Re: [life] MR as ontological; 3 kinds of life

["John Kineman" <***>]

Comments below:

Tim Gwinn wrote:
> I would strongly disagree. The behavioral homologies to which he referred
> were those that were specifically characteristic of organisms, and which
> were specifically not present in non-living systems.
>
> If you want to discuss behavioral homologies among other (broader) classes
> of systems, then you are discussing some other set of homologies, not the
> ones that Rosen specified.
What is your evidence for that? Mine is his statements I quoted yesterday
mentioning in AS how he showed relevance in many disciplines, both phsyical
and biological. Specifically 3.3 (pg. 137) is about encoding of physical
systems.

I think you are arguing to limit the theory to biology, but for what purpose
I don't know. Many aspects of it have general applicability.
> > The only
> > thing left out are mechanisms, which unfortunately hold most people's
> > interest. But then he explains how mechanisms can be identified by
> > commutation of a  modeling relation, and how they can be obtained the
> >   
>
>
> A status of 'mechanism' is not related to the commuting of an MR. This would
> only be so if the only set of models that existed were simple (computable)
> models.
I need the references on this please. There are many statements to the contrary.
My thought is that it is a potential ambiguity that is resolved by being
clear whether the MR is with a formal description, which then must be simple,
or a natural system, which itself can be complex. This is one of the stickiest
parts of the theory, in my opinion, so not at all surprising there would
be two interpretations.
> Why does the material world need abstract models? Simply because we can
> epistemologically consider them as having anticipatory or "model-based"
> behavior need not imply that those models exist ontologically as distinct
> entities.
Yes, if we look only at gross scale of classical systems where we don't see
any apparent complexity. But these systems are not distinct and clearly are
related to cases with few components that behave complexly. Thus, for a general
theory, it works to explain the apparent mechanistic behavior by commutation
with a model, otherwise there must be multiple theories, one for each kind
of system.

>  Protein folding seemed to have been argued by Rosen to be
> anticipatory (Life Itself p. 271); however, this strikes me as just a way of
> describing the behavior of a system. I personally do not think that Rosen
> proposed or suggested that proteins actually have some accompanying
> "non-material" (or even material) part that would be the model guiding the
> behavior.
I am comfortable with considering strange realities at ontological levels,
so for me it represents no difficulty at all to imagine a formal domain that
is always present. In fact, even traditional theory does this, but it separates
it as a Platonic realm where incontrovertible "laws" exist. Admiting to models
everywhere, while that may seem radical at first, is far less radical than
the Platonic/mechanistic assumption. I only says that systems are involved
in generating the laws. Some have established rather consistent laws to our
perception (mechanical laws), and that is partly because our sensory ability
was constructed to capitalize on such consistency. So we see a material world,
being a product of its rules. But that is not the only possibility. That
makes a great deal of sense to me.

> For example, I do not think that Rosen would propose that organisms have
> abstract formal (M,R) models as something that exists (materially or
> non-materially) seperately in the world, somehow alongside the organism.
>From my reading he proposes that the models are part of the organism, but
have extensions throughout other modeling relations which represent an "infinite
mathematical object," i.e., the nested hierarchy of larger and smaller systems.
The most immediate relationship is with the fully embodied model, part of
the organism, but information also is shared with larger contexts. This is
very suitable for ecology. I read him as proposing to consider models separate
from material structures, but both are operative in an organism. Additionally,
in an organism, there is the ability to respond to the model for control
purposes, thus producing a plethora of anticipatory behavior. That, I think,
is all Rosen. My own speculation is that the rules governing what makes an
organism essentially define an amplification means which capitalizes on anticipatory
behevior via evolution and adaptation. It is thus magnifying a property of
nature that is apparent in un-structured matter (free particles), but disappears
without the organismic way of preserving it.

> Instead, the (M,R) model is an epistemological model that is realized or
> embodied in the internal organization of the organism itself, and notably,
> this organizational aspect is not identical with the organisms structural
> organization.

Yes, exactly my view as well.
> Similarly, my take is that in order to epistemologically
> represent these anticipatory systems whose future state determines present
> change (such as a protein folding), we must employ formal models in our
> modeling relations that have similar characteristics to those natural
> systems. These formal models are anticipatory models, which contain the
> necessary closed loops of entailment and the necessary descriptive
> structure.
Here I think there may be a mis-step. There are many indications that all
formal descriptions, taken alone, must be simple. We thus cannot create a
complex model of anything, as a purely formal entity. Rosen mentions this
problem and says, at best one would have to create an infinite set of models
to capture the complex behavior. This is the principle on which I am constructing
a modeling/mapping system for ecosystems.

I have speculated about complex models as you seem to be doing here. By including
human intuition and judgement in, say, a decision support system, we can
regain complexity in the model, which now becomes a complete natural system,
not just a formal representation. Rosen's references to the power of analogy
now become highly relevant, because one can argue that the full set of complex
possibilities humans may generate may in some important ways represent the
possibilities of nature, simply because we are products of nature and share
many similar properties. So, in this way, we can get an anticipatory model
for managing ecosystems. In the first way we can get a multitude of simple
representations that answer specific questions or represent the range of
possibilities, as we fill out the infinite set, presumably establishing some
priorities.

>  However, just as in the case of the (M,R) model and the organism,
> there is also no need for the structure of the anticipatory model to be
> realized in the world in any explicit form. Instead, the anticipatory model
> is realized or embodied directly in the protein's innate configuration.
I would quibble here, saying that no formal representation can actually exist
independently (i.e. no Platonic realm). e.g., thoughts in our brain must
be in relationship with physical substrate, although not reducible to them.
So, somehow, there is a physical correllate of any model, but it may indeed
be nearly impossible to localize.


Thanks,

John