Dan, excellent idea, the non-human modeler. I have an example: a photograph. It is a reduced model (e.g. no smell included) of the visual boundaries-enclosed modeling. Momentarily I am at a loss to mention another one - product of not some *conscious activity* (like the camera, or say a bee-raindance provided information of flowers - to say extremes). I was looking for a model 'made' by a stone or a glalxy... Sorry. Do you think conscious activity can only lead to models? Cheers John M ----- Original Message ----- From: "Daniel A. Fiscus" <***> To: <***> Sent: Monday, April 19, 2004 4:31 PM Subject: Re: causing trouble, active/passive
I agree with John K. in the general feeling/thought that models, modeling, modeling relation are active and maybe even more active than physical/material factors in the sense of creative. We could say that for physical/material dynamics we have the 1st and 2nd laws that cover conservation of energy/mass and decay of energy quality, but we have no law yet for creation or growth of energy quality. I think this is where the relational/topological principles may be the most causally active and the most important. It links to them being ontic as well.
Also I don't see models as separable from a modeler ever, but I also don't think a modeler has to be human or even alive necessarily.
Some hunches,
Dan
On Mon, 19 Apr 2004, John Kineman wrote:
> Tim et al. > > There are numerous examples of how models are not passive, but have > causal effects on natural systems. It is RR's major point and if it were > not intended this way he would not have written so extensively and > strongly about "internal predictive models" IN organisms. If they don't > do anything there, why bother with them? Without causal effect from > models, there is nothing at all to the theory other than a different > color we can apply to the painting of nature. > > JJK > > Tim Gwinn wrote: > > >I agree with you, Judith. Models are passive - and they are not even > >'models' of anything until someone or something outside the model brings > >them into an encoding/decoding relationship with an object system of which > >they are intended to be a model. The encoding/decoding in an MR is not > >entailed by, or within, the MR itself [Essay p. 159]. > > > >Regards, > >Tim > > > > > > > >>-----Original Message----- > >>From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Judith > >>Rosen > >>Sent: Monday, April 19, 2004 9:00 AM > >>To: *** > >>Subject: Re: causing trouble > >> > >> > >> J.K. wrote: The argument for two models modeling each other > >>would be the key. That inherently defines an ontology of some kind, i.e., > >>it self-defines something. > >> > >>Most of Quantum Physics doesn't interest me because it doesn't > >>offer much of > >>value to answer the questions in Biology that my father was interested in. > >>Since he was able to derive more physics from biology than the other way > >>around, I tend to be uninclined to delve deeper into Quantum stuff. > >>Consequently, I won't be able to add much muscle to this ongoing > >>discussion. > >>However, questions of the kind like the one above DO provoke my > >>imagination > >>because modeling is key in Rosennean Complexity, both the theory and in > >>applications. And since the subject line is still "Causing Trouble", I > >>thought perhaps a little of my own mischief would be apropo. > >> > >>Two models modeling each other... Why would this define an > >>ontology? Here's > >>how I'm looking at this: If all they are doing is modeling each > >>other, there > >>is no creation or self-perpetuation or anything. Furthermore, models, by > >>their nature, are passive tools. Even the "anticipatory model" within the > >>organization of living systems may only be "active" insofar as it > >>is part of > >>the dynamic organization of the system itself. It serves a > >>function for the > >>system, therefore it is integral to the activity and organization of the > >>system. But in Quantum issues, there is no concept of function in the > >>biological sense, so I tend to discount any active participation > >>of a model > >>in generating what it models. > >> > >>Secondly, I can easily imagine any number of machines we could > >>make where a > >>pair of models model each other. I could draw drawings of it. I > >>could build > >>them. If they are modeling each other well, then they will be > >>identical. If > >>they are not modeling each other well, there will be an infinite > >>regress as > >>the models spiral downward in constant attempts to fix the accuracy. > >> > >>Self-definition is a whole other realm from this, where the questions of > >>ontology and epistemology are seperate issues. At least, that's the way it > >>looks from my perspective. > >> > >>Judith > >> > >> > > -- > © 2004 John J. Kineman > all rights reserved >