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Re: Function and functional organization



Hi, Tim,
 
Thanks for your efforts to 'reduce' your Rosenspeak to the level of my understanding. After having been educated on 3 Rosen-lists over the past ~3 years, I think I follow. From your peasantized wording: 'entirety' may refer to 'wholeness', what, of course, we CANNOT 'perceive and cognize'. (You have some mitigating remark on that, further down, so my objection may be overruled.
The 'via MRs' may be justified by that later part of your text).
Of course we cannot imply that in any MR we end up with the totality: then we don't have a model: then we have the 'thing' itself.
As you wrote: 'all that exists in the world' . With the restriction I may think of 'all that we can observe in the world' but you explained that in your graphix as observed and not. 
 
My very starting point is that we have no way to "observe all".
Only to the extent of the capability of the mind, interpreting - representing whatever made an impact upon it. Otherwise: 
we would be omniscient. We are not.
(that may come as a shock <G>). 
The use of "noumenal" comes to your first rescue: in my understanding it is compendial, without detailing, so in grouping together 'nouns' into 'noumena', we may include otherwise outstanding features (not only within our mind-content). So the only remaining objection I can think of is the word "material", unless you extend that into nonmaterial-material. Like: anything that can be called "physical" (reductionistic science-_expression_). 'As I feel'  (watch that _expression_!) the adjective 'material' in the term "reality" makes it a limited model.
I stand ignorant before the word 'posited'. Realized? composed? understood-as? dictionary:  postulated, suggested. If we just 'postulate': it is weak, maybe so, maybe not, we would like it a way, If we suggest: it is still weaker. But it sounds good to me.<G>
Perceptible reality however asks for imperceptible reality, maybe virtuality, we have no access to. "Our" reality is (only) the content (in a mind-representational fom) of perceived impacts. With my usual caveat about using the word 'reality' (cavallierly) it sounds redundant. So far the reformulated definition.
 
Then again: "subjective self" calls for an "objective" self which is an oxymoron. Maybe you aimed at "personal self?" (as opposed to eg. nationality or race feelings etc.) Self is 1st person, singular or plural. "I" or "we".
Interesting idea your "reality-out there". You are still within your own (self?) mind perceiving and interpreting that "out there" thing,
Sorry, no matter how desperately we try, in our thinking we cannot step out from ourselves.
Then comes Descartes. I like the 'longer variant' we could read lately:" I think I think ergo I think I am" so the short form does not represent a strong 'affirming' to me - as you implied.
 
In the definition of the MR - I apreciate the "apparent reality".
I think that par (before getting graphical) alleviate most of my hair-splittings. It makes complete sense even to me.
 
I wonder if you find it a true translation when I put your graphical into my vocabulary (as I see it):
[Tim]:
{noumenal entirety} <----> {perceptible phenomena} <----> {sensory apparatus} <==(MR)==> {knowledge of n.e. = totality of models of n.e.} 
 [JohnM]:
{wholeness} <----> {observables to our capabilities} <--->
{observation (sensory or ideational) <==(MR)==> {(actual) cognitive inventory}
???
 
For the rest of your text: I am not in the clear with measurements, (not RR, I have not read his description) I consider it - if carried out quantitatively - a classical reductionistic process, assigning to the model both to be measured and measuring as comparison, a strict cut-off in ONE aspect from the rest of the world. The view of the model to be measured is also reduced to the ONE aspect the comparison is carried out for. A good _expression_ is 'abstracted', meaning a total exemption of the connections with the world. The not-quantitative (as in: "you don't measure up to your father") is a similarity-check with a little wider cut in comparative features.
 
In toto: your transformed explanation is fine. Thanks, Tim. Don't be pissed off by my hair-splitting, we are in a poorly identified domain and the words are inadequate mostly. Give it 1000 years and the scientists will develop better meanings for expressions.
 
Thanks again
 
John M
 
 
 
----- Original Message -----
From: Tim Gwinn
To: ***
Sent: Monday, September 01, 2003 10:24 PM
Subject: Re: Function and functional organization

Hi John M,
 
I'll try to give an "English-like human language" version of my statement:
 
'Material reality' is the posited noumenal entirety, which we then presume to perceive and cognize - in other words, via modeling relations - as being all that exists in the world.
 
The "posited noumenal entirety" is essentially a condensed version of how I read Rosen in Life Itself, sec 3B and p. 56. It is the idea that it seems readily obvious - but is not provable - that there is a some kind of perceptible reality. This makes itself apparent in the distinction between the subjective self (affirmed by "cogito ergo sum") and all else that - from this perspective of "self vs other" - appears to us as a reality "out there". We posit that it actually exists and is not mere illusion. On further inspection, we seem to be able (that is, "we presume") to perceive the phenomena of this posited reality; but even our perceptions are mediated by our sensory apparatus. We also seem unable to know the reality in itself: the latter is like Kantian "noumena". Put these statements together, and we have "posited" + "noumenal". "Entirety" indicates that the phrase refers to all of this posited reality, and the generality of the word "entirety" imposes less limiting preconceptions than "universe" or other possible terms. Thus, "posited noumenal entirety".
 
The process of perceiving and cognizing the phenomena of this apparent reality means, essentially: the modeling relation process. Insofar as "modeling is the habitat of all epistemology" [EL p. 324], the totality of all that we can perceive and cognize thus represents the full extent of our knowledge of this posited noumenal entirety. The totality of this knowledge is then our basis for what we comprehend as "being all that exists in the world".
 
Graphically, it is:
 
{noumenal entirety} <----> {perceptible phenomena} <----> {sensory apparatus} <==(MR)==> {knowledge of n.e. = totality of models of n.e.} 
 
This leaves us in a position quite removed from the "reality" we posit to exist and that we want to study. It is a humbling position to be in. I think seeing it in graphical form makes it more obvious to me how important is Rosen's book "Fundamentals of Measurement", since measurement and its consequences and limitations directly intercede and impact all efforts at understanding "reality". 
 
It also makes it apparent that the full range of what constitutes "effective processes" is to be found in the posited noumenal entirety, and thus our ability to make models that capture these processes requires that "the notion of effectiveness has to get imported into language via modeling relations arising in material nature". [EL p. 160] That is, that our modeling relations implicitly inform us about effectiveness, and it is up to us to be aware enough to notice that when our models are inadequate to the effectiveness they intend to model, that we strive to create classes of models that can meet or approach that effectiveness. That is what takes us outside the realm of computable models.
 
I hope this has made the statement clearer....but I'm not sure. :)
 
Regards,
Tim
 
 
 
-----Original Message-----
From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:***On Behalf Of John M
Sent: Monday, September 01, 2003 5:40 PM
To: ***
Subject: Re: Function and functional organization

My dear Tim,
all apologies gracefully accepted (ha ha). (No need for them).
The homo-stuff : look up the medium-size Webster, both -ousion       and -iousion are in. It is medieval Christian stupidity for which they killed each other.
To your "explanatory" formulations: could they be translated into some English-like human language?
And if you are graciously including all the concepts in question into the 'material reality' whether or not ambient mortals could consider it 'matterly' or not, why bother to add the word "material" to it?
(Of course with "reality" I have other problems, on lists of psych-philos-physics people I successfully proved that it is virtual, objective reality is indeed subjective virtuality - 1991-4) since all we (may) know is the interpretation of the mind and we have no way to access 'that' reality which allegedly made the impact on it.
But I let it go, call it 'reality' if you like the word.
 
Your 'completed' version looks to me as the MR is virtual and subjective. And "all that exists in the world" is what we know of
(presumed?)
I could not give a better definition, but I claim the right to criticize.<G>
 
Best wishes
 
JohnM
----- Original Message -----
From: Tim Gwinn
To: ***
Sent: Sunday, August 31, 2003 3:21 PM
Subject: Re: Function and functional organization

Hi John M,
 
Yep, I screwed up. I did not intend to make a division between "self" and "material reality", as if self is - as you pointed out - outside of nature, somehow. That was grossly in error. I'll blame it on posting too late at night...but really it was plain sloppiness.
 
I also apologize for getting lazy, and not always addressing my posts distinctly to "JohnK" vs "JohnM". That was rude of me. :(
 
As you point out, my formulation of "material reality" was too much of an objectification(?) of our internal conception of it. After thinking about this overnight, I might rephrase my view more completely as:
 
'Material reality' is the posited noumenal entirety, which we then presume to perceive and cognize - in other words, via modeling relations - as being all that exists in the world.
 
So, with regard to question of whether functions (or atoms, or whatever) are material or not (in this sense of material), the question is then more fully stated as "Do the effective processes in the posited noumenal entirety transduce through commuting modeling relations into what we call "functions" (or "atoms", or whatever)?"
 
Also, can you elaborate on "homousion vs homoiusion"? I enjoy your philological abilities and I am unfamiliar with those Latin terms and could not find a good reference on the 'net.
 
Regards,
Tim