Dear Tim,
wouldn't it be more fruitful if we concentrate on the concepts pertinent -
and within RR-language, ideas, vision, whatever?
"Complex' and 'simple' are personalized qualifiers of reductionist models.
(Convoluted is not the same for Einstein as it is for me) "simple" is a
model
having cut off (by boundaries?) most of its complicatedness.
So why fill up our ideads - and this list with distraction?
"One should never indulge in the enemy's turf".
All my 'due respect' for J. von Neumann (indeed I appreciate this (older)
schoolmate of mine) but he was "before" our topic evolved.
Are there are 'words' we cannot get over with?
Why not concentrate on RR vocabulary (thoughts!)? Not the ones - mind you -
he fought against.
Threshold in an unlimited interconnectedness? well, quantitatively I can
think of such, as the 'differential strength' of influences, formulating a
(natural) togetherness (I don't apply here "unit").
If we want to "think new" we should "talk new" and forget about "old".
When you say:
Since we, as humans, cannot step outside of the world, our interactions
with
the world, and thereby our interactions with systems we identify in
modelling relations, are always subject to the notion of complexity above.
I would change the last two word to 'reductionism'.
Our point of view should be RR-complexity, even when acknowledging our
difficulties in staying there.
John Mikes
----- Original Message -----
From: "Tim Gwinn" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2004 11:32 AM
Subject: Re: Comparing Rosennean Complexity
Judith's and JohnK's comments reminded me of another central reason that
"threshold" is an improper term to apply to the distinction between
'simple'
and 'complex'. It is that 'threshold' implies an intrinsic objective
property of material reality, whereas Rosennean complexity involves the
irreducible interaction between subjective and objective (mainly, if not
wholly, embodied in the form of the modelling relation process). From AS:
"John von Neumann argued that there was a kind of "threshold" of
complexity,
below which systems behaved with their traditional regularities, but above
which entirely new kinds of phenomena emerge, such as self-reproduction,
evolution, and free will, which are sui generis, and which can have no
counterpart in systems of lesser complexity.
A corollary of the idea that complexity possesses such a threshold is that
it is a quality of systems which can in fact be measured, or at least
computed on the basis of other measurements. Thus, a great deal of
literature on system complexity exists; this literature stresses such
things
as the number of components or variables involved in a particular
description of the system, or the richness of the inter-connection of
these
components, or the length of the shortest algorithm required to construct
the system. In all of these approaches, complexity is not only viewed as
intrinsic to a system, but even is referred to a single particular mode of
description of that system.
In what follows, we are going to take a quite different approach. Namely,
we are going to define a system to be complex to the extent that we can
observe it in non-equivalent ways.
----
This approach to complexity is novel in several ways. For one thing, it
requires that complexity is not an intrinsic property of a system nor of a
system description. Rather, it arises from the number of ways in which we
are able to interact with the system. Thus, complexity is a function not
only of the system's interactive capabilities, but [also] of our own." [AS
321-322]
Since we, as humans, cannot step outside of the world, our interactions
with
the world, and thereby our interactions with systems we identify in
modelling relations, are always subject to the notion of complexity above.
This is why I like John's "one degenerates a complex system to a simple
one", because it embodies the active role of the interaction of the
observer
in the simple/complex distinction, and it also highlights that such
degeneration amounts to the imposition of artefactual restrictions.
Regards,
Tim
-----Original Message-----
From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Judith
Rosen
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2004 10:54 PM
To: ***
Subject: Re: Comparing Rosennean Complexity
The quarrel between myself and Don M. was over his contention that
"Rosen
said" there is no such thing as a simple system in the material
world; that
all simple systems are formal systems (i.e. models). I told him
[paraphrasing here]; that was incorrect and did not accurately reflect
my
father's theoretical beliefs. That's when it got ugly.
But the truth is what it is. The thing people seem to get
confused on is; if
complexity is a fundamental tendency in the universe, how can any
material
system be simple (non-complex)? My father's answer was that both types
of
organization co-exist in this universe (it's even possible that there
are
others) and it is the organization that determines whether the system is
complex or non-complex. Don M's argument was that if atoms are
complex and a
car engine is made of atoms and made by humans and so on... how
can that be
a "simple system". But that's a reductionist approach. The parts are not
what determines complexity; ORGANIZATION is what determines complexity.
A
car engine is a system with non-complex organization. A simple
system in the
material world.
It's easy to transform a complex system into a simple system: collapse
the
complex organization. Kill the organism. We have the technology to build
a
dead organism out of other dead parts. That's not so hard,
really.Complicated but not complex. The parts can all be modelled too,
and
computed. It's the organization of the living organism that's beyond the
reductionist approach to model completely because the
organization involves
interrelationships that are constantly in motion, constantly in a state
of
"flux" or change. Any "snapshot" you try to take of the organism's
complex
organization is already out of date, in a sense. Out of time. Therefore,
incomplete.
Judith
----- Original Message -----
From: "John Kineman" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2004 8:28 PM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Comparing Rosennean Complexity
Yes, this seems likely, that the problem was in believing that in fact
there is such a threshold. If one presumes that it is possible
to (a) have
a simple system, and (b) transition from a simple system to a
complex one,
then the question of a threshold where this can be said to have
occurred
comes up. However, if (a) there are no truly simple natural
systems, just
conceptual models that are simple and that can make a complex system
act
simple, then (b) one does not in fact transition from simple to
complex,
one degenerates a complex system to a simple one, perhaps in degrees.
At
what threshold would we then say it is no longer complex?? I
believe there
are passages in RR's writings (Tim can probably recall them)
where he says
even though a complex system may behave like a simple one, it always
retains the possibility of changing that behavior, and hence remains
complex. Part of complexity is not being able to predict
behavior, so how
long a simple system will stay simple is part of that
unpredictability,
hence complexity. I think some of this concept was articulated by Don
M.
rather well, and regardless of other matters in his interpretations I
think
this is one thing he got right. But Judith can perhaps comment
further on
that.
So, Howard, please don't get the idea that I'm on a campaign
here against
the Von Neumann view, but I think there is a legitimate question as to
whether the assumptions involved in that view are the right ones for
understanding life.
JJK