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Re: Comparing Rosennean Complexity
- From: Tim Gwinn <***>
- Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 11:32:00 -0500
Judith's and JohnK's comments reminded me of another central reason that
"threshold" is an improper term to apply to the distinction between 'simple'
and 'complex'. It is that 'threshold' implies an intrinsic objective
property of material reality, whereas Rosennean complexity involves the
irreducible interaction between subjective and objective (mainly, if not
wholly, embodied in the form of the modelling relation process). From AS:
"John von Neumann argued that there was a kind of "threshold" of complexity,
below which systems behaved with their traditional regularities, but above
which entirely new kinds of phenomena emerge, such as self-reproduction,
evolution, and free will, which are sui generis, and which can have no
counterpart in systems of lesser complexity.
A corollary of the idea that complexity possesses such a threshold is that
it is a quality of systems which can in fact be measured, or at least
computed on the basis of other measurements. Thus, a great deal of
literature on system complexity exists; this literature stresses such things
as the number of components or variables involved in a particular
description of the system, or the richness of the inter-connection of these
components, or the length of the shortest algorithm required to construct
the system. In all of these approaches, complexity is not only viewed as
intrinsic to a system, but even is referred to a single particular mode of
description of that system.
In what follows, we are going to take a quite different approach. Namely,
we are going to define a system to be complex to the extent that we can
observe it in non-equivalent ways.
----
This approach to complexity is novel in several ways. For one thing, it
requires that complexity is not an intrinsic property of a system nor of a
system description. Rather, it arises from the number of ways in which we
are able to interact with the system. Thus, complexity is a function not
only of the system's interactive capabilities, but [also] of our own." [AS
321-322]
Since we, as humans, cannot step outside of the world, our interactions with
the world, and thereby our interactions with systems we identify in
modelling relations, are always subject to the notion of complexity above.
This is why I like John's "one degenerates a complex system to a simple
one", because it embodies the active role of the interaction of the observer
in the simple/complex distinction, and it also highlights that such
degeneration amounts to the imposition of artefactual restrictions.
Regards,
Tim
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Judith
> Rosen
> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2004 10:54 PM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Comparing Rosennean Complexity
>
>
> The quarrel between myself and Don M. was over his contention that "Rosen
> said" there is no such thing as a simple system in the material
> world; that
> all simple systems are formal systems (i.e. models). I told him
> [paraphrasing here]; that was incorrect and did not accurately reflect my
> father's theoretical beliefs. That's when it got ugly.
>
> But the truth is what it is. The thing people seem to get
> confused on is; if
> complexity is a fundamental tendency in the universe, how can any material
> system be simple (non-complex)? My father's answer was that both types of
> organization co-exist in this universe (it's even possible that there are
> others) and it is the organization that determines whether the system is
> complex or non-complex. Don M's argument was that if atoms are
> complex and a
> car engine is made of atoms and made by humans and so on... how
> can that be
> a "simple system". But that's a reductionist approach. The parts are not
> what determines complexity; ORGANIZATION is what determines complexity. A
> car engine is a system with non-complex organization. A simple
> system in the
> material world.
>
> It's easy to transform a complex system into a simple system: collapse the
> complex organization. Kill the organism. We have the technology to build a
> dead organism out of other dead parts. That's not so hard,
> really.Complicated but not complex. The parts can all be modelled too, and
> computed. It's the organization of the living organism that's beyond the
> reductionist approach to model completely because the
> organization involves
> interrelationships that are constantly in motion, constantly in a state of
> "flux" or change. Any "snapshot" you try to take of the organism's complex
> organization is already out of date, in a sense. Out of time. Therefore,
> incomplete.
>
> Judith
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "John Kineman" <***>
> To: <***>
> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2004 8:28 PM
> Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Comparing Rosennean Complexity
>
>
> > Yes, this seems likely, that the problem was in believing that in fact
> > there is such a threshold. If one presumes that it is possible
> to (a) have
> > a simple system, and (b) transition from a simple system to a
> complex one,
> > then the question of a threshold where this can be said to have occurred
> > comes up. However, if (a) there are no truly simple natural
> systems, just
> > conceptual models that are simple and that can make a complex system act
> > simple, then (b) one does not in fact transition from simple to complex,
> > one degenerates a complex system to a simple one, perhaps in degrees. At
> > what threshold would we then say it is no longer complex?? I
> believe there
> > are passages in RR's writings (Tim can probably recall them)
> where he says
> > even though a complex system may behave like a simple one, it always
> > retains the possibility of changing that behavior, and hence remains
> > complex. Part of complexity is not being able to predict
> behavior, so how
> > long a simple system will stay simple is part of that unpredictability,
> > hence complexity. I think some of this concept was articulated by Don M.
> > rather well, and regardless of other matters in his interpretations I
> think
> > this is one thing he got right. But Judith can perhaps comment
> further on
> that.
> >
> > So, Howard, please don't get the idea that I'm on a campaign
> here against
> > the Von Neumann view, but I think there is a legitimate question as to
> > whether the assumptions involved in that view are the right ones for
> > understanding life.
> >
> >
> >
> > JJK
> >