Re: [life] MR as ontological; 3 kinds of life

["John Kineman" <***>]

Tim, nice references!. some add'l comments below..

Tim Gwinn wrote:

>So, the demarcation is characterized by this set of "homologies between the
>behaviors exhibited by organisms", not by structural considerations. I also
>suspect (but am not certain) that this is the basis for his cryptic remark
>in Essays (p. 28), where he says, regarding the conditions "for a material
>system to be an organism", that "Sufficient conditions are harder; indeed,
>perhaps there are none."
>
Yes. It seems consistent to begin with the "homology" of behaviors. In
plain English, these systems behave similarly, and so we look first for
a common way to identify them (the MR), and then a common explanation
(possibly an MR!). The homology extends to quantum systems, social
systems, organisms, ecosystems, and psycho-biological systems. The only
thing left out are mechanisms, which unfortunately hold most people's
interest. But then he explains how mechanisms can be identified by
commutation of a  modeling relation, and how they can be obtained the
same way. It is a small step then to say the theory is entirely general,
which I think dawned on him at some point in the work, but it may not
have been apparent at the outset, nor particularly desired (because of
the trouble it would create). Nevetheless, there seems to be a
consistent trail starting general with fundamentals of measurement,
getting specific to biology, then ending general, with a general thoery
that can "inform physics." Also, he clarified that it was not informing
physics of a new special case, but that physics was the special case. So
I think both interpretations are true (a complex modeling
relationship!), although the one is much harder to swallow. The ontology
may be somewhat avoidable if dealing only with biology, but without it
one's arguement does lose its compelling force  among the physicists who
will still think that beneath it all, there is a mechanism unless you
take their rug away.

On page 221, he writes: "In the preceding sections, we have seen many
examples of modelling relations, which have spanned a wide range of
physical and biological contexts...This is indeed the main thrust of the
entire book; to determine how we may employ formal models of natural
systems to make temporal predictions about the systems themselves [the
empistemological use of MR], and ultimately to utilize such predictions
to modify the systems' present behavior [the ontology]. In order to
accomplish this, we must investigate modelling relations involving
dynamical systems in more detail than we have heretofore done." He then
goes on to discuss the nature of time itself, in relation to percepts,
which implicate models.

I interpret the quote as meaning you can't get life from a mechanism,
but you can get mechanisms from a modeling relation, which is also
necessary for life and thus general to both. A material system would
have to beome partly non-material (a non-commuting modeling relation) to
produce life, so of conditions other than this (which would have to be
there at the outset) "there are none." In other words, there is no way
for a strictly material system to invent an abstraction or model to
which it can respond in a complex manner. Some form of abstraction
ability must be present.

>By "perhaps there are none", I suspect he meant that, as noted in the first
>quote, that one cannot specify some finite set of structural conditions
>which constitute sufficient conditions for life, and I further suspect that
>he may well have meant that perhaps one also cannot specify some finite set
>of relational (functional) conditions which constitute sufficient conditions
>for life.
>
The former, certainly. The later I think only admitting incomplete
knowledge of all the extra steps needed on top of having an internal
model. But the model is certainly the big step up front, and the one
everyone is want to accept in the traditional world. Since that is a
"necessary" condition, it is the first hurtle to overcome.

> Rather, *any* physical structure (and perhaps also any number of
>relational (functional) structures) will suffice as long as it "allows the
>characteristic behaviors themselves to be manifested". (Think of Crichton's
>novel "Prey", which Don brought to the attention of the VCU Rosen group last
>year).
>
Sorry I missed the novel.  - Yes, this is the epistemological method of
recognizing the system by behaviors (his main focus). However, he is
forced to an ontological view out of necessity when dealing with the
problem of cause of complexity, which becomes necessary for example in
distinguishing simulations. I think his paper on simulations dealt with
that, but its been a while since I read it.

>What does seem to be clear is that for living organisms to be constituted,
>the reality that comprises it is - at least - causally adequate to generate
>systems which manifest these behaviors in these homologies.
>
Yes, exactly.

> In particular,
>it would seem to be causally adequate to allow complex systems in general,
>and anticipatory ("model-based") systems, specifically.
>
I don't know the technical distinction here between complex and
anticipatory, other than degree of anticipation (ie., degree to which
the entailment of the FS in behavior is used for control purposes by the
subject system). Is there a categorical distinction, or is it just a
contingency that there might be a distinction? What I'm thinking is that
certain quantum experiments  exhibit "feed-forward" behavior fitting the
anticipatory system homology. So we have it in the least evolved and the
most evolved natural systems. Then the middle, classical ground, is
carefully shown to be representable by a commutation of the MR, assuming
it has one..

> Rosen regarded this
>model-based behavior as "...true at every level, from the molecular to the
>cellular to the physiological to the behavioral. Moreover, model-based
>behavior is the essence of social and political activity." (AS, Preface, p.
>vii)
>
>Regards,
>Tim
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Dan
>>Fiscus
>>Sent: Monday, August 25, 2003 1:59 PM
>>To: ***
>>Subject: Re: [life] MR as ontological; 3 kinds of life
>>
>>
>>John,
>>
>>Good stuff!
>>
>>Referring to the subset of your post below and especially where you
>>say '"life form" in terms of a realized system that magnifies it - i.e.,
>>an organism' and then 'along the continuum from MR to organism,
>>there are many additional steps, all of which add up to getting a
>>FULLY realized life form', I would say I agree fully, except for
>>differing in the demarcation of the origin of life in that "contiuum"
>>of "steps" (a nicely paradoxical way of saying it). I put the real
>>event at a step prior to organisms, namely a coupled complementary
>>process much more "analogous" to an ecosystemic set of autotrophic
>>and heterotrophic functions operating interdependently. This is HT
>>Odum's hypothetical origin and it fits everything I know of life,
>>ecology, systems, etc. and so I have adopted it as my own view and
>>seek to develop it. One reason I start here is that the ecosystemic
>>process could plausibly generate cells and organisms.
>>
>>To compromise, find the point of overlap of ecosystemic and
>>organismic views of life, we might meet in the middle and try to
>>describe some other intermediate step at which point the ecosystemic
>>(whole life system, functionally closed in coupling of autotrophic
>>"composing" and heterotrophic "decomposing" functions as well as
>>autotrophic energy "pump up" and heterotrophic energy dissipate
>>functions) and the organismic (part or life function sub-system,
>>spatially closed, "miniaturized and encapsulated" as Odum said)
>>aspects reach a synergy such that the part-whole relation is
>>self-sustaining and self-evolving within the likewise self-sustaining
>>life-environment relation. This would in essence be the original
>>entanglement of bottom-up (molecular or organismic) and
>>top-down (global or ecosystemic) causality.
>>
>>This would then suggest a third category of life to add to your
>>life itself (life principle, holds everywhere, in everything), life form
>>(a fully formed organism), and this would be life process or maybe
>>life function, or life system, or perhaps life-environment relation.
>>Whatever we call it, it is the bridge between organisms and physical
>>environment, it is implied in that "missing link" period you mention,
>>it unifies life and non-life. I think it the arena in which the general
>>"life itself" life principle is/was channelled and magnified into,
>>precipitates out into, fully formed life forms. Since it is still
>>operational (essentially ecology, inter-operation of organisms or life
>>forms in webs of interdependency and mutual causation), this
>>network amplification process is worthy of treatment in its own
>>right, here and now. I.e., I don't suggest it relevant only at the origin.
>>Instead, I suggest it a more fundamental form of life than organismic
>>life.
>>
>>I also have thoughts that organismic life is not really closed to
>>efficient cause (neither autotrophic nor heterotrophic organisms are
>>really able to self-build in isolation; takes a minimum of two kinds of
>>organisms to do so, to get efficient cause closure) whereas ecosystemic
>>or life system life is. And also some quotes from both Rashevsky and
>>Ulanowicz that speak to these topics and jive with these views. But I'll
>>save these for another post...
>>
>>Some thoughts...
>>
>>Dan
>>
>>
>>
>>John Kineman wrote:
>>
>>snip
>>
>>
>>
>>>Now, if having and internal MR is the CRITICAL factor that makes living
>>>systems alive, AND it is general to all natural systems making them
>>>complex, then what is the distinction between complex and living? I
>>>think logic will require this to be only a matter of degree, otherwise
>>>the whole theory breaks down. So you can see how I get to saying that we
>>>can say nature fundamentally and ontologically involves the critical
>>>property of life, i.e., internal MR. Perhaps it can be stated this way:
>>>the novel factor or principle that makes the critical difference between
>>>a living system and a non living one is embedded in nature. So, calling
>>>this fundamental property "life" is really just a labeling issue at this
>>>point (aside from the hackles it raises). It is clearly the case in
>>>Rosen's theory that the most critical property of life is also existent
>>>in all natural systems. Thus I rever to "life itself" as this principle,
>>>vs. "life form" in terms of a realized system that magnifies it - i.e.,
>>>an organism. Anyway, I think Rosen's statements that preserve some
>>>difference between complexity and life are simply because along the
>>>continuum from MR to organism, there are many additional steps, all of
>>>which add up to getting a FULLY realized life form.
>>>
>>>Furthermore, we have to recognize that the MR includes a formal system
>>>component, which has no other interpretation than something that can be
>>>considered psychological, epistemic, mental, abstract, e.g., whatever
>>>words we want to use for non-material. It is thus a radical
>>>
>>>
>>proposition.
>>
>>