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Re: models - branch fromf GM discussion

Hi John M.,

You are pointing out that we can mean different things by
reduction(ism). Certainly that is true.

Rosen, I believe, discussed it in terms of explaining a system in terms
of its components, i.e., reducing everything the system does to its
parts and not attributing any causes to its organization.  Since that
view - that the organization comes from the parts - is essentially the
mechanical view of nature, Newtonian, etc., that's what I meant by
"physical reduction:" referring to the common way the term has been
used/connoted.  An example (from Blackburn Dictionary of Philosophy) is
"reducing biology to chemistry, supposing that no distinctive biological
facts exist, or chemistry to physics, supposing that no distinctive
chemical facts exist." Clearly RR believed that certain distinctive
facts exist in biology that are not represented in physics.

However, the broader and more technical definition is simply explanation
of one thing in terms of something else. Again from Blackburn:
"reductionism (reductivism) A redutionist holds that the facts or
entities apparently needed to make true the statements of some area of
discourse are dispensable in favor of some other facts or entities."
Hence there is a sense where the use of any kind of model is a
reduction, for working purposes.

Those were the two usages I was referring to -- our own personal
definitions may be equally interesting, but the "confusion" I was
referring to is that most people, most scientists anyway, will relate to
reduction in the physical sense, i.e., as "reductionism," as defined by
Blackburn, reducing biology to chemistry and physics, and it is that
sense that RR seemed most opposed to. In the broader sense, however,
where any model is a kind of reduction, even Rosen theory cannot escape
it - it is still a way of thinking about nature, i.e., a surrogate for
nature, but it is not reduction to physics.

For more fun and grins, one can point out another confusion - that
saying RR theory is not a reduction to physics is incompatible with the
statement that RR theory implies "new physics" because in the latter
case we are again saying that what is new would be captured by the
supposedly improved physics. My personal belief  is that even new
physics can't do it without ceasing to be physics, and I think at the
core that was Rosen's belief too, but talking about new physics is a way
of getting the physicists to be a little more humble about the scope of
their discipline and to really be saying that some "new science" is
needed.. The new science in the Rosennean sense is Rosennean biology. If
one wants to play tit-for-tat, calling it "new physics" is reducing that
new part of physics to biology, where the "new physics" presumably comes
from. But unraveling that circularity is unimportant; all I'm saying is
that we need to distinguish between traditional reductionism and
modeling in general, which is a more general form of reduction.

JJK

John M wrote:

Hello, John,
do we have a concensus on reductionism? On another list and some years
back someone overpoured me with ½ dozen theoretical definitions from
diverse philosophers, in which I was not interested. To your remarks:
First: I never mentioned "physical reductionism".
I don't know about any connection of "ism"s to physical measures or
measurablity. Spiritualism comes to mind.
Reduction, however, brings to my spiritualism (just for the pun of it)
a reduction <G> meaning: to reduce a total view into some part of it,
substituting the part for the original (total?). The reduction occurs
by selecting aspects to consider, called: boundaries, WITHIN which we
observe and visualize. Topical is a broad selection.
A second step is "model" formation, we pick (consciously or by
occurrence) a limited cut from a topic, call it a name and consider it
as a "total" for our observation. All of our sciences are topically
identified, - all are reductionistic. That's my stance. \
(Except for (pure) math, which is a 'world of its own', with its
language and logic. As long as it is not "applied" to sciences, when
it runs into (contributes to) difficulties by reductionism.  - the
equational formalism of models.)

>"I would prefer to state it that way - "best available concept >of
nature." - "<
Available to us - at what level? The Flat Earth? It changed.

>We can take it as given that the way we understand nature >is through
models.<
Aren't we working on improving our understanding? Can you 'understand'
the wholistic interconnectedness, an unlimited impredicativity of a
natural system by clean-cut models? Isn't Rosenism a step forward from
the "model-view"?
Yes, models are useful, practical and usable. Conclusions have been
drawn in successful development for technology and the underlying
(reductionist?) science (formalism),  in a very complex (complicated)
fashion.
Models and IMO reductionism:  predicative, T-computable.
Wholism (RR-complexity): impredicative,T-non-computable.

Your take--------

John M

----- Original Message -----
From: "John Kineman" <*** <mailto:***>>
To: <*** <mailto:***>>
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 4:23 PM
Subject: Re: models - branch fromf GM discussion

> John M.
> Your rewording is OK too. However, I think it is will be confusing to
> add the qualifier "in the reductionist sciences" because modeling in
> terms of relationships and their organization is also
> "non-reductionistic" in the strict sense of physical "reductionism",
> which is what most people think of when using the term. "Reductionism"
> that is, the "ism" does historically refer to reduction to physically
> measurable quantities. The Rosennean model, if used as a picture of some
> aspect of nature, does introduce non-reductionistic elements in this
> sense, and hence a kind of  biological uncertainty which is not
> reducible. Yet in a broader sense, it is itself a reduction to
> relational concepts. So, as I've stressed before (and will again I'm
> sure), it is much more a matter of what we are reducing to, than
> reduction itself, which arguably all thinking requires.
>
> Also, a much more minor quibble with the rewording, and my original
> wording, is that the goal of science isn't so much to understand models
> or completeness, as I think about it, as to understand nature, so I
> suppose I would prefer to state it that way - "best available concept of
> nature." We can take it as given that the way we understand nature is
> through models.
> John K
>
>
> John M wrote:
>
> >Hello, John K. and Judith,
> >Thanks for John's concurring ideas in the post - except for one little
> >correction I want to point out: Instead of the concluding
> >
> >>"For the present, however, adding the relational model is
> >>such a major step toward a more complete view of nature that >for
present
> >>
> >>
> >working purposes, this addition gives us our best >available concept of
> >completeness."<
> >
> >Why not turn it around, like (a very scanty re-wording):
> >
> >"For the present, however, speaking of the relational model is
> >such a major step toward a more complete view of nature in the
reductionist
> >sciences that for present working purposes, this addition gives us
our best
> >and most complete available concept of a "model"."
> >
SNIP> >
> >I am all for the successfulness of reductionist science-technology, the
> >'mechanistic' models we formed brought us down from the tree and
out from
> >the cave. I exercised it for ½ century myself. THINKING is
different, with
> >(in) new vistas, for better (new) understanding.  MR is a good
bridge in
> >between (I wish I knew what it is).
> >I formulated lately the relational aspects as network-extensions
> >http://pages.prodigy.net/jamikes/Influence.htm - changing only the
format
> >(wording) of views.
> >It all depends how much we restrict the boundaries in modeling.
> >(How much "realtion" fits in).
> >
> >I think we can talk about "Rosennean models" knowing and keeping in
mind,
> >how far we have to go to be away from the mechanistically cut
limited models
> >(this is what my "but close" referred to in my post to Jack -
thanks, Jack,
> >for you consenting reply to it).
> >
> >Cheers
> >
> >John M
> >
> >
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "John Kineman" <*** <mailto:***>>
> >To: <*** <mailto:***>>
> >Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 10:42 AM
> >Subject: Re: Fw: GM Food & Feed Not Fit for "Man or Beast"
> >>Hi John M.
> >>You raise a topic that I have and will come back to many times.
The idea
> >>of a "Rosennean model" -- is there such a thing?
> >>
> >>Here's how I look at it.
> >>
> >>RR's statement that there isn't a largest model means there can by no
> >>complete model that can capture all aspects of a complex system.
It does
> >>not say there can be no useful models.  Mechanistic models are one
> >>example of both statements. I accept this argument fully, based on the
> >>explanation he provided in convincing detail and with considerable
> >>emphasis and repetition.
> >>
> >>I also belive there is a kind of model that is not mechanistic in its
> >>foundation, which describes certain aspects of systems that are
> >>different than what mechanistic models can describe. These look a lot
> >>like Rosen modeling relationships themselves, and they describe the
> >>natural relationship between functional specifications (models) and
> >>their realization in material systems. Such models can indeed tell us
> >>something important about nature, particularly biology, because they
> >>represent an aspect of nature that is excluded by mechanistic models.
> >>Their incompleteness, in part, is in excluding the mechanistic
model. We
> >>gain understanding of certain relational aspects, but need to go to
> >>mechanistic models for representing non-relational aspects. Hence
in my
> >>work, for examepe, it is necessary to consider both kinds of models,
> >>recognizing that neither is a complete descriptions, and the most
likely
> >>even the two kinds of models taken together will not provide a
complete
> >>description. For the present, however, adding the relational model is
> >>such a major step toward a more complete view of nature that for
present
> >>working purposes, this addition gives us our best available concept of
> >>completeness.
> >>
> >>John K.
> >>>
> >>>----- Original Message -----
> >>>From: "Jack Park" <*** <mailto:***>>
> >>>To: <*** <mailto:***>>
> >>>Sent: Saturday, May 08, 2004 10:51 AM
> >>>Subject: Re: Fw: GM Food & Feed Not Fit for "Man or Beast"
> >>>
> >>>>My response would be a simple question:
> >>>>
> >>>>What steps must I take to craft a Rosennean model using their
data and
> >>>>anything else I might need, such that I gain the ability to
study their
> >>>>results with a different model than the one(s) they presumably
applied
> >>>>to get those results?
> >>>>
> >>>>Jack
> SNIP the rest



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