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What he proposed was to enlarge the definition of "material world"
to include causal agents that are "non-physical" or not made up of "particles"
(matter) but are still part of material reality. That's what he meant by
"natural world" (not to be confused with terms like "supernatural" or religious
or "spiritual", etc).
So, you read it right, Tim. Relational analysis would admit the
existence of something that has no physical form but acts as a causal agent upon
things that do. Namely, a relationship between parts of a complex system or a
relationship between relationships, and so on. "Conventional" analysis would not
accept the existence of a relationship between parts as a real "thing".
Conventional approaches would say that the viewer is imputing a relationship to
inanimate parts.
Judith
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, February 02, 2004 4:40
PM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] "Natural Law" in
Rosennean Theory
Judith,
I need a little
help here, because read his work rather differently. Instead of the 'material
world' being a subset of a larger universe, I read it that what he proposed
was enlarging the notion of 'material world' to include what would
normally be considered 'non-physical':
"The radical departure of relational
analysis from conventional analysis should now be evident. However, there is
nothing in the relational strategy that is unphysical, in the sense
of "ideal" physics. The organization of a natural system (and in particular,
of a biological organism) is at least as much a part of its material reality
as the specific particles that constitute it at a given time, perhaps indeed
more so." [LI 119, ital. orig.]
And the quote
I used the other day:
"One of the main sources of referents, meanings, and
truths expressible in language is what I have called the external
world - the material world of cognizable events, which we observe
and measure, and with which science deals." [EL
156]
As for "natural
world", I have seen the term used intermittently, but I cannot recall him ever
defining it anywhere.
Regards,
Tim
It occurs to me that if members of the group are going to do
any kind of philosophical analysis of Rosennean Complexity, the place to
start may be with my father's notion of "The Natural World" (as
compared to the "material world") and "Natural Law".
There has been some confusion, even here on the
list, about what my father meant by terms like reality, material
world, material existence, and his use of the word "Natural" when
applied to scientific laws or constants, etc. He believed that the
relationships that exist in a complex system, which have no material weight
themselves and are therefore rejected by reductionist approaches, are
every bit as real as the particles that DO have material weight. He
believed that the relationships are a crucial aspect of the organization of
the system. He believed that the relationships exist as part of something
larger than material reality-- which he then defined as "The
Natural World". AND, he felt that we could learn about these things
using SCIENCE because these things behave according to
universal constraints that are built in. Those constraints are what he
referred to as "Natural Law". The material world is only a subset
of the larger universe, and he actually came out and said so. This is why he
was accused of being a mystic rather than a scientist. But what he said was
that the Natural World is knowable by science, we just have to develop new
methods of approach. Causality was the logic by which he arrived at many of
these conclusions. If these relationships are having causal effects, that is
the proof that they exist. When one has eliminated all other possibilities,
the one that's left is your answer.
Incidentally, he felt that consciousness was one such
"non-material" reality that exists as part of the Natural world. In making
that statement, he meant that consciousness is something real, which exists
according to Natural Laws, and is therefore knowable by
science.
Judith
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