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Re: Howard's challenge

Howard,

Here's how I see it:.

Is it a new world view? My own interpretation of Rosennean complexity is
such, but not all those studying Rosen agree. On Don's list there was
objection to it and we agreed to call it "The Kineman Interpretation,"
which I objected to because I really think it is directly implied by
Rosen's work, and in various phrases he essentially called it such. I
think there is generally misunderstanding of its most fundamental
implications, which are radical. However, the more we discuss it, the
more this aspect seems to be emerging among the Rosen scholars. Those of
a traditional orientation find strong objection. This, as you corrected
me regarding QM, is typical of new views.

The WV assumption is that functions are real and causal and in a
complementarity relationship with observable states - generally and
universally. In other words, the modeling relation is more than an
indicator of complexity, it is a model of its ontology and thus
complexity is fundamental to all systems. That natural condition
bifurcates into simple systems on the one hand (the physical world) and
others that retain complexity in relationship with simple systems,
giving rise to what we call life forms. This is a broader application of
an uncertainty principle than proposed in physics and it applies not
only to physics but to ecosystems, social systems, and the basis of
consciousness. If one applies this idea to evolution, for example, one
gets evolutionary pathways that are in part influenced or even wholely
determined by functional definitions (which could be called choices),
and if applied cosmologically one gets a dual aspect of time, where
natural systems have an infinite intrinsic time that is the natural log
of finite observable time (also deduced by the mathematician Robert
Vallee). This means that the Big Bang is a projection of history, not
history itself which is experientially infinite. It predicts a precise
curve for the Hubble relation that is consistent with subsequent
observation of early accelleration, and also predicts that we should
find an age paradox in current cosmological theory (which is only now
being suggested based on new HST observations). Which is the "real" time
may be a meaningless question as both are real in its domain and the Big
Bang physics worked out in the traditional view is unaltered in that
view. Hence it is consistent. The evolutionary result is very much in
line with suggestions of James Mark Baldwin; the cosmology is along the
lines (up to his handling of gravity) of the Kinematic Relativity of
E.A. Milne. Neither of these former ideas were ever dismissed or
discredited, as far as I could determine - both were treated with
curiosity then abandoned. The basic assumption in this view allows for
all four of Aristotle's causes. It is new not because it includes the
four causes, but because it shows how to work with the modeling
relationship in explicit mappings of causes; thus it meets an important
epistemological criteria for viable scientific world views that its
predecessors did not, that it be formalizable. The basic criteria it
meets are: universality, consistency, parsimony, formalization,
usefulness, and necessity. Necessity is most evident to me in evoluton,
ecology and sociology, where mechanical theories have dominated science
to the exculsion of considering functional causes, and have dramatically
failed to provide effective management, leading to a current ecological
crisis. For these and other epistemological reasons I consider it a new
world view, although it is not without precedents, so we always have to
be careful with the word "new." In this context "new" means different
than the present traditioinal assumption about reality, that it is
constructed on physical states.

Its assumption about reality makes nature fundamentally non-specifiable
and consequantly self-generative. In this paradigm, physical states are
themselves constructed on "acts of abstraction."

It is the opposite of Platonic. Current assumptions are Platonic in that
they propose that all physical laws are prior to realized systems and
independent of them, thus existing in a Platonic realm that is not
itself dependent on realized conditions. The view I identify has the
ability to place the generation of laws within natural systems. Natural
systems consequently contain their own ontologies, in the present not
just historically. So, real-time complexity, consciousness, thought,
etc. introduce novelty of their own accord and living systems continue
to "invent" new realities and laws.

JJK

Howard Pattee wrote:

John,

That is a very clear statement of an important distinction.
I have some comments and questions.

John: These [worldviews] are often not commensurate with each other, quite simply because they begin with different assumptions about reality and the founding assumptions of a world view are not themselves directly testible.

HP: To some degree I think that was the case with both quantum theory and both relativity 
theories. But the new assumptions were about the observable world (discreteness of energy 
levels, speed of light, inertial mass).
By contrast, Rosen’s worldview is apparently based only on the limits of formal models 
(including formal Newtonian dynamics). This appears to many to be an old world view, i.e., 
Platonism, with new limits places on the forms by Goedel.

In my own words these are the views I share with Rosen: (1) State-determined dynamical laws (most of physics) are inadequate to describe the distinguishing character of life. (2) Reality (whatever it is) requires many models for adequate understanding. (3) Complex systems exhibit behavior that cannot be modeled by purely formal syntax-based symbol manipulation.

John: So, the point is that Rosennean assumptions, I believe, constitute a new world view.

HP: My problem is that the views above that I share with Rosen are not, in my mind, enough to constitute a new worldview. What am I missing?

John: I also commented that it was important for us to develop the Rosennean
view, in relative safety, in order to understand its implications for
theory.

HP: That might or might not be ideal. I see a problem of inbreeding and lack of really objective critical analysis.

John: It would not have been possible to develop quantum theory if
there were a very strong classical theory mafia breathing down their
necks every moment.

HP: My information about the history of physics says there was always the establishment breathing down necks or worse. What is most important is a persuasive example or question that the established worldview can’t touch.

Howard



From: John Kineman <***>
Date: 2004/03/29 Mon AM 10:36:17 EST
To: ***
Subject: Re: Howard's challenge

I responded to that question, I believe, but I'll try to summarize:

Within a world view there can be multiple complementary theories.
There can also be multiple world views, which involve assumptions about
reality on which theory is constructed. These are often not commensurate
with each other, quite simply because they begin with different
assumptions about reality and the founding assumptions of a world view
are not themselves directly testible. Their test is through the
application and use of the view in formulating theories and the
subsequent value of those theories as a set. In other words, how much
new territory does the view allow us to explore, if any?

So, the point is that Rosennean assumptions, I believe, constitute a new
world view. In that sense it is not correct to say that it should
"complement" other views directly. In other words, there may not be a
1:1 translation to other views. This was the case with the quantum
theory and classical mechanics. Niels Bohr attempted to develop a
"correspondence" but failed. A new view can thus contain something new
that the other view cannot represent.

I also commented that it was important for us to develop the Rosennean
view, in relative safety, in order to understand its implications for
theory. It would not have been possible to develop quantum theory if
there were a very strong classical theory mafia breathing down their
necks every moment. The new assumptions need to be understood and taken
serioiusly by a group interested in exploring them. It does not mean
that everyone needs to be interested, but those who are need to have the
freedom, respect, and confidence to proceed with their work. As a
secondary matter - a very important one but nevertheless secondary - it
is important to evaluate how any new view's theories relate to other
view's theories - to check for consistency within the whole scientific
enterprise. If the new view predicts something different to occur in the
other views, that difference should be verifiable in both. Again, in
quantum theory the explicity representation of uncertainty is indeed a
phenomenon that can be discovered in the classical view. The difference
is that it can only be discovered in the classical view, it can't be
explained there. So there is no contradiction between these two views,
one is simply the larger set of phenomenon. This is precisely the
situation we suspect to be true of Rosennean theory and mechanistic
world views.

Respectfully,
JJK

Howard Pattee wrote:



Judith, Tim, Jon, et al.,

In my last post I irritated Judith and Tim by my wording, for which I apologize (it was not ?willfull?). As a consequence no one responded to my central question that was: What happened to the need for multiple complementary models?

Bob and I were in full agreement that one model doesn?t fit all. Bob proposed as a measure of complexity the number of inequivalent models necessary for adequate understanding of systems. The equivalent concept I used was generalized complementarity. Here is the basic idea: We make models to answer specific questions. One model can?t answer all questions. The more complex a system, the more questions are needed. That?s why we like Aristotle. His causes are simply answers to four different classes of questions: What is the house made of? Who built the house? Who designed the house? Why do you want a house? One could add more: What is a house? How do houses evolve? Why do houses decay?

The point is that the answers are independent of each other. One cannot derive one model or one answer from another, nor are the languages in which they are expressed necessarily mutually consistent. ?The whole thrust of the old Aristotelian analysis of causation is to make manifest that no one mode of causal entailment suffices to understand anything. At root, this is because the causal categories do not entail each other.? (Rosen, LI, p. 132)

Now I don?t believe it is entirely a mischaracterization to say that Rosen and his followers as represented on this list are following this principle. I hear a lot of objection to, or dismissal of, other models answering other questions about life, reductionist questions in particular. There is some grudging acceptance that, well, reductionism is not so bad but only if based on or accompanied with Rosenean models. I never hear that Rosen?s views are only valuable if accompanied by reductionist models.

I?m trying to get across the idea that modeling complex systems should not be a competitive sport. I know it is an easy trap to fall into, egos being what they are, but if you try to simply compete with reductionist models or the common sense of the likes of von Neumann you have already lost.

I think we need to acknowledge the fact that other people?s models may indeed answer their questions. If you want to ask different questions and their models don?t answer your questions, you have no reason to criticize their models. The same goes for different definitions of the symbols and words, like constraint, complexity, causality, etc., used in different models.

Am I getting through to anyone?

Howard



http://www.ws.binghamton.edu/pattee/
http://www.c3.lanl.gov/~rocha/pattee/




--
© 2004 John J. Kineman
all rights reserved




--
© 2004 John J. Kineman
all rights reserved