Re: causing trouble

[John M <***>]

Howard, (this is the 'other' John talking):
A remark about "simple":
In my view (I believe close to RR, even if formally it does not look like
it):
"simple" is a model cut into boundaries well knowable for the beholder.
Every 'simple' model belongs into networks of interrelated complexity.

Question about Q-measurement (I really know very little about Q-science):
Isn't it changing the system only because what we call 'measuring" is indeed
the destruction (extraction?) of a substantial component in the model-system
we visualize? In which case the word is used wrongly.
Our knowledge of the QM-(glossary contents) is poor, so when we talk about
QM-items we apply "simple" models for indeed 'natural systems'.
I know it is hard to accept that QM (as indeed a linear domain) is a product
of reductionistic cut-off modeling.
(I think I used the concepts congruent to the RR vocabulary).

Regards

John M
----- Original Message -----
From: "Howard Pattee" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2004 8:55 AM
Subject: Re: causing trouble


> John explains:
> The operative question becomes why is one a
> simple relationship and the other a complex one? A possible clue, in
> this view, might be that in the physical example the numbers you
> abstract about the system don't feedback any causal relationships. If
> they did, then the system would be complex.
>
> HP: Thanks. Your explanation clarified your meaning of ontology.
>
> I'm thinking in quantum mechanics a measurement of the most elementary
system does change the state of the system. That would mean the simplest
system can be seen as complex, but we ignore this in macroscopic physics
thereby making complex systems seem simple.
>
> Howard
>
> >
> > From: John Kineman <***>
> > Date: 2004/04/16 Fri PM 09:57:29 EDT
> > To: ***
> > Subject: Re: causing trouble
> >
> > Howard,
> >
> > The ontology in your example would recognize you, the scientist,
> > abstracting numbers. That whole relationship defines the ontology. A
> > similar ontology (in kind, not content) can be said to exist for any
> > natural system. An organism thus is seen most basically as a
> > relationship between functions and the material realization of those
> > functions. Likewise your planets are material realizations of your
> > abstraction of them, but the relationship is less interesting because it
> > commutes. So, there is a big difference in these two systems, the first
> > exhibits surprising complex behaviors, the second commutes fairly well.
> > The point is to find a common ontology that can deal well with the
> > complex example, since it cannot be adequately handled by a simpler
> > ontology that one might presume looking only at physical examples (i.e.,
> > the traditional view). The operative question becomes why is one a
> > simple relationship and the other a complex one? A possible clue, in
> > this view, might be that in the physical example the numbers you
> > abstract about the system don't feedback any causal relationships. If
> > they did, then the system would be complex. In other words if you always
> > ensured that the number of planets fit some model of yours, and
> > destroyed or created planets to make that true, and if the model changed
> > depending on the number of planets, then the planet-scientist system
> > would be behaving in a complex and unpredictable manner, like organisms
do.
> >
> > JJK
> >
> >
> > Howard Pattee wrote:
> >
> > >John,
> > >
> > >Could you explain again what you mean by ?the modeling relationship
taken ontologically??
> > >Can all cases of a modeling relation be taken ontologically? An example
would help. Take a very simple case of measurement, say counting. On the
natural (left) side I have the planets. On the right side I have the
integers. By some protocol I find a one-to-one matching and I end up with a
symbol (an integer) that corresponds to these objects in nature.
> > >
> > >I can then say that I know (epistemologically) the number of planets in
the solar system.
> > >
> > >How do you want me to view this ontologically?
> > >
> > >Howard
> > >
> > >
> >
> > --
> > © 2004 John J. Kineman
> > all rights reserved
> >