John K et al,
-----Original Message-----
From: ROSEN Forum [ -snip- ]On Behalf Of John
Kineman
Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2003 11:05 AM
To: -snip-
Subject: Re: [life] Machines and wholeness - a speculative hierarcy
Hi Jon & list,
This makes a lot of sense to me. I think there is an inconsistency in
asserting efficient closure except as a relative matter. It would be
interesting to get reactions from the Rosen list, so again I'm
cross-posting this to both lists.
-snip-
I do not perceive "closed to efficient causation" as presenting an
inconsistency. However, Rosen certainly does not make it terribly clear what
he is talking about in that sentence, and it can appear to lead to
inconsistencies. Certainly, how could an organism be "closed" to, or cut off
from, or fail to be susceptible to, impressed (efficient) forces from
outside?
Including the next sentence after the "closed to efficient causation"
sentence helps some:
"The answer we propose is now this: a material system is an organism if, and
only if, it is closed to efficient causation. That is, if f is any component
of such a system, the question "why f?" has an answer within the system,
which corresponds to the category of efficient cause of f." [LI p. 244]
And, in regards to the (M,R) system and the above criteria:
"Clearly, the diagram [10C.6] satisfies the condition we have laid down at
the outset of this chapter, namely, that everything in it is entailed in the
sense of efficient cause entirely within the diagram. Any material system
possessing such a graph or relational model (i.e., which realizes that
graph) is accordingly an organism." [LI p. 251-252]
The discussion in that chapter, and these quotes specifically, are based
around characteristics of functional organization. In the first quote,
"component" refers to Rosen's use of the term as referring to a functional
element - a "particle" of functional organization. And, the (M,R) system is,
of course, a functional model of an organism.
So "closed to efficient causation" means that the functional organization of
the system possesses the characteristic of having answers to the question
"why f?" be answerable, in terms of efficient causation, from within that
functional organizational structure, and not from some efficient cause from
outside that organization. The latter (requiring efficient cause from
outside that organization) was what led to the incipient infinite regresses
in machines and mechanisms in ch. 9.
On the other hand, from a perspective of structural organization (its
configuration of atoms, molecules, organs, etc.), the organism is certainly
"open" to efficient causes from outside (and from inside, too, most likely)
forces.
When the question of self-organization is tacitly framed entirely in terms
of structural organization, the question of organism is something
approaching disbelief:
How can an organism possibly maintain its self-organization in the face of
all the forces and influences to which it is subjected??
Which is more fully rendered as:
How can an organism possibly maintain its [structural] self-organization in
the face of all the forces and influences to which it [its structural
organization] is subjected??
The solution is to be found in breaking apart the term "self-organization"
into the two distinct and incommensurable categories: "structural
organization" and "functional organization". (Other than Rosen, it is
unfortunately still widely assumed that "functional organization is
reducible to "structural organization".)
This allows us to restate the question thusly:
How can an organism possibly maintain its functional organization in the
face of all the forces and influences to which its structural organization
is subjected??
This question is clearly not so disconcerting, since the two types of
organization are completely different, and what constitutes an efficient
cause for one type of organization does not in any way imply that it is also
an efficient cause for the other type of organization. It is in this way
that an organism can be "closed to efficient causation" in its functional
organization, and simultaneously open to efficient cause in its structural
organization. Thus an organism can maintain an invariance of functional
organization while suffering various external efficient causes to its
structural organization. Seen this way, I feel it is reasonably clear.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty is in attempting to conceptualize or
visualize in the mind these two incommensurable modes of organization being
realized simultaneously in one material system without trying to reduce one
to the other. That is a bit of a mind-bender. :)
This also makes it clear why structural approaches to studying
self-organization (e.g., self-organizing criticality, cellular automata,
etc.) are not very relevant to understanding what makes an organism
organized, and it also makes clear why studies such as molecular biology are
likewise generally not terribly fruitful in that direction.
Finally, just to note, at some later point Rosen appeared to have
reconsidered "closed to efficient causation" as a sufficient condition, and
in Essays (p.28), it seems that this has become only a necessary condition.
Regards,
Tim