Re: [life] MR as ontological; 3 kinds of life

["John Kineman" <***>]

This is Part B

-------------

>>It is true that complex system will not have a single "largest model",
>>while a mechanism will. (The latter follows as a corollary of a mechanism
>>having all its models be computable.) So, with a mechanism, there will be
>>some single largest computable model which will commute fully with it. Is
>>this perhaps the distinction to which you were referring?
>>
Yes, it was the largest system test that I was referring to, but I believe
other statements as well (that I will have to research). However your
preceding comments and citations are very much to the point, and suggest an
incorrect statement that I have been making. I have been saying that "all
models are simple," whereas Rosen on many occasions  discusses models that
may be more than simple, computable models. I need to modify my statements
to say "all computable models are simple."

Formality includes more than just computability, which was argued
effectively with regard to Goedel's incompleteness, etc. If we then look at
the reason for this difference, it seems to be attributed to the need for
semantic input to the mathematics, i.e., the role of the mathematician in
establishing meanings. If that is the basic difference between computable
and complex, then it correlates with the picture I have been presenting -
that the "something else" in this case is a semantic element, which must
inhabit the formal system domain. Thus the nested arrangement I diagrammed
captures this difference. However, I need to look more deeply into what
constitutes this difference, if there is anything at all of the mechanical
domain that can be involved. That would seem to be logically excluded, for
the very reason that we are discussing something more than what is
precisely mechanical and thus computable. So I think I get back to the same
place, but with the correction mentioned above. I would also want to look
into whether or not "complex model" can thus be equated with the case where
Rosen conflates "natural system" with model, i.e., the case where two
natural systems are models of each other. So, I am speculating that when
"formal" means more than computable, i.e., is allowed to be fully complex,
then it is essentially "natural." That would seem to tie the language back
together in a consistent way.

It would be a stretch for many traditionalists to consider something that
is not computable to be a model. However, I have to agree entirely on this
point. It indeed places the modeling relation diagram in question as to its
self-consistency (as a general meta-theory), but I think that is solvable
by clarifying the contextual definition problem.
>>
>>This does not seem to bear on the question of why these models need to
>>exist ontologically as distinct entities.
Not the models existing as distinct entities, the modeling relation
representing distinct elements of a way of analyzing nature. As a
world-view, it must apply generally. This gets back to the relative realism
and provisional instrumentalism. Nothing can be said to be truely distinct
in nature itself, if we presume it to be a self-consistent whole; which
seems to be the implication and a philosophical starting point for many
(and goal of science). If only observers create distinctions, we at least
want them to be relevant to as much as possible. So we imagine our
distinctions as relating to something "real" but it is a theoretical real.
>>
>>I would disagree wholeheartedly.  I do not see where Rosen proposes that
>>the models are a part of the organism. Instead, I think he indicated
>>repeatedly that models are realized in organisms.
>>
>>I also recall no point where he intimated any "nested hierarchies" of
>>larger/smaller systems.
>>
>>
On this I can also wholeheartedly disagree. Even in the jacket statement in
AS it uses the word "contain" in this precise regard: "Presents the first
detailed study of this most important class of systems which contain
internal predictive models of themselves and/or of their environments and
whose predictions are utilized for purposes of present control." How can it
be clearer??  With regard to where models realized by organismic structures
reside, it is in the organizaton itself of those systems - an abstraction
which feeds back (actually forward) to the structrual realization. These
are not the human scientific models that are feeding forward to biological
structures, but the organism's own models, as clearly stated. I would
further suggest that the organization of a system, and hence the organism
model, should not be said to be "outside" the system (thus thinking of the
organism system in only its structural aspect). They are an indivisible
whole. I describe it as a complementarity relationship. This is
foundational to his entire theory, which becomes trivial without it.

Also, we know he discussed "larger" models, as referred to above. These
larger models are not separate models of different systems that somehow
happen to be bigger by some measure, they are larger models that contain
the smaller ones. That is a hierarchy.

I'll dig up the references over the coming months and try to make a more
coherent argument. I need to do this for a project anyway, and this
discussion tells me which points are important to emphasize. Let's give
this some time. (not putting this off, I've been taking advantage of a hole
in my schedule in the past several weeks, and that hole is rapidly closing,
so I won't be able to spend so much time on the list for a while).

>>  The most immediate relationship is with the fully embodied model, part
>> of the organism, but information also is shared with larger contexts.
>> This is very suitable for ecology. I read him as proposing to consider
>> models separate from material structures, but both are operative in an
>> organism. Additionally, in an organism, there is the ability to respond
>> to the model for control purposes, thus producing a plethora of
>> anticipatory behavior. That, I think, is all Rosen.
>>
>>
>>Again, I disagree. I do not read Rosen as "proposing to consider models
>>separate from material structures". I can recall no wording that speaks
>>directly to anything like that.
I think this is being overly literal. I meant nothing more than is obvious,
for example from the MR diagram itself which distinguishes FS from NS
diagramatically, and thereby "proposes" to "consider" models as distinct
from their realizations - as an analytical method. I did not mean that he
said they are separate in nature, in fact, referring to the above
discussion, I have argued that they are intimately involved in the whole
organism. Earlier I said the character of the relationship is that of a
complementarity.
>>
>>  My own speculation is that the rules governing what makes an organism
>> essentially define an amplification means which capitalizes on
>> anticipatory behevior via evolution and adaptation. It is thus
>> magnifying a property of nature that is apparent in un-structured matter
>> (free particles), but disappears without the organismic way of preserving it.
>>
>>>
>>>Instead, the (M,R) model is an epistemological model that is realized or
>>>embodied in the internal organization of the organism itself, and notably,
>>>this organizational aspect is not identical with the organisms structural
>>>organization.
>>
>>Yes, exactly my view as well.
>>
>>
>>Hmmm, it seems your view is different. You say models are "separate from
>>material structures".
Yes, meaning they are distinguished analytically in this view. Perhaps
"distinct" is a better word than separate.
However, in your statement above, I would note that "structural
organization" is potentially confusing. The internal organization of the
organism is not reducible to its structure (which is a material
organization). The difference is its functional aspect, which can only
exist in the formal domain and related abstractions.
>>  This is an entirely different claim than Rosen makes (and to which I am
>> making reference above):  "Organization in its turn inherently involves
>> functions and their interrelations; the abandonment of fractionability,
>> however, means there is no kind of 1 to 1 relationship between such
>> relational functional organizations and the structures which realize
>> them. These are the basic differences between organisms and mechanisms
>> or machines." [LI p. 280]
This seems to directly support what I've been saying, that the functional
relations are inherent, embodied, inside, contained, etc. in the organism's
model of itself and environment , so it is unclear why you think it is a
counter-example???. The quote is specific about the nature of the
distinction between functional organization (the internal model) and
realized structure in a modeling relation, and emphasizes that the two
aspects of this relationship are not reducible to each other ("no 1:1
relationship"). Furthermore this non-reducibility (non commutation of this
aspect of the MR) is related to their difference from machines. Note that
this statement about the criteria for machine does not mention the
computability aspect, so my earlier comments on that may be a way to
reconcile the two statements, i.e., commutation, or 1:1 relationship, is
possible between natural systems, but in a pure picture where one draws an
MR between the formal component alone (which is not natural) and a natual
system, commpution always implies mechanism. That also is consistent with
the largest system description statements. So I don't see any problem here.

Further clarification of my semantics (possible roots of our different
views???):
1. "epistemological" does not imply only human science: I assume it refers
to knowledge generally but is first known to us as science.
2. "no kind of 1:1 relationship" does not mean "no kind of relationship."
In fact it is a "modeling relationship" which does not generally commute in
a 1:1 manner.
3. I assume "structural organization" is the realized material aspect
organized according to mechanical laws; as distinct from functional
organization, which is associated with the formal domain of models, and the
abstract domain of encodings and decodings (as we clarified earlier)..


>>
>>Rosen is referring to differing organizational aspects - one structural
>>and one functional - both of which are realized in the one material system.
I would say realized in the one "organic" system, which is more than just
material - the whole point being made, right?
>>He is not referring to the structural organization as material, and the
>>functional organization as "non-material". I think this deeply
>>misconstrues Rosen.
I don't see how to avoid this association, nor any basis for claiming it
misconstrues the theory.

Lets revert to some more basic terms, then look at these combinations.
"Function" is clearly "non-material" and "structure" is clearly material.
The "organization" can be represented in causal mappings, which are roughly
related to modeling relations.

I assume we can interpret "functional organization" to mean "functional
organization of components?" I don't think it means "organization of
functions" which would just be compounding the idea of function. Given the
former, a picture of that phrase could be constructed which is a modeling
relation. Functions are what comprise the formal system, which is then
realized by a system of components. This is consistent with the quote,
where the word "relational" was used as a modifier, to emphasize that this
is indeed a relational diagram, or modling relation, as I have described.
Finally, the modeling relation, taken as a whole, is not reducible to
anything that is strictly mateiral - Rosen's main point.

Continuing, let's do the same with "sturctural organization" [of
components] (does RR use this term?).  Again we draw a MR of this
statement. But in this case "structural organization" which we would think
of in terms of a "structural model" refers to something computable - i.e.,
structure, i.e., a mechanism. So, putting the two together, you have
"sturctural organization" referring to the mechanical aspect of the system,
also representable by a modeling relation but this time one that commutes
computably - i.e., a mechanism..

Thus "functional organization" refers to the complex part of the model in
an MR - the part we have inadequate language for since it is not usually
discussed in mechanistic science, but in any case is non-computable;
whereas "structural organization," if that is used, would refer to the part
of a system that can be described mechanically.

Example. The functional organization of a car-driver system would include
all kinds of relations with humans, including the manufacturing process,
beauty perceived by the owner, transportation uses, etc. The structural
organization would refer to the engineering designs, including the
prescribed ways that the driver is supposed to interact with it; all of
which is computable. Both can be described by modeling relations, the
former being complex, the later being simple.

GENERAL REMARKS

This exchange has been very interesting and challenges me to think deeply
about the proper interpretation, and, as indicated above, make adjustments
and attempt to clarify terms that are not clearly defined in Rosen's work.
There are many instances where Rosen uses a word in a different context,
with a different meaning, so this is a constant problem. It is especially a
problem because part of the subject matter is novel to traditional science
and so does not have pre-defined or well-known jargon. We have to
constantly decided from the context where a term is being used in a general
sense or a specific one, or if context changes its meaning. Nevertheless,
when one finally gets a strong feeling of understanding and checks that out
against all statements, and can apply the theory in a range of examples,
there is some confidence that at least a consistent interpretation has been
achieved. Only Rosen will have Rosen's consistent view of this material,
and even if present today would have all the problems we do in
communicating it. On many occasions he has re-stated the same idea with
different language. If the language were precise this would not be
necessary. Hence interpretation in a self-consistent manner is necessary.
In this it is possible to make mistakes which will be revealed by sharp
inconsistencies with writings not considered or forgotten. In those
instances, sometimes a retreat is needed, sometimes it leads to a new and
deeper insight. My hope is that a group such as this can work on the
interpretations, classify them (not deciding which are right and wrong, but
making them clear and distinct views), and then work with them individually
to see their value. This kind of spirit was prevalent in working with
Einstein's theories, about which there is no end of debate even today. What
would be a shame, in my opinion, would be if the Rosen schoolars could not
agree to progress carefully and methodically in proposing and testing
various interpretations and understandings, including potential
advancements of the theory. It seems that we have a good start on doing
this, if we can all keep our heads cool and avoid feeling insulted or
unduely challenged. The fact that anyone attempts to understand this stuff,
without putting it in a straight-jacket, is to their credit, I believe.

I must reduce my interaction for the time being, due to other committments,
but I will be doing further reserach into these ideas and specifically into
Rosen's writings over the next year, and will certainly not be able to
avoid the curiosity of checking in with this list.

If I may be allowed a parting request for the time being, it is that my
ideas be considered as at least potentially reasonable, even if there are
other, even drastically different interpretations.

All the best,

John Kineman