Re: Judith's challenge #1

[Howard Pattee <***>]

John,

In my last post to Judith I tried to show by direct quotations from both von Neumann and 
Rosen that they substantially agreed in their epistemology. I claim this is fundamental. 
If people do not agree on what constitutes scientific knowledge they will never reach any 
consensus. This epistemology can be represented by the Hertzian condition often 
represented by Rosen as a graph we call the modeling relation.

John K responded: You are essentially showing that the "modeling relation" as such was an 
accepted concept, epistemologically. The subtle difference, I believe, is that by the end 
of his work, and perhaps all along, RR was implying it was more than that, that it should 
be taken ontologically. That too has precedents in observership, but this generalizes it, 
I think.

HP: I cannot provide any evidence one way or the other about such a subtle, but obviously 
essential, difference. Bob and I discussed the Hertzian view at some length, but that was 
years ago. At that time I believe he did agree with Hertz?s further statement about what 
in knowable (I?ll quote the whole statement):

Hertz: ?We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and the form which 
we give them is such that the logically necessary (denknotwendigen) consequents of the 
images in thought are always the images of the necessary natural (naturnotwendigen) 
consequents of the thing pictured.?

?For our purpose it is not necessary that they [images] should be in conformity with the 
things in any other respect whatever. As a matter of fact, we do not know, nor have we 
any means of knowing, whether our conception of things are in conformity with them in any 
other than this one fundamental respect.?

Rosen?s LI statement: The ?whole purpose of modeling is to bring causal entailment, in 
the external world of natural systems, into congruence with the inferential entailment in 
a formal system or model.? (LI, p. 228)

It seems to me that if there is no ontology implied here, but you suggest that only by 
adding some ontological subtlety does Bob?s modeling make a difference.

John continues:
My question would be if Von Neumann saw this relationship as a natural
ontology. In other words take the case where the natural system "NS" is
a scientist doing modeling and you see the ontological view I'm
referring to (also in my 1999 paper). As I indicated earlier there is
even controversy about whether or not Rosen saw it ontologically like
this, but I am convinced from his many comments, particularly the later
ones, that he did, and also that no other interpretation will indeed
produce a difference from these other prior views that you cite (and
more).

HP: I have to reflect on this. Von Neumann?s views about quantum measurement definitely 
takes into account the scientist in the NS, but I?m not sure whether this would be 
considered  ontological.

Can you give me your concept of ?ontological??

Howard