Re: Howard's challenge

[Howard Pattee <***>]

John,

That is a very clear statement of an important distinction.
I have some comments and questions.

John: These [worldviews] are often not commensurate with each other, quite simply because 
they begin with different assumptions about reality and the founding assumptions of a 
world view are not themselves directly testible.

HP: To some degree I think that was the case with both quantum theory and both relativity 
theories. But the new assumptions were about the observable world (discreteness of energy 
levels, speed of light, inertial mass).
By contrast, Rosen?s worldview is apparently based only on the limits of formal models 
(including formal Newtonian dynamics). This appears to many to be an old world view, 
i.e., Platonism, with new limits places on the forms by Goedel.

In my own words these are the views I share with Rosen: (1) State-determined dynamical 
laws (most of physics) are inadequate to describe the distinguishing character of life. 
(2) Reality (whatever it is) requires many models for adequate understanding. (3) Complex 
systems exhibit behavior that cannot be modeled by purely formal syntax-based symbol 
manipulation.

John: So, the point is that Rosennean assumptions, I believe, constitute a new world view.

HP: My problem is that the views above that I share with Rosen are not, in my mind, 
enough to constitute a new worldview. What am I missing?

John: I also commented that it was important for us to develop the Rosennean
view, in relative safety, in order to understand its implications for
theory.

HP: That might or might not be ideal. I see a problem of inbreeding and lack of really 
objective critical analysis.

John: It would not have been possible to develop quantum theory if
there were a very strong classical theory mafia breathing down their
necks every moment.

HP: My information about the history of physics says there was always the establishment 
breathing down necks or worse. What is most important is a persuasive example or question 
that the established worldview can?t touch.

Howard

>
> From: John Kineman <***>
> Date: 2004/03/29 Mon AM 10:36:17 EST
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Howard's challenge
>
> I responded to that question, I believe, but I'll try to summarize:
>
> Within a world view there can be multiple complementary theories.
> There can also be multiple world views, which involve assumptions about
> reality on which theory is constructed. These are often not commensurate
> with each other, quite simply because they begin with different
> assumptions about reality and the founding assumptions of a world view
> are not themselves directly testible. Their test is through the
> application and use of the view in formulating theories and the
> subsequent value of those theories as a set. In other words, how much
> new territory does the view allow us to explore, if any?
>
> So, the point is that Rosennean assumptions, I believe, constitute a new
> world view. In that sense it is not correct to say that it should
> "complement" other views directly. In other words, there may not be a
> 1:1 translation to other views. This was the case with the quantum
> theory and classical mechanics. Niels Bohr attempted to develop a
> "correspondence" but failed. A new view can thus contain something new
> that the other view cannot represent.
>
> I also commented that it was important for us to develop the Rosennean
> view, in relative safety, in order to understand its implications for
> theory. It would not have been possible to develop quantum theory if
> there were a very strong classical theory mafia breathing down their
> necks every moment. The new assumptions need to be understood and taken
> serioiusly by a group interested in exploring them. It does not mean
> that everyone needs to be interested, but those who are need to have the
> freedom, respect, and confidence to proceed with their work. As a
> secondary matter - a very important one but nevertheless secondary - it
> is important to evaluate how any new view's theories relate to other
> view's theories - to check for consistency within the whole scientific
> enterprise. If the new view predicts something different to occur in the
> other views, that difference should be verifiable in both. Again, in
> quantum theory the explicity representation of uncertainty is indeed a
> phenomenon that can be discovered in the classical view. The difference
> is that it can only be discovered in the classical view, it can't be
> explained there. So there is no contradiction between these two views,
> one is simply the larger set of phenomenon. This is precisely the
> situation we suspect to be true of Rosennean theory and mechanistic
> world views.
>
> Respectfully,
> JJK
>
> Howard Pattee wrote:
>
> >Judith, Tim, Jon, et al.,
> >
> >In my last post I irritated Judith and Tim by my wording, for which I apologize (it 
> >was not ?willfull?). As a consequence no one responded to my central question that 
> >was: What happened to the need for multiple complementary models?
> >
> >Bob and I were in full agreement that one model doesn?t fit all. Bob proposed as a 
> >measure of complexity the number of inequivalent models necessary for adequate 
> >understanding of systems. The equivalent concept I used was generalized 
> >complementarity. Here is the basic idea: We make models to answer specific questions. 
> >One model can?t answer all questions. The more complex a system, the more questions 
> >are needed. That?s why we like Aristotle. His causes are simply answers to four 
> >different classes of questions: What is the house made of? Who built the house? Who 
> >designed the house? Why do you want a house? One could add more: What is a house? How 
> >do houses evolve? Why do houses decay?
> >
> >The point is that the answers are independent of each other. One cannot derive one 
> >model or one answer from another, nor are the languages in which they are expressed 
> >necessarily mutually consistent. ?The whole thrust of the old Aristotelian analysis of 
> >causation is to make manifest that no one mode of causal entailment suffices to 
> >understand anything. At root, this is because the causal categories do not entail each 
> >other.? (Rosen, LI, p. 132)
> >
> >Now I don?t believe it is entirely a mischaracterization to say that Rosen and his 
> >followers as represented on this list are following this principle. I hear a lot of 
> >objection to, or dismissal of, other models answering other questions about life, 
> >reductionist questions in particular. There is some grudging acceptance that, well, 
> >reductionism is not so bad but only if based on or accompanied with Rosenean models. I 
> >never hear that Rosen?s views are only valuable if accompanied by reductionist models.
> >
> >I?m trying to get across the idea that modeling complex systems should not be a 
> >competitive sport. I know it is an easy trap to fall into, egos being what they are, 
> >but if you try to simply compete with reductionist models or the common sense of the 
> >likes of von Neumann you have already lost.
> >
> >I think we need to acknowledge the fact that other people?s models may indeed answer 
> >their questions. If you want to ask different questions and their models don?t answer 
> >your questions, you have no reason to criticize their models. The same goes for 
> >different definitions of the symbols and words, like constraint, complexity, 
> >causality, etc., used in different models.
> >
> >Am I getting through to anyone?
> >
> >Howard
> >
> >
> >
> >http://www.ws.binghamton.edu/pattee/
> >http://www.c3.lanl.gov/~rocha/pattee/
> >
> >
>
> --
> © 2004 John J. Kineman
> all rights reserved
>