Re: Rosen & Ashby

["James N Rose" <***>]

Tim,

Interleaving ....


Tim Gwinn wrote:
>
> Hi Jamie,
>
> The two Rosen quotes are of decidely different natures. ...
>
> You are correct that they, in effect, say the same thing.

> The "subjective
> limitation" in the first statement that is codified in the second statement
> is the subjective expectation that all models are "simulable".  It was one
> of Rosen's great insights that the belief that all systems should be
> entirely able to be modeled by algorithmic models was incorrect. So it is
> that complex systems are those that sit on the other side of that subjective
> limitation, by virtue of their possessing nonsimulable models.

Ok.  I see a probable divergence of views between Rosen and
myself on this particular point.  One I'd rather not get into
here, because it might be misinterpreted as my discounting
the rest of what he wrote, which I absolutely would not assert.

Suffice it to say that I have an open and ongoing position
in my writings and academic debates wherein I dispute
Godel's incompleteness theorems .. as specifically applied
in general extension(s) .. that effectively say the same thing
you just ascribed to Rosen.

That's problematic when there is driven interest to accomplish
a unified theory of existence.  The universe already behaves and
functions in a way such that models and nature, closed and open
systems, specifity and complexity (Rosennean sense) coordinate
smoothly and well together.  There are natural/normal relations
between the domains which have 'decidedly different natures'.
They are inter-involved together, and so if not an 'algorithm'
then something similar exists that can identify the pandemic
cross-coordinations that are the reality of Being and performnce
in the universe.

Does Rosen anywhere address those evident cross-coordinations
and interactions, or does he just get to the strong statement
of differential types and leave it at that?

>[shortened]
>
> Similarly, "simulation" refers to a very specific concept for Rosen. It took
> him an entire painstaking chapter in "Life Itself" to explain. I'll try to
> crudely summarize simulation as: the substitution of algorithmic entailments
> in a Turing machine for the entailment structure of the original system. The
> upshot is that 'simulation' both invokes the limits of Turing-computability
> and also uncouples any necessary relationship between the entailment
> structure in the simulation and the entailment structure in the original
> system. This makes simulation a very insidious way of superficially
> appearing to do modeling, when it fact, the two are generally worlds
> apart. I'd probably have to refer anyone to ch. 7 of LI for any more detailed
> explanations on these concepts.

[Judith ... would you have any copies that I could purchase
directly from you?  Please let me know, thank you!  Jamie]


> > The two quotes of Rosen's you cited "defining"
> > complexity, is one of them 'wrong'?  And how does
> > an information set (a mathematical statement)
> > 'not let itself be exhausted'?  Does the mathematics
> > have intentional volition of some sort?  Do you
> > think that's part of what Rosen was trying to convey?

Any comments in reply to these questions, Tim?

Thanks for all your considered postings!

Jamie
11/19/03