>
>
> --
> © 2004 John J. Kineman
> all rights reserved
>