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Re: [COMPLEX-M] Free-will
- From: "James N Rose" <***>
- Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2003 06:12:27 -0500
John K.,
What you have described is effectively a change in the
number of parameters or dimensions of the 'description
of a system'. What I've discovered is, that when you
do that, you also change the commutivity, and, you change
stochatistic properties. You prioritize the entire range
of possible events, over the outcomes of 'specific inputs --
specific outputs'.
To make 'all possibles' instantaneously available .. is to
compress a time dimension to '1'; you collapse (erase) time.
Which effectively is what mathematicians do in
vector/tensor/matrix analysis .. make all possibles
'instantaneously' instantiated. Which is tantamount
to a condition of forced a-priorical 'symmetry' as the
most primitive frame of reference for all analysis. :-)
Jamie
John Kineman wrote:
>
> Hi Tim and others;
>
> I think this is exactly to the point. Once the causalities are looped
> and simultaneous, there is no sequence in modeling, it happens
> instantaneously. What would that be like experientially? In that case,
> any non-commutation between model and system must appear compressed into
> the moment of experience and would necessarily appear as the ability to
> resolve the mis-match (or keep imagining resolutions). The mismatch
> produces uncertainties or multiple possibilities of a system realizing a
> function or a function describing a system. That's about as close to
> free-will as any description of it can get, I think.
>
> Tim Gwinn wrote:
>
> >Hi James,
> >
> >...
> >
> >The problem of free will, in my view, is not solved by finding some way to
> >escape causal determinacy. The problem of free will is solved by an opposite
> >method of maximally utilizing causal determinacy: by creating causal loops
> >such that the system has pulled all the requisite organizational causal
> >entailments inside itself. In this way, a human, or more generally, an
> >organism, is not susceptible to impressed external forces as the causal
> >basis for its actions. In other words, it can have free-will.
> >
> >And Rosen's anticipatory systems demonstrate how there can be systems which
> >not only contain these closed causal loops, but also utilize such loops to
> >incorporate internal predictive models so that "free-will" can have some
> >internal causal basis for decision-making. By this view, free will may -
> >perhaps - be limited to the degrees of freedom of the internal predictive
> >model.
> >
> >
>
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