Re: Function and functional organization

["John Kineman" <***>]

Tim, 

  These statements are not the contradicton you claim they are, although
we do have to navigate the semantics carefully according to their context. 
The context is how scientific the theory can be considered and whether it
is less valid or rigorous than the traditional formulations. A quick look
at the section this is in and the surrounding paragraphs can easily confirm
that. Also, it was an important point to make because traditionalists would
have criticized the relational view on the grounds that it is epistemologically
weak compared to traditional formulations from the "old school" thinking.
But here, he claims it is equally rigorous, equally valid as physical theory.
For example, just after the phrase you bolded, he writes "in the sense
of "ideal" physics." We should not overlook that contextual clarification.
He is thus expanding physics to something more ideal, but is not thereby
producing something that is any less valid as a material theory -- it is
a better one, he says. If he did not say this, his entire analysis could
be rejected on epistemological grounds as having any importance to physics.
He is in fact explaining what material is actually composed of better than
the Newtonian model did, which incorrectly predicted it would be rigid particles
all the way down, and when it was proved not to be, that it must then be
seen as fundamentally uncertain. Rosen says there's another alternative for
basing physical reality - the relational model. Knowing that context, one
can then attribute the appropriate meaning.

As an aside, this issue reminds me of a quote from a particular philosopher,
Alan Watts, who turned the semantics around very similarly. He said many
people criticise the West for being materialistic, but we are not true materialists
because we seem to have so little regard for material, so little respect
or reverance for its intricacy and mystery. We imagine it as a dull static
thing to be manipulated at our whim and nothing more. We don't appreciate
its amazing origins or accord it any intrinsic value. Here Rosen is echoing
this sentiment, moving us to a truer materialism where we might have some
respect for what actually goes into material - the incredible complexity
of functional relations that at no point devolve into the traditional concept
of a thing.

Recall our earlier conversation where you questioned my assertion that the
theory applied to physics. Now you are criticizing my view by making the
claim that it IS physics. Which criticism should I answer? Rosen is saying
it goes beyond traditional physics, but it is valid enough to be considered
a more ideal physics. Precisely my view as well (except that I would be less
placating to the physicists). This also supports my earlier arguments that
the theory can be taken and was meant to be general, and the process is as
I said, he worked out the theory for organisms, then applied it to physics
and all of reality.

Look closely at the statements. He does not say there are no unphysical or
non-material components, if you read carefully. This quote refers directly
to a comparison of conventional analysis with relational analysis,
not components of reality as discussed in the body of the book. He said there
is nothing in the "relational strategy" that is unphysical. The strategy
is the analysis. It is a physical analysis, he says - a new physical view
and theory if we wish to stretch the definition of physics beyond its traditional
Newtonian foundations (which many physics would agree to, if they liked the
theory, because they want to ensure that physics potentially includes everything.)

Contrast this statement with his other statements about physics when he was
considering it in its traditional sense. He said we "keep the organization
and throw away the phyiscs" (I think that's an exact quote, but I didn't
look up the page ref). Obviously he was then talking about traditional physics,
not his expanded physics which includes the organization. In fact he dealsa
rather destructive blow to the traditional formulation of physics, without
suggesting that the traditional view has its value in a limited domain. But
he shows how to modify it, and now claims that the modified view is just
as valid and rigorous an analysis as any prior theory in physics. Many, of
course, are not convinced, but I am. He was correct in this assertion, as
I see nothing epistemologically invalid in his construction. It is good science
in the best tradition, and I think that is what this section is saying.

Also, in the very saying that the (functional) organization  is "as much
a part of its material reality as the specific particles that constitute
it" he has clearly distinguished the two. His theory distinguishes them and
places them in relationship, unlike Newtonian theory which distinguishes
them but keeps them separate and not interacting. So, once again, functions
are distingished from the Newtonian definition of material, although both
can be said to comprise a new concept of material, or a new material theory. 
This supports both of my main assertions in this discussion, that functions
are not material in the Newtonian sense, and that the relational theory linking
functions to material states is itself general to biology AND physics, thus
giving a new definition to matter as well as organisms.

Note that Newtonian theory also depends on the unquestioned existence of 
"non-material" elements -- natural laws themselves. The only difference is
that it does not allow any genericity of those laws from within the system
being studied. So, in this sense, Rosen's relational approach is more
physical than Newtonian physics (as in the quote), because Newtonian
physics placed the "non-material" elements out in the absolute Platonic realm
- the domain of God. Rosen's approach makes it part of the system, and thus
subject to analysis. 

All of what I am saying should be really clear from his last sentence, which
I'll repeat, bolding it all to retain the context: "the resulting
formalisms have at least as much right to be  called images of material reality
as any reductionistic model based on  states and dynamical laws." 

Images of material reality are not the material reality itself, they are
models, theories, concepts. And he is clearly talking about the right to
call his theory a scientific formalism.

Finally, let me offer one more opportunity to agree:

I would suggest that you are arguing this from a Newtonian-type paradigm, where (roughly) 'Newtonian = all material things', and thus, 'non-Newtonian = non-material'. A notable point of Rosen's overall arguments was that 'Newtonian = all material things' is false.

Yes, what I have also said, that there must be something more than the Newtonian
concept, but you are playing semantic games here. The statement is false
if by "material things" you mean Rosen's view, in which "thing" becomes a
different concept that most are used to. If by "material thing" we mean what
most people would assume from traditional Newtonian view, then the statement
is true. The Newtonian view sees Newtoning "things" and writes laws about
nothing more than that.

In the Newtonian view of the material world, functions and context-dependence are disallowed.

Yes, my statements exactly.

In the Rosennean view of the material world, functions and context-dependence are part of the material world

Only in an expanded view of material, which explicitly includes functions
as a component of the system. This is by no means common parlance, so it
has to be clearly spelled out if you want to refer to the relational definition
of material. You have to be in the context of discussing the expanded theory
for this to be understood or obvious without saying it.

and, so too, they should be part of the enlarged physics that describes that material world.

Yes

This is why there is nothing unphysical about the relational strategy.

Yes, again allowing that we are expanding the traditional meaning of the
concept "physicsl." For a critic who did not allow anyone to change the meaning
of words, it would be entirely unphyiscal, and mysterious. So Rosen's construction
demystifies the relationship between our usual concept of material, and our
poor treatement or understanding of contingent functions.

Thus, as the quote at top indicates, there is no need to posit that function is "non-material".

Don't presume the need that others may have in discussing how the new theory
relates to the old. Rosen's view is not the common one. It is essential for
communication to relate the semantics, and aside from defending the theory
as Rosen does in this section of the book, I would suggest that it would
be very confusing to shift semantics this way without telling people that
you are doing it. Functions are decidedly not Newtonian-material, but are
intimiately and fundamentally embedded with all material in Rosen's view.
This is one of the quotes I would use to support the idea that his theory
is meant to be general and that this principle of relationship must be taken
all the way down with the turtles. You seem to agree, but not to agree.

Instead, functions are "as much a part of material reality" as any other material thing.

It can be said, if you clarify the implied semantic differences between the
first reference to "material" and the second, even in this sentence. By "other
material thing" do you mean in the Newtonian view? If so, why wasn't it stated
for clarity. And if not, is it not a tautology, i.e., "functions are part
of Rosen-things as much as any other Rosen-thing is." So we are both relating
old and new meanings here, and we have to be careful when doing so.

 

 

I think my view has been clearly stated by now, BUT guessing that you will
find this unconvincing, perhaps it would be better for me to ask what your
point of view is. Maybe give an example of how you are applying Rosen's theory
in which I can see how your are interpreting the concepts. What in fact is
your interpretation? I would like to write less and listen more at this point.
I think we are in full agreement that Rosen provides an expanded meaning
for "material" and "physical" thereby making the theory generally applicable
to reality itself.  
 
 John K.