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Re: Time/Life/Science



Hi Judith,
See inteposed.
Regards,
Tim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Judith
> Rosen
> Sent: Sunday, October 05, 2003 5:34 PM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Time/Life/Science
>
>
> Hi Tim
>
> I found your point of view really intriguing, even though ultimately it's
> very different from mine. I'd like to get a few clarifications.
> When you say
> that "Time is a mental construct" are you saying that even the Einsteinian
> view of time isn't referring to a real phenomenon?


It ("the Einsteinian view of time") refers to (that is, it models) a real
phenomenon, but I think that it is an inadequate representation of that
phenomenon.


 So how do you
> account for
> this "dynamical nature of all things", as you see them? If the
> definition of
> dynamical isn't "moving over time" or something similar, how do you define
> it?


As I see it, "dynamical" is a term which is based in the language of a
3-dimensional space + 1-dimension of time conceptual framework. So, from
within this conceptual framework, "dynamical" is indeed about changes along
both dimensions of space and time.

My feeling is that this conceptual framework is inadequate in a way akin to
which the Newtonian framework for physics is inadequate for representation
of complex systems. My thought is that any 3+1 conceptual framework -
including Einsteinian - will be inadequate as a conceptual modeling
framework for what we call "dynamical" processes in the material world.

>From this view, "dynamical" is a limited concept. It is limited by the
notion of state. This notion of state in turn rests on conceptually dividing
the world into "space"+"time". I suggest that this concept, although as
commonsensical as Newtonian physics, is not thereby a true and complete
representation of the material world. I believe it is incomplete, and cannot
be made complete by any amount of enhancements or modifications.


It seems to me that in order for something to move at all,
> there has to
> be time. Time is what makes all activity fluid. It allows for
> causality. If
> there was no such thing as time, how can one thing lead to
> another?


I think that this kind of thinking is mistaking the formal concept for the
reality. We model the world in 3+1 spacetime frameworks, and we then begin
to think that the material world _actually_is_ this 3+1 framework, and so
"time" is also a real thing.

This is quite similar to modeling reality in a Newtonian conceptual
framework and then, based on successes in that modeling, concluding that the
material world _must be_ Newtonian. Einsteinian concepts are modifications
to to the Newtonian framework, but they are both of the same ilk.

What I am doing is to saying that not only are Newtonian/Einsteinian
frameworks inadequate, but that _any_ kind of framework that relies upon a
framework of space+time will be inadequate.


If there
> is no such thing as time, then what is "rate"? I agree that what my father
> was discussing with the concept of a clock "measuring something" being
> merely a human concept. But that doesn't mean that time itself
> isn't a real
> thing/entity/phenomenon. I believe it is. A clock is designed to
> measure one
> observable aspect of time, and a clock (-- a simple system) is extremely
> limited both in scope and in description of what it's supposedly
> measuring.
>
> I believe my father would agree (as do I) that the material world is
> dynamical. That's one given that comes out of the atom being a complex
> system, in my view. Perhaps it is even more fundamental than that; even
> simple systems are dynamical, one way or another... (which some have
> mistaken for "complexity"). But I see the property of "dynamical behavior"
> very much as a factor of time involvement. My father viewed time
> as another
> natural phenomenon and surmised that we should be able to discern some of
> the aspects of it by observing how it behaves, how it interacts with other
> natural phenomena that we do know something about, how it impacts complex
> systems, and make comparisons, study connections, etc... Whatever time
> actually IS, we're having trouble defining, but if it is a real phenomenon
> in the material world, what are the odds that it's complex?
>
> When you talk about "static natural systems" like a rock, what I see is a
> system that has a different RATE of change, which can be


Agreed. As I said, a rock is a static system given the appropriate
definitions of the system and remaining within those definitional limits.
This is like defining a car engine as simple rather than complex: one must
stay within the certain definition of the system for this to hold true. In
more general terms, I agree that a rock is a dynamical system.


> rephrased to say a
> different relationship with time such that its time scale is
> slower, just as
> it has a different melting point and a different freezing point than, say,
> water, the rock also has other relationships that are different. I tend to
> view time as one of those relationships.
>
> Regards,
> Judith
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Tim Gwinn" <***>
> To: <***>
> Sent: Friday, October 03, 2003 6:14 PM
> Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Time/Life/Science
>
>
> > Hi Judith et al,
> >
> > In my view, all material systems in the external world are innately
> > dynamical. "Time" arises as part of a human scheme for tracking that
> > dynamical behavior. That is, time is a mental construct that sits on the
> > formal side of the modeling relation. As your father said, a clock does
> not
> > "measure" anything; instead, a clock is a natural system which generates
> > percepts which serve as the basis for labels. [AS 51] These labels can
> then
> > be applied to percepts from other systems that are deemed to satisfy the
> > relation of "simultaneity" with the clock percepts.
> >
> > It is possible to define a natural system as "static" given the
> appropriate
> > definitions for the system so that, within those definitional
> limits, the
> > system does not have perceptible movement. So, given a certain
> definition
> of
> > a rock as a natural system, it is static. However, from another, more
> > perspective, the rock is interacting with other systems around
> it, so that
> > it has dynamics. Or from the view that the rock is floating on
> a continent
> > slowly drifting, or on a planet spinning or in a solar system
> moving along
> > in a galaxy.
> >
> > >From the viewpoint that all material reality is innately
> dynamical, time
> is
> > (at least to me) more easily seen as just a human construct. As
> it is with
> > space. "Space" is something that seems readily obvious, yet as
> science has
> > come along we have gone from a Cartesian-Newtonian idea of space, to
> > Minkowski space, to Reimannian space, etc.Some applications use a space
> with
> > a Euclidean geometry, some use a non-Euclidean geometry.
> >
> > In all cases, these are formal frameworks within which to
> situate certain
> > kinds of relations among percepts. "Time" is likewise such a formal
> > framework within which to situate relations between percepts.
> >
> > I think this also makes talk of "the flow of time" as being just a
> primitive
> > human metaphor. And "time-travel" as being an empty concept,
> since "time"
> is
> > not something that one travels on, in or through - instead
> 'time' is just
> a
> > formal framework.
> >
> > I think that the formal framework called 'time' is an almost inevitable
> > consequence of first partitioning material reality according to some
> notion
> > of "space". The question that arises is whether or not this 3+1
> dimension
> > framework is 'the' way the world actually works, or that if it is not,
> then
> > it is _at least_ general enough to encompass the innate dynamical nature
> of
> > material reality. My view (and I imagine, Rosen's view) is that this 3+1
> > framework does not satisfy that latter criteria. And, therefore it does
> not
> > satisfy the former, either.
> >
> > So it is that just as Rosen speaks of the inability of fixed
> functions to
> > describe some dynamics of complex systems, he also speaks of multiple
> > incommensurable timeframes as being necessary for describing
> some complex
> > systems, including some biological systems. To me, this - along with the
> > multitude of 3+1 framework schemes being used - is likely symptomatic of
> an
> > inherent inability of any 3+1 scheme to adequately act as a
> framework for
> > the dynamical nature of material reality.
> >
> > To come back around to my first statement ("In my view, all material
> systems
> > in the external world are innately dynamical."), it should now be clear
> that
> > "dynamical" is here only a metaphor for what actually occurs in material
> > reality, couched in the language of 3+1 frameworks. By this I
> do not mean
> > that material reality is not "dynamical"; but rather that "dynamical" is
> > itself an inadequate term because of its conceptual basis in an
> inadequate
> > framework.
> >
> > >From this viewpoint, it does however open up the possibility that there
> are
> > more "organic frameworks" that might be more inclusive and comprehensive
> and
> > representative of the innate "dynamical" nature of material reality than
> are
> > _any_ of the 3+1 frameworks.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Tim
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf
> Of Judith
> > > Rosen
> > > Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2003 12:21 PM
> > > To: ***
> > > Subject: Time/Life/Science
> > >
> > >
> > > With all the discussion about my father's theories about Anticipatory
> > > Systems and what Biology reveals about Time, etc. I thought
> it might be
> > > useful to open up a discussion about Time, itself, as a concept.
> > > Biology uses time in many different ways, some of which are intuitive
> > > and observable; from population mechanics and rates of growth and
> > > taking things like RATE into account when analyzing statistical
> > > date.... Time is not separable from the other aspects of  any
> > > biological investigation, which also means that it's not
> separable from
> > > any discussion about Rosennean Complexity. If my father was right that
> > > his definition of complexity is the generic organization of the entire
> > > universe, then this relationship with Time is endemic in all things.
> > >
> > > Why is a "dynamical system" dynamical? I think it is because TIME is
> > > one of the ingredients. It's moving, it's in motion, the rates of
> > > interaction of the parts are every bit as integral to the organization
> > > of the parts (in other words the rates of one part influencing another
> > > part are as important as the fact that one part IS INFLUENCING another
> > > part-- that's as much a "relationship"...) as any other aspects of how
> > > the system is organized. The atom is a dynamical system. The whole
> > > premise of why complexity won't yield to reductionism is because
> > > reductionism wants to remove the relationships from the parts
> and study
> > > the parts. If my father was correct that time is one of the
> ingredients
> > > in these relationships-- in fact a relationship itself, then
> > > reductionism is the process of removing/divorcing TIME from the system
> > > on order to study or describe it in a state outside of time. In other
> > > words; fractionate the atom and look at the parts. Kill the organism
> > > and look at the parts... What my father said was that you
> can't do that
> > > and still hope to understand why the system (ie: the atom) behaved as
> > > it did before you fractionated it, and the reason you can't is because
> > > it no longer is an atom. Something about the organization of
> it when it
> > > was intact is responsible for the behavior of it. When you alter the
> > > organization, you no longer have the same system. My
> intuitive grasp of
> > > my father's concepts is what leads me to see the effect of killing an
> > > organism or splitting an atom as "taking that system out of time", or
> > > separating time from the other aspects of the system in order to study
> > > the other aspects. Conventional "experimental" science regards TIME in
> > > a particular way, but why should that definition of time be
> accepted as
> > > correct by people who are following my father's other theoretical
> > > ideas? The accepted definition of time is even more obscure and
> > > incomplete than the definition of life was when my father
> tackled these
> > > ideas. His investigations led him to see how integral the concept of
> > > rate is to all things and then how integral the concept of future
> > > acting on present behavior of living things is in biology. Thus,
> > > Anticipatory Systems was written. To discuss the rate of something
> > > happening is the same thing as saying that something is happening
> > > across time.
> > >
> > > What I'm wondering, or in fact challenging the list subscribers to do
> > > is define time as seen from my father's theoretical perspective. What
> > > is it? What isn't it? And why wouldn't that be seen as a valuable
> > > addition to science or, indeed, to our collective human understanding
> > > of the universe as well as of ourselves as organic systems?
> > >
> > > Judith