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Re: Question, version 2



Dan, John,

Look at the quotes again. Think about the difference between building models
of some material system versus the notion that "the ‘logical form’ of an
organism can be separated from its material basis of construction". In
particular, what does the phrase "can be separated from" mean?

Regards,
Tim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of John
> Kineman
> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 2:02 PM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Question, version 2
>
>
> My man!!! Yes, that's what I've been trying to say, and you phrase it
> well. Besides the question of integration, there is the question of what
> predictive difference it would make.
>
> JJK
>
> Dan Fiscus wrote:
>
> > Howard, John K, and all,
> >
> > I was thinking on this some more, and including John K's
> > points about comparing Langton's iterative approach to
> > impredicativity and asking whether the two views are the
> > same as time step t -> 0. I may have missed the deeper
> > issue in my first reply to Howard's question. It could be
> > that the apparent similarity of Rosen and Langton suggests
> > yet another issue we have discussed many times - whether
> > some kind of relational laws or reality are/is more
> > fundamental than (and still qualitatively different than)
> > physical/material reality. It could be that Rosen and
> > Langton agree just on points 1) that such relational
> > laws or reality or dimensions are qualitatively different
> > than the physical/material laws, and 2) that life has an
> > intimate connection with the relational laws/reality. But
> > these two may disagree on whether relational is more
> > fundamental than physical/material, or perhaps if these
> > two are equal and even mutually causal. It would seem to
> > me that Langton and the AI/AL camps might all assume
> > or assert that physical/material reality is more
> > fundamental, general, universal, context independent and
> > that life and life-like relationality "emerge" from and are
> > caused by interactions (iteratively) between
> > physical/material objects and/or their laws. Thus past some
> > threshold of iteration (complicatedness) we get complexity
> > and life as special cases. Rosen and perhaps others might
> > assume/assert the opposite - that relationality is more
> > fundamental, general, universal, context independent and
> > that it is from dynamics in this realm that physical/material
> > properties emerge and are caused - such as properties of
> > time, space and matter the metrics for which can change in
> > relativity theory depending on the velocity of travel of the
> > frame of reference in relation to the maximal speed of light.
> >
> > It may be yet another place where we (as in I, me) could do
> > well to leave off looking for an either/or, win/lose argument
> > between two views each of which seek to claim the more
> > fundamental laws, rules, principles, dynamics and ask if or
> > how these two seemingly fundmental differences might be
> > unified or transcended with the aid of some other
> > perspective. This would seem to be the Eastern religious and
> > philosophical tradition to see unity in apparent opposites
> > and to assume/assert that relational and physical/material
> > laws/realities must arise/emerge/evolve and forever "go"
> > together. They could no more be separated or one
> > considered "more fundamental" than could night and day or
> > other such obligate, complementary phenomena without the
> > specific invocation of a subjective value basis, such as day is
> > more fundamental when talking about incoming solar
> > energy.
> >
> > Hmm...any comments welcome...
> >
> > Dan
> >
> >
> >
> > Howard Pattee wrote:
> >
> >> Here is a question that I suspect will elicit several opinions:
> >>
> >> Rashevsky’s relational biology is the study of life at a level of
> >> abstraction that does not address any particular material physical
> >> realization of life, but looks at its most general logical
> >> organization. Rosen contrasts relational biology with reductionist
> >> biology in the following words:
> >> “In any case, I can epitomize the reductionist approach to
> >> organization in general, and life in particular, as follows: throw
> >> away the organization and keep the underlying matter. “The relational
> >> alternative to this says the exact opposite, namely: when studying an
> >> organized material system, throw away the matter and keep the
> >> underlying organization.” (LI, p. 119)
> >>
> >> Langton’s and other’s view of Artificial Life is that they also want
> >> to get beyond particular material realizations of life. Langton says:
> >>  “Of course, the principle assumption made in Artificial Life is that
> >> the ‘logical form’ of an organism can be separated from its material
> >> basis of construction, and that ‘aliveness’ will be found to be a
> >> property of the former, not of the latter.” (Artificial Life,
> >> Langton, ed., Addison-Wesley, 1989, p.11.)
> >>
> >> Question: What substantial philosophical differences do you see here,
> >> if any. Of course, the actual research programs are quite different.
> >>
> >> Howard
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > Dan Fiscus
> > Ecologist/Research Assistant
> > University of Maryland
> > Center for Environmental Science
> > Appalachian Lab
> > 301 Braddock Rd
> > Frostburg, MD 21532
> > 301-689-7121 (phone)
> > http://al.umces.edu/~fiscus/research
>
>
> --
> © 2004 John J. Kineman
> all rights reserved