Re: Relational "Space"

[Tim Gwinn <***>]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Judith
> Rosen
> Sent: Thursday, March 18, 2004 8:24 AM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Relational "Space"
>
>
> My point was that we can prove the existence of something we
> cannot directly
> perceive by observing (under certain conditions) the behavior of the
> phenomena it generates.
>
> The need for measurements are back to the Cartesian paradigm again, Tim.


I very much disagree with this. What about the modeling relation - the
"habitat of all epistemology"? Without measurements, there is no encoding in
a modeling relation, and it cannot commute. If we only have the decoding,
then the result is that we have metaphors, not models.


> This is what you have to get away from. The arrows in the (M,R) model of
> complexity that my father created... they delineate the existence of
> something; an ability, but not any quantification of it.


'Measurement' does not have to be quantitative. If there were no
perceptible, measurable, physical processes in organisms called 'metabolism'
and 'repair', then the (M,R) model would be meaningless - it would have
nothing in the material world to commute with in a modeling relation.


> When you have an
> ability, you possess something. Even if you don't use that ability, you
> still possess it. Intelligence, talent, fertility; these are all
> things that
> exist but are not perceptible except indirectly, via the effects
> (phenomena)
> they generate.
>
>
> One of the things that was stated over and over again in my father's books
> and papers is the fact that it is perfectly scientific to work in
> this way.
> It's what biology teaches. How does a human being prove that
> honeybees have
> the capability to communicate the location of a necter source? Not by
> studying the structure of their brain. See? The behavior proves the
> existence of the ability.


To say a system has a certain 'ability' is to say that it can potentially do
some certain behavior(s). So, to say that "X performs a behavior Z" proves
"X has an ability Y" is to say that "X performs a behavior Z" proves "X
could potentially perform behavior Z". This would be true, but quite
trivially so; it is little more than a tautology.

In causal terms, to ask "why the behavior?" and answer "because the ability"
would be the same as to ask "why the behavior?" and answer with "because it
could potentially perform the behavior". This is trivially true, but
supplies us with no causal information.

Regards,
Tim