Re: Judith's challenge #1

[John Kineman <***>]

Howard et. all

First I second Judith's proposal that the personal issue should be taken
off line.

Other than that, the historical information is interesting, and I have
just a few comments, below:

Howard Pattee wrote:

> ...This categorical separation is often called the epistemic cut. The necessary but not sufficient condition for a good model is that the two sides commute or run in parallel. Some philosophers have called this the psycho-physical parallelism. As Hertz says it, the syntactic (symbolic, inferential) consequent of the image of nature must be the same as the image of the consequent of laws of nature.
You are essentially showing that the "modeling relation" as such was an
accepted concept, epistemologically. The subtle difference, I believe,
is that by the end of his work, and perhaps all along, RR was implying
it was more than that, that it should be taken ontologically. That too
has precedents in observership, but this generalizes it, I think.

> ( I think Bob uses cause because of Aristotle’s causes.)
I wouldn't think so, as final cause for example is more a matter of the
modeling relation itself - how one system serving as a model imputes or
induces changes in another system. Although it is true that the
definitions shift inside the box vs outside and that "cause" would
include all four if one were to ask what is fundamental to the contents
of the natural system box (another nested modeling relation, and so on).
I think the terms "cause," "implication," and (I looked it up from the
previous conversation with Tim) "contingency" (the encodings and
decodings) all occur within a natural system and are needed to account
for all four A-causes; but they appear analytically in the modeling
relation diagram and so get separate labels there to distinguish them.

> I see no substantive difference in von Neumann and Rosen as indicated by the following quotations:

My question would be if Von Neumann saw this relationship as a natural
ontology. In other words take the case where the natural system "NS" is
a scientist doing modeling and you see the ontological view I'm
referring to (also in my 1999 paper). As I indicated earlier there is
even controversy about whether or not Rosen saw it ontologically like
this, but I am convinced from his many comments, particularly the later
ones, that he did, and also that no other interpretation will indeed
produce a difference from these other prior views that you cite (and
more). That interpretation also explains the penultimate language that
started to emerge - that happens (as a psychological phenomena) when one
starts to see that one's model of something specific (biology) applies
universally, and that it reverses common assumptions about reality. One
interested in preserving a respectable career might also adopt a certain
reluctance to make that result the focus of the work, but yet would feel
a personal obligation to truth to keep mentioning it by inuendo,
implication, etc. I think that is what happened. I, having no concern
whatsoever for my own existence (well, less than most, perhaps), do not
feel restricted from focusing on the ontology.

JJK