> Yes. It seems consistent to begin with the "homology" of behaviors.
In
> (possibly an MR!). The homology extends to quantum systems,
social
> systems, organisms, ecosystems, and psycho-biological systems.
As I said
above, you are free to discover homologies between all those broader
classes of systems. They will not, however, be same homologies to which Rosen
refers to in his living/non-living distinction.
It sounded like
you were attempting to extend a definition of "living" to one that
exceeds the one Rosen uses where he equates "living state" with
"organisms". One which Judith has, I believe, reiterated several times. Again,
in that same quote: "I am persuaded that our recognition of the living state
rests on the perception of homologies between the behaviors exhibited
by organisms". There is no mention or insinuation of the
application of "living state" other than specifically to
organisms.
Further, from
the last page of Life Itself (p. 280): "But complexity, though I suggest it is
the habitat of life, is not life itself. Something else is needed to
characterize what is alive from what is complex. Rashesky provided
this too, in his idea that biology was relational, and that relation meant (as
we stated it) throwing away the physics and keeping the
organization.....Organization in its turn inherently involves functions and
their interrelations; the abandonment of fractionability, however, means there
is no kind of 1 to 1 relationship between such relational functional
organizations and the structures which realize them. These are the basic
differences between organisms and mechanisms or machines."
The only
thing left out are mechanisms, which unfortunately hold most people's
interest. But then he explains how mechanisms can be identified by
commutation of a modeling relation, and how they can be obtained the
A status of 'mechanism' is not related to the commuting of an MR. This would
only be so if the only set of models that existed were simple (computable)
models.
I need the references on this please. There are many statements to the
contrary.
I can think of
no contrary statements. From LI p. 203: "a natural system N is a mechanism if
and only if all of its models are simulable." (where "simulable" =
"Turing-computable" = "simple").
Conversely, in
the definition of "complex system" [EL p. 306]: "A system is complex if it has
a nonsimulable model". So, the very definition of complex system includes
the notion of nonsimulable (complex) models. The "nonsimulable model" is (by
virtue of being nonsimulable (not Turing-computable)) a complex system.
The (M,R) model
is perhaps the most prevalent nonsimulable model that Rosen uses. From EL p.
269: "In conclusion, any material relaization of the (M,R)-systems must have
noncomputable models. Hence, they cannot be mechanisms, in the sense we have
been using the term, because the (M,R)-systems are too rich in
entailment to be accommodated within the world of
mechanism."
Another
prevalent complex modeling approach he uses is "activation-inhibition"
networks, model systems which are interlocking networks of partial
differential equations. When these differential equations are inexact,
this system is complex. [EL ch. 22, p. 337]
It is true that
complex system will not have a single "largest model", while a
mechanism will. (The latter follows as a corollary of a mechanism having all
its models be computable.) So, with a mechanism, there will be some single
largest computable model which will commute fully with it. Is this perhaps the
distinction to which you were referring?
My thought is that it is a
potential ambiguity that is resolved by being clear whether the MR is with a
formal description, which then must be simple, or a natural system, which
itself can be complex. This is one of the stickiest parts of
the theory, in my opinion, so not at all surprising there would be two
interpretations.
Why does the material world need abstract models? Simply because we can
epistemologically consider them as having anticipatory or "model-based"
behavior need not imply that those models exist ontologically as distinct
entities.
Yes, if we look only at gross scale of classical systems where we don't
see any apparent complexity. But these systems are not distinct and clearly
are related to cases with few components that behave complexly. Thus, for a
general theory, it works to explain the apparent mechanistic behavior by
commutation with a model, otherwise there must be multiple theories, one for
each kind of system.
This does not
seem to bear on the question of why these models need to exist ontologically
as distinct entities.
Protein folding seemed to have been argued by Rosen to be
anticipatory (Life Itself p. 271); however, this strikes me as just a way of
describing the behavior of a system. I personally do not think that Rosen
proposed or suggested that proteins actually have some accompanying
"non-material" (or even material) part that would be the model guiding the
behavior.
I am comfortable with considering strange realities at ontological
levels, so for me it represents no difficulty at all to imagine a formal
domain that is always present.
In fact, even traditional
theory does this, but it separates it as a Platonic realm where
incontrovertible "laws" exist. Admiting to models everywhere, while that may
seem radical at first, is far less radical than the Platonic/mechanistic
assumption.
I only says that systems are
involved in generating the laws. Some have established rather consistent laws
to our perception (mechanical laws), and that is partly because our sensory
ability was constructed to capitalize on such consistency. So we see a
material world, being a product of its rules. But that is not the only
possibility. That makes a great deal of sense to me.
For example, I do not think that Rosen would propose that organisms have
abstract formal (M,R) models as something that exists (materially or
non-materially) seperately in the world, somehow alongside the organism.
>From my reading he proposes that the models are part of the organism,
but have extensions throughout other modeling relations which represent an
"infinite mathematical object," i.e., the nested hierarchy of larger and
smaller systems.
I would disagree
wholeheartedly. I do not see where Rosen proposes that the models
are a part of the organism. Instead, I think he indicated
repeatedly that models are realized in
organisms.
I
also recall no point where he intimated any "nested hierarchies" of
larger/smaller systems.
The most immediate
relationship is with the fully embodied model, part of the organism, but
information also is shared with larger contexts. This is very suitable for
ecology. I read him as proposing to consider models separate from material
structures, but both are operative in an organism. Additionally, in an
organism, there is the ability to respond to the model for control purposes,
thus producing a plethora of anticipatory behavior. That, I think, is all
Rosen.
Again, I
disagree. I do not read Rosen as "proposing to consider models separate from
material structures". I can recall no wording that speaks directly to anything
like that.
My own speculation is that
the rules governing what makes an organism essentially define an amplification
means which capitalizes on anticipatory behevior via evolution and adaptation.
It is thus magnifying a property of nature that is apparent in un-structured
matter (free particles), but disappears without the organismic way of
preserving it.
Instead, the (M,R) model is an epistemological model that is realized or
embodied in the internal organization of the organism itself, and notably,
this organizational aspect is not identical with the organisms structural
organization.
Yes, exactly my view as well.
Hmmm, it
seems your view is different. You say models are "separate from material
structures". This is an entirely different claim than Rosen
makes (and to which I am making reference above): "Organization in
its turn inherently involves functions and their interrelations; the
abandonment of fractionability, however, means there is no kind of 1
to 1 relationship between such relational functional organizations and the
structures which realize them. These are the basic differences
between organisms and mechanisms or machines." [LI p. 280]
Rosen is
referring to differing organizational aspects - one structural and one
functional - both of which are realized in the one material system. He is not
referring to the structural organization as material, and the functional
organization as "non-material". I think this deeply misconstrues
Rosen.
Similarly, my take is that in order to epistemologically
represent these anticipatory systems whose future state determines present
change (such as a protein folding), we must employ formal models in our
modeling relations that have similar characteristics to those natural
systems. These formal models are anticipatory models, which contain the
necessary closed loops of entailment and the necessary descriptive
structure.
Here I think there may be a mis-step. There are many indications that all
formal descriptions, taken alone, must be simple. We thus cannot create a
complex model of anything, as a purely formal entity. Rosen mentions this
problem and says, at best one would have to create an infinite set of models
to capture the complex behavior. This is the principle on which I am
constructing a modeling/mapping system for ecosystems.
As I showed
further above, there are complex models. However, it is true
that, in terms of simple models, only an infinite set of such simple
models can fully model a complex system.
I have speculated
about complex models as you seem to be doing here. By including human
intuition and judgement in, say, a decision support system, we can regain
complexity in the model, which now becomes a complete natural system, not just
a formal representation. Rosen's references to the power of analogy now become
highly relevant, because one can argue that the full set of complex
possibilities humans may generate may in some important ways represent the
possibilities of nature, simply because we are products of nature and share
many similar properties. So, in this way, we can get an anticipatory model for
managing ecosystems. In the first way we can get a multitude of simple
representations that answer specific questions or represent the range of
possibilities, as we fill out the infinite set, presumably establishing some
priorities.
However, just as in the case of the (M,R) model and the organism,
there is also no need for the structure of the anticipatory model to be
realized in the world in any explicit form. Instead, the anticipatory model
is realized or embodied directly in the protein's innate configuration.
I would quibble here, saying that no formal representation can actually
exist independently (i.e. no Platonic realm). e.g., thoughts in our brain must
be in relationship with physical substrate, although not reducible to them.
So, somehow, there is a physical correllate of any model, but it may indeed be
nearly impossible to localize.
Thanks,
John