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Re: Fw: Rosennean definition of "life"

Hi Judith and everyone,

I'd like to jump in the middle here (sorry for being absent - very busy), not having seen all the previous exchanges on this; so please excuse me if I overlook or repeat what has been said. Too swamped for more than just a pot shot..

How I now think of this is very similar to what Judith describes, except if I go to the philosophical level (where all theories find their limits). Someone once said that good models fail in interesting ways; i.e., lead to some further insight. That's one reason I like RR's approach; i.e., it works in a very practical sense, then when pushed beyond its limits it implies a very interesting question: Is nature dead or alive? Of course, that's philosophy at that point, not strictly speaking, science. Science can be built on either premise, something I like to point out.

The result is that I have two simultaneous interpretations; one for realized systems - the practical view, and one as a formal consideration.
A. Life form, referring to a realized living system
B. Life itself (as property or principle), referring to the formal nature (and/or recognition) of life.

I would emphasize that it is not a matter of choosing between these alternatives, but in accepting them both, which then implies a higher level that we havn't described, but which RR's overall theory gets at.

So, with that preamble, please see my quips below, with due regard for their speculative nature:

Judith Rosen wrote:
Dan,

What you are describing in ecosystems is what I believe my father would call
"complexity". Life is a property, according to him, that is caused by
complexity.
Interpretation A: Life is a formal property of a certain kind of complex system, i.e., one that has metabolism-repair functions, etc. In this sense life is close to being synonymous with organism. Here we probably mean "life form." In this case, an ecosystem is generally not recognized as a life form in itself, but composed of life forms and non-living components in relationship, but not in such tight relationship that we would call it a living being or life form. Hence there is a certain degree of closure of causes in such a system beyond which we accept it as a living entity in and of itself. As I speculated before, if the global information system and increasing human domination of Earth systems produces such a degree of closure, then it may approach the idea of a super-organism.

Interpretation B: Life is a formal property, by which we recognize a distinction from non-living, or strictly material systems. The non-living may be synonymous with mechanism and the mechanistic world view (debate); i.e., the realization of a mechanical model. Thus, if life is "not that" it must be the realization of a complex formality (which includes the capacity for abstraction). That is, unless we propose a third category sitting between living and non-living (One of the conversants on the Life list discusses "non-trivial machines" and I am trying to find out what he means by that and if it defines such a third category). But if we accept only the two categories for the moment, then "life" in this view is general, whereas non-life is a special "degenerate" case. It is thus close to being synonymous with complexity. In this view, an ecosystem is a living system, because the system as a whole cannot be reduced to a mechanism.  At this scale or perspective, it  is analogous to a complex organism in that it has both living organisms and non-living systems comprising it. The human body, for example, has many relationships with microorganisms without which we could not  live. Mitochondria may have been an invading organism that became  sufficiently entailed to lose its distinction. etc. But we do not worry whether or not the ecosystem is closed enough to be called a life form or organism - at this level or interpretation, we are only saying it is a living system. This is really a philosophical view, and it is in that framework that one can say that nature itself is living and/or complex. in principle.

It may not be important to distinguish life from complexity at this scale, whereas it is significant to do so in regard to life meaning life form. There, for an otherwise meso-scale system to exhibit properties of life, it must somehow emphasize it rather than diminish it. So I think of systems that "amplify" complexity into what we then recognize as life in a particular realized system. But what we are really recognizing in that system is the general, philosophical, life principles; and then calling the system "alive" or a "life form" depending on the degree of organization and amplification.

I thus find it useful to think in terms of life-form (realized) and life-princple (formal), not choosing between them but applying these views at their appropriate scale.

Both life and complexity are principles that presumably can be defined formally, and yet appear and are recognized as properties of a realized system. It is different to talk about the property vs. the system that exhibits it. But in regard to the later, we have a sense that the presence of "life" sufficiently to call a system a life form involves something more that that which is sufficient to call it complex. I think that is a practical difference, involving the degree of closure of the system -- its ability to repair, metabolize, reproduce, etc.

But if life is more than complexity, one of RR's ideas was that what is more can't be "caused" by what is less; it must be the other way around. Physics/mechinism (non life) is thus the subset of whatever domain complexity is associated with, and similarly complexity would be the sub-set of whatever domain life is associated with. To invert one end of that hierarchy only gives a funny picture, where life is sitting between complexity and non-life, i.e., something less than complex. I wouldn't that that would be consistent (draw a line and label the ends of the continuum).

Is complexity a property of organisms? (I think that was the beginning, not the end of his inquiry; yet remains the practical application of it)
Is complexity a property of natural systems? (I think that is more where the theory ended up; thus implicating something even more interesting, the philosophical limits I mentioned above.

The same can be said of life, that is life-as-principle or property, as opposed to "a living form."
The quality of "life" in a single celled organism  is orders of
magnitude higher in complexity than what you are describing in ecosystems.
One discussion we had on the VCU list was if "complexity" was a scaler at all, or a boolean quality; i.e., either complex or not. I think RR defines it in a way that looks like a boolean quality, theoretically; but in real systems it might be a continuum between complex and non-complex.. It can be discussed in scalar terms, e.g., in ecosystems, in regard to the mixture of complex and non-complex processes in one's analysis, or in terms of the degree to which the freedom of complexity is limited, i.e., how machine-like is the behavior. (Cake and eat it too?)
It seems to me that you are trying to make "life" the generic quality here,
rather than complexity. But if you do that, you will not be able to
"scientifically" understand or explain the difference between an organism
and anything not-organism.
I'm not sure that is true. "Life" after all is just a word, like "complexity" is. A general principle should not preclude sharper distinctions of sub-systems. We cannot escape using the word at both levels (philosophical and practical) in our current language, or at least there would not be general agreement to do so. So we're stuck with two context-dependent usages of the term. In the general views we are discussing, you can easily get mechanisms from a living/complex system as discussed earlier; but you can't get life or complexity from a mechanical system, by definition. So, it seems clear to me which is the general (life and complexity) and which is the specific (mechanism).
 This was what led my father to develop the whole
framework as he did in the first place. His view was that ecosystems only
have "life" in them because there are organisms in them.
And yet I agree with this too, as usage A. ; so perhaps I am schitzophrenic. But I think there is a resolution to the puzzle. We have to consider the scale at which we are looking. At the ecosystem scale, only organisms preserve complexity in their functional entailment. If we were to look at the composition of physical material in the ecosystem at the finest scale, we would again see similar functional entailment (or at least be able to apply the theory effectively to the behavior sub-atomic particles). So I get living systems as systems that preserve complexity, and mechanical systems as systems that expell it. Complexity is general. Life too must be general. Both manifest non-generally (we do experience mechanical objects and systems which are neither complex in behavior nor living).

The general philosophical view of life-principle is thus consistent with the specific view of it - i.e., the two usages are non-contradictory; and it has many implications for society. We really need a more living or complex world view to overcome the mechanical mind-trap that has spread to almost every discipline as a result of its success in physics. The usual way of doing this was to adopt an "organic" world view, like the Chinese ideas of living cycles, etc. But that now seems more limited compared to a complex or fully living world view.
 To go backwards and
say that organisms are alive because they are part of a larger ecosystem
makes questionable sense.
I agree wholeheartedly, as I hope the above comments indicate. Organism are alive because of an intrinsic property, although that property is also connected with the effect of context (i.e., the larger system). It is hierarchically contingent, as discussed before. Ecosystems are interesting assemblages of organisms and "energy/things." The mixture can vary considerably. I could think of them as proto-organisms or potential organisms; i.e., if they eventually get the degree of entailment/contingency closure needed to act sufficiently like an organism (metabolism-repair theory now). The key, I think, is defining the scale of description. 
As for the closure "paradox", the way out of the maze is simple:

Non-life, under certain circumstances, gives rise to complexity;
This I would doubt is supported in RR's framework. I think he has it the other way around. Complexity gives rise to non-life by virtue of models that reduce a system to a mechanism. Life sits at the complex end of that continuum. 
Complexity creates more-complex-ity (an awkward term but would "more and
sometimes higher levels of complexity" be any better?);
Perhaps we are talking about the degree of relational entailment/contingency as in ecosystems?? Thus we can get the "more" by mixing complex and non-complex systems in different ways. (Cake and eat it too).
More-complex-ity causes life.
Organismic life, to be sure. In this case, however, one should not use the word "life" alone, as that may also be taken to be the essence of life, or "life itself" as opposed to life as realized. I guess this is the sticky part.
It looks to me, from a Rosennean (Complexity) perspective, that Ecosystems
(systems comprised of communities of living organisms and all of their
contexts) are a side effect. They only exist if life exists. A lifeless
"ecosystem" isn't an ecosystem, is it?
 It's a "context".
I would agree with this; a dead ecosystem is an environment, with which, however, life can interact. If we consider the interactions and  they get sufficiently wrapped up with each other, we then call it an ecosystem. If it then develops an M-R system and reproduces both materially and functionally, then it has become an organism. At which point did life enter? I don't think you can find one. So then it was either there all along, as principle, perhaps synonymous with complexity, or it is an arbitrary definition like all we have had so far.
The very first
  
"ecosystem" only came into being when life emerged out of complexity.
again, I'd clarify "life form" -- the first organism?
 If
that is so, then ecosystems are an example of complexity creating more
complexity.
or mixing it thicker with non-complex systems.
Judith

----- Original Message -----
From: "Dan Fiscus" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2003 1:40 PM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Fw: Rosennean definition of "life"
Regarding prior discussion below - generally, if I get the drift:

This is why I deal with both the general and the specific meanings of life. In my interpretation, the specific meaning is, basically, the organism, which appropriately requires additional organizational aspects (metabolism-repair systems) to count for being sufficiently "organic." The formal meaning, however, is basically complexity. Non life is then easily conceived as a mechanism. This, of course, given that "grey" areas can always be found in any analytical distinction, this included.

Another way to imagine this is that life-as-organism, i.e., "life form" is obviously a realized system in RR's construction. It can thus be the "NS" box in a modeling relation. Life-as-principle, stated as such, is necessarily formal. So is "complexity," as such (it is a kind of behavior, i.e., the means of recognizing a "complex system"). At that formal level, it can be postulated to be general, then you get both living and non-living systems developing or distilling from that.


Anyway, that's how I currently sort through these ideas. Hope it provides some useful amusement.

John K.