Re: Rosean definition of life

["John M" <***>]

Tim,
 a maple tree does NOT drop its leaves. The leaves fall off.

John
----- Original Message -----
From: "Tim Gwinn" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Friday, September 26, 2003 8:41 PM
Subject: Re: Rosean definition of life


> Hi Viktor,
> See interposed comments.
> Regards,
> Tim
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of slovak
> > Sent: Friday, September 26, 2003 4:54 PM
> > To: ***
> > Subject: Re: Rosean definition of life
> >
> >
> > Hi Judith and Tim,
> >
> > sorry for the delayed response.
> > Regarding the Daisyworld model, I brought it up as an example of
> > how organisms can change their environment to suit their needs
> > without invoking telos.  I agree that as Lovelock put it forth,
> > it is based on the reaction paradigm, in that a deviation from an
> > equilibrium state triggers the system to move back to the
> > equilibrium state.  This differs from an anticipatory view in
> > which a system, presumably, reorganizes itself so that the future
> > deviation does not lead to a move away from the equilibrium
> > state.  Let me know if I have that right, I haven't read AS and I
> > still feel fuzzy about this.
>
> ====
> I would suggest that thinking in terms of "equilibrium state" might not be
> beneficial. In the maple leaf example, the tree dropping its leaves in
> anticipation of the cold is certainly a change from its previous
> "equilibrium" state. When talking about open-systems, I think
"equilibrium"
> is an ill-defined word. Even Bertalanffy's "fliessgleichgewicht"
> ("steady-state") fails to capture the flexibilities of many (most?)
> biological systems.
>
> So, an anticipatory system is not as concerned about maintaining some
> "equilibrium" as it is about generating the appropriate (according to its
> internal model) control behavior _now_ before some undesireable (as per
its
> internal model) change _would occur_ in the future. The control behavior
> itself may generate a significant change, rather than always preventing a
> change.
> ====
>
> > So could the Daisyworld model be redesigned to display
> > anticipatory behavior?
>
> ===
> Good question. The model would have to involve Rosennean complexity by
> representing closed causal loops in the model as inferential loops. Of
> course, this makes such a model inherently noncomputable. But, perhaps it
> could be turned from a model into a simulation? That is the question. It
is
> what initially led me to thinking of N-body systems as an analogous
> situation, since they have such causal loops, and yet, we do have some
> abilities to create computer simulations of them. Those simulations (as
far
> as I know) likely do not have anything to do with embodying anticipatory
> internal predictive models, but perhaps it is still somewhat encouraging.
> ===
>
> >
> > With regard to Judith's comments about ecosystems and such not
> > fitting into Rosen's definition of life, meaning closed to
> > efficient causation...
>
> ====
> Rosen seemed to have backed off of that definition ("closed to efficient
> causation") he gave in "Life Itself". In "Essays", he goes so far as to
say
> that with regard to sufficient conditions for a material system to be
> considered an organism, there may be none. [EL 28]
>
> However, he does also say later on that a cell is _at least_ a material
> realization of an (M,R) system (which is closed to efficient causation)
and,
> on the other hand, he also sees no reason not to consider a material
> realization of an (M,R) system a life form. [EL 263]
>
> I think Judith's insights into what Rosen informally considered "life" are
> more important insofar as they seem to have directed his investigation,
and
> that these more formal considerations above are consequent steps in that
> investigation, and not the other way around.
> ====
>
> > That definition means to me that an organism A can only come
> > about from another organism A.
>
> ===
> "Closed to efficient causation" refers to the closed loop of efficient
> causation in the (M,R) cell model. This is a functional organization
model.
> There is no requirement that such a system having such organization must
be
> realized or fabricated only via reproduction.
> ===
>
> That does not mean to me, as
> > someone recently claimed, that organism A leads to a sufficient
> > condition to 'fabricate' another organism A, but to a necessary
> > one.  Meaning, for example, that of course the right
> > environmental conditions have to exist.
> > But what about symbiosis, such as lichens, Atta ants and their
> > fungus, trees and microrhyza (sp?), etc.  In fact, an ant colony
> > sems like a great exmaple, even without the fungus.  Ant colonies
> > clearly produce other ant colonies, but can a lone queen by
> > itself 'fabricate' another ant colony? What about a worker?  A
> > worker's efficient causation is the queen, are they the same organism?
> > And what about a one-legged man?  he can clearly reproduce, so
> > should the essense of an organism get confined to the minimum
> > that can still reproduce?
> > I'll appreciate any comments....
>
> ====
> I'll go along with Judith and say that 'reproduction' is not a useful
> criteria for living/non-living.
> ====
>
> >
> > Viktor
>