My point was that we can prove the existence of something we cannot directly
perceive by observing (under certain conditions) the behavior of the
phenomena it generates.
The need for measurements are back to the Cartesian paradigm again, Tim.
This is what you have to get away from. The arrows in the (M,R) model of
complexity that my father created... they delineate the existence of
something; an ability, but not any quantification of it. When you have an
ability, you possess something. Even if you don't use that ability, you
still possess it. Intelligence, talent, fertility; these are all things that
exist but are not perceptible except indirectly, via the effects (phenomena)
they generate.
One of the things that was stated over and over again in my father's books
and papers is the fact that it is perfectly scientific to work in this way.
It's what biology teaches. How does a human being prove that honeybees have
the capability to communicate the location of a necter source? Not by
studying the structure of their brain. See? The behavior proves the
existence of the ability.
Judith
> --snip--Judith Rosen wrote:
> > Why does something need to be perceptible to be accepted as real,
> > when there
> > are phenomena (effects) that are being caused by it? We should be able
to
> > prove its existence indirectly, via the behavior of the effects under
> > certain circumstances. The need to "verify the existence of something
with
> > one's own senses, directly" is right out of the Cartesian methodology.
> Tim Gwinn wrote:
> I disagree that we could prove its existence indirectly. Primarily for the
> reason that we could not distinguish this theory from some other different
> one which might also purport to explain the causal basis behind phenomena,
> if both theories adequately predict phenomena but both consist of
> imperceptible things. At best, all we would have is an observation that
the
> phenomena behave *as if* they were generated by folding. We would not have
a
> commuting modeling relation, because we could not have measurements on the
> elements which possess the hypothesized causal entailment relations.
>
> I think this is akin to the state the quantum mechanics is in (and has
been
> in all along). It has equations that predict certain phenomena correctly,
> but it is unclear if elements in those equations ought to be interpreted
as
> real things and real causal relations, or not.
>
> Regards,
> Tim