|
Hi John
M,
I'll try to give
an "English-like human
language" version of my statement:
The "posited
noumenal entirety" is essentially a condensed version of how I read Rosen in
Life Itself, sec 3B and p. 56. It is the idea that it seems readily obvious
- but is not provable - that there is a some kind of perceptible
reality. This makes itself apparent in the distinction between the
subjective self (affirmed by "cogito ergo sum") and all else that - from
this perspective of "self vs other" - appears to us as a reality "out
there". We posit that it actually exists and is not mere illusion. On
further inspection, we seem to be able (that is, "we presume")
to perceive the phenomena of this posited reality; but even our
perceptions are mediated by our sensory apparatus. We also seem
unable to know the reality in itself: the latter is like
Kantian "noumena". Put these statements together, and we have "posited" +
"noumenal". "Entirety" indicates that the phrase refers to all of this
posited reality, and the generality of the word "entirety" imposes less limiting
preconceptions than "universe" or other possible terms. Thus, "posited
noumenal entirety".
The process of
perceiving and cognizing the phenomena of this apparent reality means,
essentially: the modeling relation process. Insofar as "modeling is the habitat
of all epistemology" [EL p. 324], the totality of all that we can perceive and
cognize thus represents the full extent of our knowledge of this posited
noumenal entirety. The totality of this knowledge is then our basis
for what we comprehend as "being all that exists in the
world".
Graphically, it
is:
{noumenal
entirety} <----> {perceptible phenomena} <----> {sensory apparatus}
<==(MR)==> {knowledge of n.e. = totality of models of
n.e.}
This leaves us in
a position quite removed from the "reality" we posit to exist and that we
want to study. It is a humbling position to be in. I think seeing it in
graphical form makes it more obvious to me how important is Rosen's book
"Fundamentals of Measurement", since measurement and its consequences and
limitations directly intercede and impact all efforts at understanding
"reality".
It also makes it
apparent that the full range of what constitutes "effective processes" is to be
found in the posited noumenal entirety, and thus our ability to make
models that capture these processes requires
that "the notion of effectiveness has to get imported into
language via modeling relations arising in material nature". [EL p. 160] That
is, that our modeling relations implicitly inform us
about effectiveness, and it is up to us to be aware enough to notice that
when our models are inadequate to the effectiveness they intend to model, that
we strive to create classes of models that can meet or approach that
effectiveness. That is what takes us outside the realm of computable
models.
I hope this
has made the statement clearer....but I'm not sure. :)
Regards,
Tim
|