Tim, we're speaking in tongues here. I realized that our definitions are
completely different when you said "a measurement doesn't have to be
quantitative". My understanding of the word "measurement" connotes
quantitative analysis of something. Therefore, it looks like my statement
that "we can prove the existence of something we cannot directly perceive by
observing the behavior of the phenomena it generates" means (in your terms)
that "we can measure it indirectly, using the phenomena it generates".
If that's so, then we are in agreement.
My father said, in response to the accusation that theory is "abstract":
"There is nothing MORE abstract than a MEASUREMENT." He was putting
measurement into the realm of experimental science, from whence the
accusation of abstraction was coming. His use of the word usually referred
to quantitative analysis of some kind.
However, I was struck by something new you said in your post about the
modelling relation:
> I very much disagree with this. What about the modeling relation - the
> "habitat of all epistemology"? Without measurements, there is no encoding
in
> a modeling relation, and it cannot commute. If we only have the decoding,
> then the result is that we have metaphors, not models.
The modelling relation is a wide ranging area that goes from very precisely
measured (in my sense of the word) aspects in a precise model (say, of a
simple system or of a subsystem from a larger or complex system) to very
broadly defined models, such as my father's model for a complex system. He
didn't quantify anything in that diagram except the existence of the system
and the existence of its abilities, in a particular arrangement of
relationships. That model has been attacked for stating the existence of
things that cannot be precisely quantified. These kinds of imprecise (as in
unquantified) models are, indeed, a form of metaphor or analogy. Why would
the fact that a model is analogous to the system it represents make it "not
a model" in your opinion? Isn't that one way to define what a model IS?
Further; how do you get to your logic of encoding and decoding in your
analysis? I don't see how there "is no encoding" in a modelling relation
without measurements. That's a non-sequitur. Even if I change the word
measurements, in the above statement, to not mean 'quantitative analysis'
but something else, even a vague model such as my father's (M,R)-System
'commutes'. It has encoding. And it is analogous.
Again, I suspect that you and I are defining things differently from each
other.
Judith
----- Original Message -----
From: "Tim Gwinn" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Thursday, March 18, 2004 9:53 AM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Relational "Space"
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Judith
> > Rosen
> > Sent: Thursday, March 18, 2004 8:24 AM
> > To: ***
> > Subject: Re: Relational "Space"
> >
> >
> > My point was that we can prove the existence of something we
> > cannot directly
> > perceive by observing (under certain conditions) the behavior of the
> > phenomena it generates.
> >
> > The need for measurements are back to the Cartesian paradigm again, Tim.
>
>
> I very much disagree with this. What about the modeling relation - the
> "habitat of all epistemology"? Without measurements, there is no encoding
in
> a modeling relation, and it cannot commute. If we only have the decoding,
> then the result is that we have metaphors, not models.
>
>
> > This is what you have to get away from. The arrows in the (M,R) model of
> > complexity that my father created... they delineate the existence of
> > something; an ability, but not any quantification of it.
>
>
> 'Measurement' does not have to be quantitative. If there were no
> perceptible, measurable, physical processes in organisms called
'metabolism'
> and 'repair', then the (M,R) model would be meaningless - it would have
> nothing in the material world to commute with in a modeling relation.
>
>
> > When you have an
> > ability, you possess something. Even if you don't use that ability, you
> > still possess it. Intelligence, talent, fertility; these are all
> > things that
> > exist but are not perceptible except indirectly, via the effects
> > (phenomena)
> > they generate.
> >
> >
> > One of the things that was stated over and over again in my father's
books
> > and papers is the fact that it is perfectly scientific to work in
> > this way.
> > It's what biology teaches. How does a human being prove that
> > honeybees have
> > the capability to communicate the location of a necter source? Not by
> > studying the structure of their brain. See? The behavior proves the
> > existence of the ability.
>
>
> To say a system has a certain 'ability' is to say that it can potentially
do
> some certain behavior(s). So, to say that "X performs a behavior Z" proves
> "X has an ability Y" is to say that "X performs a behavior Z" proves "X
> could potentially perform behavior Z". This would be true, but quite
> trivially so; it is little more than a tautology.
>
> In causal terms, to ask "why the behavior?" and answer "because the
ability"
> would be the same as to ask "why the behavior?" and answer with "because
it
> could potentially perform the behavior". This is trivially true, but
> supplies us with no causal information.
>
> Regards,
> Tim