Re: Information and Volition

A modeling relation can probably be constructed to describe anything you want.

> If it helps to see the problem, let's ask the question, "are human
> abilities natural"? If they are, then modeling relations are natural.
> If they are not human epistemology emerged mysteriously.

I don't follow this one. Human abilities are "natural", yes. Modeling relations are a human creation. Is the question; "Are modeling relations natural?"??? The point my father made was that human constructed models (formalisms) are always incomplete representations when a complex system is the system being modeled. If you are talking about "internal predictive models" that are the source of Anticipatory Behavior in organisms, then there is a major difference between formalisms and "internal predictive models". Internal predictive models, or anticipatory behavior, are only found in organisms according to Rosennean Complexity. If this doesn't answer the next question, then I will attempt to clarify what the question is:
>
> Then let's ask, is its application restricted to organisms alone?

Perhaps that depends on what you define as a relation. All of the disagreement on this thread about information comes out of several different definitions of information and different definitions of relationships.

Reproduction is really not relevant at all as a "qualifier" for living things. My father and I discussed this issue. He pointed out that a mule cannot reproduce yet is clearly alive. Reproduction is not relevant in this discussion at all.

> because the modeling relation operates in real time. There is no reason
> to say the modeling relations exist only in systems that reproduce
> themselves unless the relation is generated by the reproduction itself.
> But in real time, when we relate to our environment and think about

> what
> road to take, there is nothing in that involves our reproductive
> abilities. Reproduction and resulting evolution could have amplified
> something for use in an organism, thus making it highly noticible in the
> final product (e.g., us),

Is the question here "Can evolution produce a mind from a non-mind?"??? Obviously, the answer is yes, unless you are defining "mind" way differently than I am. My father defined "mind" quite differently than he defined "brain". They aren't the same. An earthworm has a brain but my father would have said there is no mind there. All the neurons are hooked up to motor and other non-mind activity. We could argue the point from now until doomsday whether earthworms have a mind... with no way to currently settle the argument. But what's the point here?

Not from physical "states". From physical organization; specifically from Complexity. A complex system where the complexity of its organization has evolved past a threshold-- a threshold that has yet to be defined in Rosennean theory, by the way-- after which life emerges as a property of the system (or a behavior or a manifestation...)

"Mind" emerges similarly from complex organization: A brain that has evolved past a threshold of complexity such that "mind"-- or consciousness of self, or whatever you want to call this quality-- emerges as a property of this brain. This is not mechanistic in any way. Mechanists have and will happily dissociate themselves from such ideas.

>The only other solution that I can see is to
> propose that relationships are fully natural, in all systems, and that
> biological systems have taken advantage of them to preserve their
> ontological qualities and turn them into more obvious decision-making
> capabilities.
>
> So, I say human abilities have evolved from more primitive ones of a
> similar kind. If we don't account for the more primitive condition or
> aspect of nature that led to human epistemology, then physics and
> biology have a sharp dividing line.

There is no argument here. Relationships are fully natural. This is exactly what Rosennean Complexity states. What accounts for "the more primitive condition" is complexity. What accounts for anticipatory behavior is complexity. What it looks like to me is that the difference between phenomena and "information"-- a difference that is manifested in a living organism's relationship with its environment and itself when that is compared with a molecule's relationships with its environment and itself....That there is a difference at all is the assertion that is causing such argument. Is that correct?

If so, my question becomes: Why is the assertion that living organisms are the dividing "line" for life and for anticipatory behavior, for the different use of environmental phenomena, for the newly created category of causal inputs (which I have been calling "information")... why is this assertion causing such discomfort?

RR was referring to Complexity, to the importance of organization over particles in system, to an approach that studies systems differently than reductionistically.... What he was saying is NOT that "relational biology is the general and physics the special..." He was saying that "Complexity is the general, and simplicity is the special case". He was saying that contemporary physics, ie; that which admits only systems that are approachable by reductionistic means, is only about simple (non-complex) systems. I hope that clarifies things.

For that to be true, you have to show how the
> modeling relation applies generally to complexity, from which we get
> what humans do AND what apparently phyiscal system do. Since complex
> systems CAN degenerate to simple ones if sufficiently restricted, it is
> then no problem to show the physical case. This is what makes a general
> theory general.
>
By "apparently physical systems" in the above paragraph, are you referring to simple (non-complex) systems? I'm confused by what the issue here is. I can assert, though, that the general theory proposed by my father was Complexity. I can assert that he believed models are accurate only when applied to non-complex systems. I can assert that he believed there are benefits in applying models to complex systems, BUT that there will always be inaccuracy built in to those models, because complex systems are not completely model-able (ie; non-computable). If you are talking about consciousness as a property of a system, then Rosennean Complexity makes the assertion that non-complex systems are also not conscious.