Re: Landauer and Bellman critique

[Judith Rosen <***>]

Tim,

Daniel Dubois... there's a name out of the recent past... About a year before my father's 
health went super critical, he was invited to a set of meetings being put on by the 
"Society of Anticipatory Systems" or something to that effect, and I believe Daniel 
Dubois was the one in charge. Since my father coined the term and founded the science of 
Anticipatory Systems, they wanted him to attend the innaugural set of meetings. He wanted 
to go, but couldn't travel on his own and Dubois balked at paying for me to accompany my 
father or making the necessary modifications to the speaking schedule to take my father's 
need for dialysis into account, etc. He asked me if I would videotape an interview of my 
father, for "Belgian Television", which I decided to go ahead and do, but since I got no 
guidance from Dubois on content, I winged it and just interviewed my father about what he 
and I were interested in talking about. That interview and its transcription, was the 
thing that put the kabash on any chance of my father actually being brought to the 
meetings in Belgium. They decided to use the tape and the transcription at their meeting, 
and sent my father a plack and a thankyou/apology.... It was weird. My father was 
disappointed and I developed some hostility towards Mr. Dubois because of all that. The 
transcription is on the internet in several places. While I was still on good terms with 
Don Mikulecky, I gave him permission to use it on his website which I rather regret now.

Frankly, it wouldn't surprise me if the Anticipatory Systems Society (Sorry-- the Society 
for Anticipatory Systems! Can't have ASS as their initials, now can we??? The People's 
Front of Judea or the Judean People's Front? --I was watching "Life of Brian" this 
evening) if the SAS totally misses the essence of what my father was talking about the 
same way that the Santa Fe Institute of "Complexity" mostly revolves around 
"complicatedness" rather than complexity (aka "simplicity").

Judith

-----Original Message-----
From: Tim Gwinn <***>
Sent: Feb 19, 2004 10:33 AM
To: ***
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Landauer and Bellman critique

Thanks Dan!

I don't know about publishing it - being outside the academic realm I
wouldn't have the foggiest idea where to begin. :) At the least, I will
fine-tune it and post it on my website, under the section I set aside for my
opinions.

There are also some papers by someone named Daniel Dubois
(http://www.hec.be/~ddubois/), on a topic he calls "hyperincursion". The
concept is intended to be "anticipatory", so he references Rosen in at least
his 1998 paper at: http://www.ulg.ac.be/mathgen/CHAOS/AIP/AIP_PAPERS_DD.htm
but he makes several remarks about Rosen's AS which seem to me incorrect and
misleading. I'd be curious what others here think of his remarks and of
"hyperincursion".

In a way, it is a shame that the Landauer-Bellman paper was so faulty.
Otherwise, as Jannie suggested, it might have made a worthy topic of
discussion.

On the other hand, their minterpretations can also perhaps be seen as
symptoms of an unnecessarily obtuse presentation style in Life Itself. To
me, reading LI is like going on a quest: you have no clear roadmap or
overview to guide you, so you must carefully gather up all the clues along
the way in order to find your way to the end and reap the rewards of the
quest. A "Guide to Life Itself" might be a useful book or booklet.

In addition, there is no one writing of his which pulls together relational
modeling, the (M,R)-system, and Rosennean complexity in a complete way. Life
Itself and Essays on Life Itself do not go into the (M,R)-system in the
depth that the 1972 paper does. (By the way, Landauer-Bellman do not
reference, and were apparently unaware of, the 1972 paper). But the 1972
paper does not tie in the concepts of complexity, which to me are most
clearly presented in Essays, and also lacks the discussion of relational
models from Life Itself. So, that seems to me like another opportunity for a
book.

Regards,
Tim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Dan
> Fiscus
> Sent: Thursday, February 19, 2004 9:20 AM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Landauer and Bellman critique
>
>
> Tim,
>
> That is such an excellent critique - you should publish it!
> I am serious - it would make a major contribution and help
> spread the word.
>
> Also, I have not forgetten the letter to Nature as reply to
> Ottini's article on engineering complex systems. I have your
> and Judith's revisions to my draft and still plan to merge
> them and send back to ya'll.
>
> Dan
>
>
> Tim Gwinn wrote:
> > Well, I finished reading this paper by Landauer and Bellman (LB).
> > Unfortunately, as far as I am concerned, it is perhaps useful only
> > insofar as it exemplifies ways in which a newcomer to Rosen might
> > misunderstand him.
> >
> > LB take as their point of departure the (M,R)-system model:
> >
> >     "We start with the description from [Essays on Life Itself] of a
> >     model of living systems, his (M,R)-systems, since it gives the
> >     clearest description of what Rosen intended to do. Then *we explain
> >     the equational distinction* from [Life Itself], and discuss its
> >     implications. Finally, we describe our example solutions to the
> >     equations from three areas of Mathematics, to show that *equational
> >     distinction* does not work."[p. 60, bold added]
> >
> >
> > At this point, LB have already erred. LB have mistakenly interpreted the
> > /relational mappings/ in the (M,R)-system diagram as /equations/ (see
> > bolded in quote above). They spend p. 61 describing how the "equational
> > formulation" is wrong. They clearly do not understand the entire concept
> > of relational models.  For example, here is their supposedly damning
> > conclusion of this discussion:
> >
> >     "Since metabolism and repair change an organism, we should actually
> >     expect the function /f/ that comes out of /p(b)/ to be different
> >     that the one that goes into /b(f)/ and transforms /a/ to /b/, since
> >     the process is actually unfolded in time (this is the "helical"
> >     argument). This modeling approach, however, projects all of time
> >     into a single point." [p. 61]
> >
> >
> > That is, they argue that the specific /f/ that is acting as the function
> > of metabolism cannot be the same /f /is being output by the repair
> > process at a given moment in time. Hence, the logic behind the
> > model must be faulty. However, relational models are precisely
> > /atemporal/ representations of relations. (This is why chapter 5 of
> > /*Life Itself*/ is conspicuously entitled "Entailment Without States:
> > Relational Biology".) Near the beginning of chapter 5, Rosen
> clearly states:
> >
> >     "On the formal side, we shall see that the inferential structure
> >     characteristic of relational biology is much richer than, and at the
> >     same time very different from, the formalisms we have considered
> >     heretofore. Our systems are assigned /no states/, /no environments/,
> >     /and there is no recursion/." [LI p. 109, ital. orig.]
> >
> >
> > This is later reiterated. After describing the basics of relational
> > models, Rosen contrasts the relational approach with the Newtonian,
> > state-based approach:
> >
> >     "In the relational approach, on the other hand, the situation is
> >     quite different. As I have developed it so far, there is no time
> >     parameter, no states, no state transition sequences.  There are only
> >     components (mappings), and the organizations, the abstract block
> >     diagrams, which can be built from them." [LI p. 134]
> >
> >
> > Thus, it is entirely erroneous for LB to interpret relational models,
> > such as the (M,R)-system, as an "equational formulation".  They do not
> > address their argument to a relational model, but instead to what they
> > think is a set of equations. Therefore, their main argument and their
> > main point is entirely invalid.
> >
> >
> > LB demonstrates another lack of understanding of Rosen in sec 2.6 of
> > their paper after summarizing their main argument, when they say:
> >
> >     "More importantly, this [Rosen's approach] is probably not the right
> >     approach. After all, claims that complexity is non-computable
> >     contradict claims that formal systems are computable, since
> >     computability is only defined for formal systems, and cannot be
> >     proven or even properly defined for non-formal systems. There are
> >     many such confusions in the literature." [p. 65]
> >
> >  Again, by misinterpreting relational models as predicative equations,
> > LB mistakenly asserts that these models are thus computable (by virtue
> > of being formal systems). They further suggest that Rosen is claiming
> > that non-computability is a property of the organism, rather than of the
> > formal model, and so Rosen must be confused, since it is rightly
> > nonsensical to speak of computability of non-formal systems (such as
> > organisms).  On the contrary, it is LB who is confused. Rosen is quite
> > clear that computability criteria apply to the /models/, not to the
> > organism:
> >
> >     "I call a material system with only computable models a /simple
> >     system/ or /mechanism/. A system that is not simple in this sense, I
> >     call /complex/. A complex system must possess noncomputable models."
> >     [EL p. 325]
> >
> >
> >
> > In their next section, LB spend 3 pages discussion analytic vs.
> > synthetic models. They state at the beginning of the section that "we
> > describe some other difficulties with the Theoretical Biology program as
> > stated...". [p. 66] It is unclear why LB perform this exercise, since,
> > in fact, they end up restating the same conclusion that Rosen makes in
> > ch. 6 of /*Life Itself.*/ Namely, that there are generically far more
> > analytic models than synthetic models to a system.
> >
> > As best I can discern, LB seem to provide this argument because they
> > mistakenly think Rosen is arguing that a "largest model" is the
> > universal case: that analytic models are always only the inverse of
> > synthetic models. Nothing could be more wrong. Rosen remarks near the
> > beginning of his chapter on analytic and synthetic models:
> >
> >     "In a sense, it is the thrust of this entire work that this
> >     hypothesis of analysis = synthesis must be dropped. Above all, it
> >     must be dropped if we are to do biology, and hence a fortiori, it
> >     must be dropped if we are to do physics. By dropping it, we enter a
> >     new realm of system, which I call /complex/, and which in certain
> >     sense needs to have no synthetic models at all. The distinction
> >     between relational and Newtonian models of natural systems will
> >     become crucial here, because as we shall see, the former extend to
> >     the realm of complex systems, while the latter cannot." [LI p. 154]
> >
> > LB clearly do not realize the consequences of dropping the "analytic =
> > synthesis" hypothesis (consequences which lead directly to Rosennean
> > complexity), even though they (apparently unwittingly) agree with Rosen
> > that such a hypothesis is unwarranted by purely formal considerations.
> >
> > All in all, I find that this paper by Landauer and Bellman fails to
> > comprehend the fundamentals of Rosen's relational modeling concepts, the
> > import of Rosen's discussion of analytic vs. synthetic models, Rosen's
> > use of computability criteria of models, as well as Rosen's concept of
> > complexity. Their paper misinterprets these concepts and their arguments
> > are directed against those misinterpretations. As such, their paper
> > offers no legitimate argument and thus no damage to Rosen's actual
> > concepts; but by its gross misstatements, this paper does a disservice
> > to Rosen's work.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Tim
> >
> >


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