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Re: Panpsych - was: MR as ontological, Fechner



John M,

NOw you have caught me in a dilemma. I just responded to Judith retracting the "everything is complex" statement, in regard to the sense that mechanisms are, by definition, not complex.

Now I have to do a little dance and recover complexity generally. That was done by pointing out how Rosen showed mechanisms to be a degenerate case of complexity.

So we have cake and eat too. Is that OK?

I like pansensitivity! Maybe more primitive to panpsychism (which I do not endorse as the historical "ism", as noted earlier).

Consciousness is indeed all things to all people. Without any general theory, what more can we do but be vague?? Still, there is something we all preceive in this that doesn't want to go away.

Complex? Don M. used to say there were about 31 different definitions of complexity. Most of them are mechanical, computational ones. Like computing landscape complexity from measurements of patch size, shape, organization, etc. Rosen's does stand apart in that it heretically introduces formal entailments. So I refer to it as "deep complexity" or just "Rosen complexity."

GB Shaw??  Aparently stupidity is not anathema to success?

John M wrote:
JohnK and list,

1. Panpsychism? rather Pansensitivity -
 I don't propose it as an 'ism' rather as a characterisation. A statment of
what we know anyway, just usually let it unmentioned.

I am strongly against the panpsych terminology - on the bases of the stupid
historical bagage John mentioned.
I proposed over the past ~12 years (on ~12 lists) "pansensitivity" instead
(not my formulation of the word) which eliminates the snide remarks on a
'nagging' Fe atom or a sobbing star. I received no refutations, but no
acceptance either. Maybe because I wrote it as part of my negative stance
against the use of the (elusive) word: "consciousness". (Attacking a tabu).

Pansensitivity we do experience, even in the 'inert' noble gases, and not
only in the material domain: also ideas, processes are sensitive.
To whatever. An electron to a positive charge, a photon to a refractive
index. GB Shaw to stupidity.

2. Complex
I gave up (with reservations) my opposition to using this word, if I
want to stay 'connected'. Find, however, that the distinctions-loaded
variations of "complexity" are counterproductive to conveying ideas
(especially Rosen-based ones to RR-heretics, even RRneophites).
I use complex as complex. Period.

As John correctly quoted (agreeing, I suppose):
  
In particular, Rosen identifies everything as being complex.<
    
I would stop here, without the added "justifications" which may give rise to
convoluted (complex?) arguments.
Nothing is simple, only the utmost restricted models WE construct.
I totally agree. This "only" however is a big one to those who look only in that category and then claim it is the reality we all should accept. So the sweeping statement had to be modified to account for that case and demonstrate consistency with it, while implying a more expanded view of it. Good politics in any case.
As part of the wholeness (nature) everything is as complex as far as far we
can include (consider?) ramifications. Unlimitedly, all the way,  to - as I
understand this _expression_ - 'the natural systems'.

Sorry, if I sound unorthodox in my views.
I completely agree here, and that is how I interpret Rosen, or at least implications of his views. Still, the distinction that Judith caught is important, if we want to have anybody to talk to.



One thing that bothers me. As I read Anticipatory Systems Rosen identifies "natural system" as "external" to our perception. I suspect this needs to be clarified somewhat as the theory is applied to our own system, which we would have to call internal. I would think he really means whatever system percepts are about, internal or external or whatever, even abandoning this difference. By external, perhaps he means outside the model??? But this is implicit in it being a realized system vs. a formal one because they are immissible logical types. ?? any thoughts

Cheers,

John K.