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Re: Time and context



Tim,
a decade - or so - ago I ent through some agony to identify the "simple" concepts MY WAY. (I was not exluding earlier similar variations of others, if they seemed acceptable in my terms).
For time I remember the definition: a function of movement (I added: in space) which can easily be generalized into a function of change in its sequence.
I found an inadequacy between our ideas (as crutches for  the understanding of the world) of space and time: in the physical sense I could figure space without time, but not time, without space. Generalized: topics can be seen without change, but change cannot be seen without topics.
Then I slipped into trying to find terms of aspatial and atemporal world systems, which is very hard. I had to abandon causality in timelessness, since cause and effect mixed together, in spite of Feynmans sweat to do a similar thing in QM.
 
I believe the 'time' problem is so fundamental in our reductionism based ways of thinking that the 'time' <G> may not be ripe for the clarification of the concept.
 
Just a remark from an innov=cent bystander.
 
John M
----- Original Message -----
From: Tim Gwinn
To: ***
Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2003 3:58 PM
Subject: Re: Time and context

Hi Judith,
 
I think we are indeed each looking of time in somewhat different ways. As do you, I do not think time is "merely a figment of collective human imagination". Not entirely, anyway. To me, time is the observer-imposed relation of changes in some physical clock system as a reference system to changes in some physical system under study.
 
What I see in ch. 4 ("The Encoding of Time") of AS is primarily the exploration of dynamics and logical time as a way of exposing the notion of "time" as not being a true physical quality; but, rather, a quality of the type I mentioned above.
 
To me, the dilemma of "time" is that it is inherently about the relations between changes in values of observables of multiple systems, and therefore we cannot study this relation except by comparison of two (or more) such systems. In a sense, we have no way to speak of changes in the material world except in reference to other changes in the material world. This is, of course, just the frustrating restriction due to not belonging to a universe we can make fully objective, and one in which we can deem no particular source of change as being regarded as 'the' universal and fundamental measure of change in the universe.
 
Regards,
Tim