[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next]   [Date Index] [Thread Index] [Author Index] 

Re: Comparing Rosennean Complexity

Judith,

Thanks for clarifying this. It has been a point of confusion indeed. Being
the synthesist (hopefully not apologist) my tendency is to see how both
statements are right - perhaps unsatisfying at times when we want answers.
But what I concluded agrees fully with what you say here, and it is a
subtle matter of definition. A dead cat is a simple dead cat. The reason is
that the word "cat" refers to a whole organism with certain functions
involved, like its origin, metabolism, and repair functions; and that
organism has now been degenerated irretrievably where those functions are
lost. All the stuff of the dead cat is now only organized at the level of
matter, which is still complex, but only at the level of the material
existence of the elements. So, as you said, the cat organization has gone,
leaving a dead, simple cat. However, the philosophical issue would then
arise of whether there is any such thing as a dead cat, i.e., at that point
the "cat" no longer exists in the present; its a cat that used to be a true
cat. If we look at a car, we might think of it as a dead car because it is
a machine, i.e., it does not contain those functions mentioned above in its
own system, but it is still a car. Here, however, I have to look at what
"car" means ontologically. That is because when we said "alive cat," the
aliveness was an ontological matter and so that's where we look for
aliveness, at the ontologies of origin, metabolism, and repair. The
ontological context for a car, is its manufacture, use of energy and
materials, and maintenance. This gets confusing merely because those things
are a distributed system, not self-contained as in an organism; but that
doesn't matter to the definition. The critical functions defining
complexity and aliveness involve a human-based ontology -- idea, design,
manufacture, sales, metabolism and repair. It is alive as a broader system
because of its human components. That living system dies when the
manufactur stops and there is no longer a metabolism (use of materials &
energy) or repair function. So the Edsel is a dead car. In truth there are
no longer any living Edsels (maybe some being kept alive as collector's
items). While it is alive in this sense, it is a complex system by virtue
of its human components. If we look only at the car itself, without those
production, metabolism and repair components, we are essentially looking at
a limited model of the living system and thus seeing a simple one, so in
that sense one could say that simple system of a currently maintained car
is actually identified by a model, not the true system that produced and
maintains it. But since it is also a distributed system, one can say that
this non-living simple component of the system does indeed "exist."

So, as in most philosophy, there is a way to justify both points of view.
It is a shame it came to blows, but I can imagine that Don was not
particularly flexible in his philosophy about this. He seemed to take it in
another direction, claiming that the car was complex without all those
human components because we could relate to it in many different ways (the
epistemological test). There was a big and useless (in my opinion)
discussion about a rock in the same vein.  I disagreed with that
interpretation because our ability to relate to it in many different ways
is a function of our complexity, not the car's; whereas in the case of the
manufacture and repair functions, the very existence of the car depends on
that. The dead car or rock will exist as a material object whether we
relate to it or not. So, I called that subjective complexity, where the
observer provides the variability of views and they do not affect any of
the ontologies of the object, as opposed to objective complexity where the
complex elements are embedded in the system as defined and being studied. I
think this works much better. So perhaps I could have saved Don's view
somewhat, but I think he defended it on the wrong basis. He had the last
laugh, however, forcing a peer reviewed paper of mine not to be published
because of this very disagreement.

JJK


At 10:54 PM 3/23/04 -0500, you wrote: 
The quarrel between myself and Don M. was over his contention that "Rosen
said" there is no such thing as a simple system in the material world; that
all simple systems are formal systems (i.e. models). I told him
[paraphrasing here]; that was incorrect and did not accurately reflect my
father's theoretical beliefs. That's when it got ugly.

But the truth is what it is. The thing people seem to get confused on is; if
complexity is a fundamental tendency in the universe, how can any material
system be simple (non-complex)? My father's answer was that both types of
organization co-exist in this universe (it's even possible that there are
others) and it is the organization that determines whether the system is
complex or non-complex. Don M's argument was that if atoms are complex and a
car engine is made of atoms and made by humans and so on... how can that be
a "simple system". But that's a reductionist approach. The parts are not
what determines complexity; ORGANIZATION is what determines complexity. A
car engine is a system with non-complex organization. A simple system in the
material world.

It's easy to transform a complex system into a simple system: collapse the
complex organization. Kill the organism. We have the technology to build a
dead organism out of other dead parts. That's not so hard,
really.Complicated but not complex. The parts can all be modelled too, and
computed. It's the organization of the living organism that's beyond the
reductionist approach to model completely because the organization involves
interrelationships that are constantly in motion, constantly in a state of
"flux" or change. Any "snapshot" you try to take of the organism's complex
organization is already out of date, in a sense. Out of time. Therefore,
incomplete.

Judith

----- Original Message -----
From: "John Kineman" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2004 8:28 PM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Comparing Rosennean Complexity


> Yes, this seems likely, that the problem was in believing that in fact
> there is such a threshold. If one presumes that it is possible to (a) have
> a simple system, and (b) transition from a simple system to a complex one,
> then the question of a threshold where this can be said to have occurred
> comes up. However, if (a) there are no truly simple natural systems, just
> conceptual models that are simple and that can make a complex system act
> simple, then (b) one does not in fact transition from simple to complex,
> one degenerates a complex system to a simple one, perhaps in degrees. At
> what threshold would we then say it is no longer complex?? I believe there
> are passages in RR's writings (Tim can probably recall them) where he says
> even though a complex system may behave like a simple one, it always
> retains the possibility of changing that behavior, and hence remains
> complex. Part of complexity is not being able to predict behavior, so how
> long a simple system will stay simple is part of that unpredictability,
> hence complexity. I think some of this concept was articulated by Don M.
> rather well, and regardless of other matters in his interpretations I
think
> this is one thing he got right. But Judith can perhaps comment further on
that.
>
> So, Howard, please don't get the idea that I'm on a campaign here against
> the Von Neumann view, but I think there is a legitimate question as to
> whether the assumptions involved in that view are the right ones for
> understanding life.
>
>
>
> JJK
>