Re: [life] MR as ontological; 3 kinds of life

["Tim Gwinn" <***>]

Hi John,

See interposed.

Regards,
Tim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of John
> Kineman
> Sent: Monday, August 25, 2003 7:06 PM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: [life] MR as ontological; 3 kinds of life
>
>
> Tim, nice references!. some add'l comments below..
>
> Tim Gwinn wrote:
>
> >So, the demarcation is characterized by this set of "homologies
> between the
> >behaviors exhibited by organisms", not by structural
> considerations. I also
> >suspect (but am not certain) that this is the basis for his
> cryptic remark
> >in Essays (p. 28), where he says, regarding the conditions "for
> a material
> >system to be an organism", that "Sufficient conditions are
> harder; indeed,
> >perhaps there are none."
> >
> Yes. It seems consistent to begin with the "homology" of behaviors. In
> plain English, these systems behave similarly, and so we look first for
> a common way to identify them (the MR), and then a common explanation
> (possibly an MR!). The homology extends to quantum systems, social
> systems, organisms, ecosystems, and psycho-biological systems.


I would strongly disagree. The behavioral homologies to which he referred
were those that were specifically characteristic of organisms, and which
were specifically not present in non-living systems.

If you want to discuss behavioral homologies among other (broader) classes
of systems, then you are discussing some other set of homologies, not the
ones that Rosen specified.



> The only
> thing left out are mechanisms, which unfortunately hold most people's
> interest. But then he explains how mechanisms can be identified by
> commutation of a  modeling relation, and how they can be obtained the


A status of 'mechanism' is not related to the commuting of an MR. This would
only be so if the only set of models that existed were simple (computable)
models. But simple models represent a subset of the totality of all possible
models for use in an MR.


> same way. It is a small step then to say the theory is entirely general,
> which I think dawned on him at some point in the work, but it may not
> have been apparent at the outset, nor particularly desired (because of
> the trouble it would create). Nevetheless, there seems to be a
> consistent trail starting general with fundamentals of measurement,
> getting specific to biology, then ending general, with a general thoery
> that can "inform physics." Also, he clarified that it was not informing
> physics of a new special case, but that physics was the special case. So
> I think both interpretations are true (a complex modeling
> relationship!), although the one is much harder to swallow. The ontology
> may be somewhat avoidable if dealing only with biology, but without it
> one's arguement does lose its compelling force  among the physicists who
> will still think that beneath it all, there is a mechanism unless you
> take their rug away.
>
> On page 221, he writes: "In the preceding sections, we have seen many
> examples of modelling relations, which have spanned a wide range of
> physical and biological contexts...This is indeed the main thrust of the
> entire book; to determine how we may employ formal models of natural
> systems to make temporal predictions about the systems themselves [the
> empistemological use of MR], and ultimately to utilize such predictions
> to modify the systems' present behavior [the ontology]. In order to
> accomplish this, we must investigate modelling relations involving
> dynamical systems in more detail than we have heretofore done." He then
> goes on to discuss the nature of time itself, in relation to percepts,
> which implicate models.
>
> I interpret the quote as meaning you can't get life from a mechanism,
> but you can get mechanisms from a modeling relation, which is also
> necessary for life and thus general to both. A material system would
> have to beome partly non-material (a non-commuting modeling relation) to
> produce life,  so of conditions other than this (which would have to be
> there at the outset) "there are none." In other words, there is no way
> for a strictly material system to invent an abstraction or model to
> which it can respond in a complex manner. Some form of abstraction
> ability must be present.


Why does the material world need abstract models? Simply because we can
epistemologically consider them as having anticipatory or "model-based"
behavior need not imply that those models exist ontologically as distinct
entities. Protein folding seemed to have been argued by Rosen to be
anticipatory (Life Itself p. 271); however, this strikes me as just a way of
describing the behavior of a system. I personally do not think that Rosen
proposed or suggested that proteins actually have some accompanying
"non-material" (or even material) part that would be the model guiding the
behavior.

For example, I do not think that Rosen would propose that organisms have
abstract formal (M,R) models as something that exists (materially or
non-materially) seperately in the world, somehow alongside the organism.
Instead, the (M,R) model is an epistemological model that is realized or
embodied in the internal organization of the organism itself, and notably,
this organizational aspect is not identical with the organisms structural
organization. Similarly, my take is that in order to epistemologically
represent these anticipatory systems whose future state determines present
change (such as a protein folding), we must employ formal models in our
modeling relations that have similar characteristics to those natural
systems. These formal models are anticipatory models, which contain the
necessary closed loops of entailment and the necessary descriptive
structure. However, just as in the case of the (M,R) model and the organism,
there is also no need for the structure of the anticipatory model to be
realized in the world in any explicit form. Instead, the anticipatory model
is realized or embodied directly in the protein's innate configuration.


>
> >By "perhaps there are none", I suspect he meant that, as noted
> in the first
> >quote, that one cannot specify some finite set of structural conditions
> >which constitute sufficient conditions for life, and I further
> suspect that
> >he may well have meant that perhaps one also cannot specify some
> finite set
> >of relational (functional) conditions which constitute
> sufficient conditions
> >for life.
> >
> The former, certainly. The later I think only admitting incomplete
> knowledge of all the extra steps needed on top of having an internal
> model. But the model is certainly the big step up front, and the one
> everyone is want to accept in the traditional world. Since that is a
> "necessary" condition, it is the first hurtle to overcome.
>
> > Rather, *any* physical structure (and perhaps also any number of
> >relational (functional) structures) will suffice as long as it
> "allows the
> >characteristic behaviors themselves to be manifested". (Think of
> Crichton's
> >novel "Prey", which Don brought to the attention of the VCU
> Rosen group last
> >year).
> >
> Sorry I missed the novel.  - Yes, this is the epistemological method of
> recognizing the system by behaviors (his main focus). However, he is
> forced to an ontological view out of necessity when dealing with the
> problem of cause of complexity, which becomes necessary for example in
> distinguishing simulations. I think his paper on simulations dealt with
> that, but its been a while since I read it.
>
> >What does seem to be clear is that for living organisms to be
> constituted,
> >the reality that comprises it is - at least - causally adequate
> to generate
> >systems which manifest these behaviors in these homologies.
> >
> Yes, exactly.
>
> > In particular,
> >it would seem to be causally adequate to allow complex systems
> in general,
> >and anticipatory ("model-based") systems, specifically.
> >
> I don't know the technical distinction here between complex and
> anticipatory, other than degree of anticipation (ie., degree to which
> the entailment of the FS in behavior is used for control purposes by the
> subject system). Is there a categorical distinction, or is it just a
> contingency that there might be a distinction? What I'm thinking is that


Rosen does not (to my knowledge) make an overt classification in one quote.
I can only find that: 1) all anticipatory systems are complex [AS], and 2)
that anticipatory system are those that allow future states to determine
present change [EL p. 85]. I do not think he ever suggests that all complex
systems are anticipatory. So, I am inclined to consider anticipatory systems
as a subset of the set of complex systems.


> certain quantum experiments  exhibit "feed-forward" behavior fitting the
> anticipatory system homology. So we have it in the least evolved and the
> most evolved natural systems. Then the middle, classical ground, is
> carefully shown to be representable by a commutation of the MR, assuming
> it has one..
>
> > Rosen regarded this
> >model-based behavior as "...true at every level, from the
> molecular to the
> >cellular to the physiological to the behavioral. Moreover, model-based
> >behavior is the essence of social and political activity." (AS,
> Preface, p.
> >vii)
> >
> >Regards,
> >Tim
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >