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Hi Tim,
"Are there any
particular traditions that stand out to you as ones that either resonate with,
or are diametrically opposite to, Rosennean concepts?"
That's a good question, and
one that might take a lot of space to answer as I'd like (space I
can't really afford, given some pending
deadlines!).
There are
some obvious ones that come to mind, for me, in terms of
resonance. In the philosophy of science there's a tradition of theorizing
about the structure of scientific theories. The logical positivists in the
first half of the 20th century argued that scientific theories should be
regarded as partially interpreted logical calculi, i.e. as sets of
statements written in the language of first-order predicate logic,
with the meanings of scientific terms defined by their relation to
observation statements. This view came under strong criticism in
the late 50s and early 60s, and a movement emerged that sought to define
scientific theories in terms of the mathematical models
that define the classes of natural systems studied by a given
theory. This model-theoretic tradition, or "semantic" tradition
(as contrasted with the "syntactic" approach of the logical
positivists) of understanding scientific theories, turns attention away
from the particularities of the formal language within which a theory is
formulated, to the mathematical structures that are defined within a given
language.
Thus, for
example, Newtonian mechanics can be understood in terms of one or
another formulation of Newton's laws of motion, but a model-theoretic
approach would focus instead on the class of formal models defined by
these laws, e.g. the mathematical structures embedded in Newtonian
state space . One currently popular version of this
model-theoretic approach to scientific theories is based on state-space
models (van Fraassen, Giere, Suppe, Lloyd, Thomson) - virtually all of the
philosophy of physics done these days involves analysis of the state space
structure of physical theories.. Another model-based approach is based on
structures defined as the extensions of set-theoretic predicates (this is
inspired by the Bourbaki approach to foundations of math; Suppes, Stegmuller,
Sneed, Da Costa and French, ...).
Rosen's modelling relation
approach has some affinities with all these approaches. It's quite
explicit when one looks at frameworks for studying the computational aspects of
physical theories. I took a grad course on computability and physics, and
our instructor (Itamar Pitowsky, a philosopher of physics), in discussing the
Church-Turing thesis and its application to physical systems, drew a diagram on
the blackboard that was virtually identical to the commutation-relation
description of the modelling relation.
Another connection is with
various forms of metaphysical and epistemological structuralism (metaphysical
structuralism asserts that all that exists, is structure;
epistemological structuralism asserts that all we can know of the world
is structure). George Kampis noted in his review of Life Itself that Rosen
had strong affinities with structuralist traditions. This is certainly the
way I read Rosen, too. There's a whole tradition in the philosophy of
mathematics that goes by the name "structuralism" too (one is known as
"category-theoretic structuralism"), and though this is distinct from
metaphysical and epistemological structuralism, there are lots of points of
potential contact. I'm particulary interested in this stuff, and how it
can be used to develop an interpretive framework for complex systems theories
(Rosennean and otherwise).
There's lots more to say
about all this, but I'll have to leave it at that...
" I have also
been intending to write something relating Rosennean ideas to some of those of
Nancy Cartwright. Are these the kinds of relations to existing thinkers that you
are speaking of (with the proviso that the level and depth of my writings are
most likely substandard for academic philosophers)?"
I'm not
quite sure what you have in mind. Cartwright holds lots of views on lots
of subjects. For example, she analyses scientific theories in terms of
their mathematical models too, and she likes to talk about the complex tangle of
causal relations in the world, and how physical theories abstract away from this
complexity. That's not unlike Rosen. But she differs from Rosen in
several respects, I think; she believes, for example, that science
reveals the real, true causal powers of substances in the world (she's a realist
about what she calls causal "capacities"), the reality that lies behind the
structural relations described by models. I've never read Rosen as being
this kind of metaphysical realist about properties or substances. Rosen is
an Aristotelian in terms of his account of theoretical explanation, but
not, as far I can tell, in terms of his metaphysics. Cartwright is an
Aristotelian in terms of the metaphysics of real substances and their
properties.
"But...but....this is something of a catch-22: one of
Rosen's important ideas, or results, is that the current universe of
discourse is too limited to include Rosennean complex systems. To attempt to
cast his ideas in this limited framework is difficult insofar as from
within that framework complex systems do not appear.
This is something I find a difficulty: in
order to describe Rosennean complexity to someone it is often necessary to
first describe the larger universe that contains these complex systems, and
the latter is no less difficult to present than the former. Any insights on
this would be greatly appreciated." Well, I don't know about "insights", but...
I think the fact that this list exists is evidence that
the "universe of discourse" is broad enough to allow for meaningful discussion
of Rosennean complex systems. However, if you mean that traditional
modelling frameworks are too narrow to capture such systems, that may be true,
but I don't see how this fact is a barrier to talking about them, to arguing for
their reality and significance. The problems facing attempts to
communicate Rosennean concepts to other groups are problems that, in my
experience, arise from the level of abstractness at which his key, original
points are presented. It takes a certain kind of thinker to follow a chain
of reasoning that starts to loop back on itself, that is ultimately
self-referential. But this is exactly the same kind of problem I face when
I'm trying to explain, say, the argument for Godel's incompleteness theorem to a
student. People schooled in abstract, mathematical thinking will get it
easier than others.
We can follow the analogy with Godel's theorem a little
further, actually. It's takes a while to understand the argument for
it, but once you've got it, you've got it. It's not so hard, though, to
understand the content of the theorem, or to be able to discuss
the implications of the theorem. As long as you're confident that the
argument for it is sound, then you can basically ignore the details. Godel
had the advantage that his arguments were communicated to a group of peers who
could follow the reasoning, testify to its soundness, and appreciate the
implications of it. Rosen's arguments were never successfully communicated
to a group of peers in a position to see their significance, and so there's no
tradition of authority one can appeal to in talking about Rosen's
conclusions.
Finally, I'd add that one can talk about some of Rosen's
ideas without necessarily talking about all of them. For example, I was
very impressed by Rosen's analysis of the "state" concept in Life
Itself, and it led to me investigate further the differences in how this
concept is understood in physics and engineering/systems theory (his discussion
of these differences in Anticipatory Systems was illuminating for
me). From this material alone, I was able to get a handle on some of
Rosen's major claims. None of it involved category theory,
metabolism-repair systems, genericity and stability, and so forth. I
later gave a talk on the interpretation of the state concept in physics and
the engineering sciences at a conference while still a grad student, and it
was well received. This one part of Rosen's work had informed my own
thinking on a subject, and I was able to communicate that thinking to an
audience. If I thought I had to bring in the whole Rosen package, I would
never have given that talk.
"- I have taught, and will be teaching regularly in
the future, a graduate course on the history and philosophy of ecology for the
graduate program in Ecology, Evolution and Organismal Biology at ISU. My
dealings with this crowd have been cordial, but here it's become clear that
there are deep resistances among many of the faculty to holistic approaches in
ecology and evolutionary theory. This is not atypical for departments of
biology and ecology in the US, though.
In your
view, what is the reason for this deep resistance? Is it the legacy
of a historical connection between holism and
vitalism?" In the US, it's mainly a product of the critique that
holistic approaches in ecology suffered as a result of George William's attack
on group selectionist thinking in his 1966 book Adaptation and Natural
Selection . The holistic, ecosystem approch to ecology pioneered by
folks like Howard and Eugene Odum was based on the assumption that ecological
complexity was ultimately a product of two forces -- coevolution and group
selection. Williams criticized arguments for group or multi-level
selection, and argued for a genic conception of the level of selection (Dawkin's
The Selfish Gene is just Williams warmed over). Young ecologists
in the late 60s and early 70s came to believe that ecology must be founded on
gene-centered evolutionary theory, and the result was the rise of
population-oriented evolutionary ecology and the marginalization of systems and
ecosystem ecology in the classical tradition.
That's part of the story, anyway. The vitalism issue
hasn't been a problem for ecology since the 1940s, really. The debate has
been over whether ecological systems can really be treated as unified, dynamical
systems exhibiting behavioural regularities at higher levels that owe their
existence to system-spanning correlations among the parts of the system.
For reductionists in ecology, the answer is no -- they would argue that such
views have no clear empirical support, and are likely the product of a romantic
conception of untouched nature as harmonious and
balanced.
Holistic approaches in ecology have greater
support, generally, in Europe, South America and Asia. It's
interesting to speculate on why this is the case. Reductionists might say
that these countries simply never had a George Williams to wake them
up. I suspect the answer is more complicated than this.
Peace,
Kevin
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