[life] MR as ontological

["John Kineman" <***>]

 A further comment on how generally Rosen intended MR to be applied, and
my chain of interpretations. Quotes from Anticipatory Systems:

The book Anticipatory Systems was advertised to apply to a special class
of systems. On the cover, he writes about AS, which is clearly aims at a
general treatment, that "Presents the first detailed study of this most important
class of systems which contain internal predictive models of themselves and/or
of their environments and whose predictions are utilized for purposes of
present control. This book develops the basic concept of a predictive model,
and shows how it can be embedded into a system of feed-forward control."
However, in the development of the theory, he then proposes to reverse the
general and the special, suggesting it is the other way around - that all
the not-anticipatory systems we have studied are in the class called mechanisms,
and that these are a sub-set of model-based (anticipatory) systems, i.e.,
anticipatory systems whose models commute, and thus they no longer anticipate
but react as defined entities. In fact, commutation of an MR can be taken
as the process of definition, moving from the indeterminate to the determinate.
This affords application to quantum phenomena, where a context of relations
can form and thus cause a set of modeling relations to commute according
to that context, but getting observable states.

So he concludes with more general statements than he starts the book:

pg. 399: "We saw very early that the behaviors of systems which employ predictive
models are vastly different from those which do not. At the most fundamental
level, anticipatory systems appear to violate those principles of causality
which have dominated science for thousands of years." -- This obviously referes
to the distinction between mechanistic views (the tradition) and complex
systems (not just living).

pg. 399: "Once we recognize that anticipatory behavior is the general rule
in biological systems, and that it depends essentially on the presence [
=>  internal] of predictive models, our attention was inexorably drawn
to the nature of the modelling relation itself. 

Pg. 400: "We sought to illustrate these ideas with many examples, drawn from
the widest possible variety of scientific disciplines; not only to show their
universality, but also to demonstrate that the concept of a model is not
something exotic or unusual, but rather of the broadest currency imaginable."

I'll dig more on how the modleing relation is seen as the most general way
that systems relate to each other. The designation of one as formal and the
other as natural seems relative to one's questioning - natural systems can
model each other (with the caveat that this requires encoding and decoding
relations). The complexity of organisms, at least, seems to be explained
by Rosen as the effect of having and responding to an internal model - thus
being "anticipatory" rather than "reactive." But his whole discussion of
anticipatory systems, defined thus, becomes general in his treatment of it.
 

Now, if having and internal MR is the CRITICAL factor that makes living systems
alive, AND it is general to all natural systems making them complex, then
what is the distinction between complex and living? I think logic will require
this to be only a matter of degree, otherwise the whole theory breaks down.
So you can see how I get to saying that we can say nature fundamentally and
ontologically involves the critical property of life, i.e., internal MR.
Perhaps it can be stated this way: the novel factor or principle that makes
the critical difference between a living system and a non living one is embedded
in nature. So, calling this fundamental property "life" is really just a
labeling issue at this point (aside from the hackles it raises). It is clearly
the case in Rosen's theory that the most critical property of life is also
existent in all natural systems. Thus I rever to "life itself" as this principle,
vs. "life form" in terms of a realized system that magnifies it - i.e., an
organism. Anyway, I think Rosen's statements that preserve some difference
between complexity and life are simply because along the continuum from MR
to organism, there are many additional steps, all of which add up to getting
a FULLY realized life form.

Furthermore, we have to recognize that the MR includes a formal system component,
which has no other interpretation than something that can be considered psychological,
epistemic, mental, abstract, e.g., whatever words we want to use for non-material.
It is thus a radical proposition.

J. Kineman

-------- Original Message --------

Subject:	Re: MR as ontological, Fechner
Date:	Mon, 25 Aug 2003 08:34:57 -0600
From:	John Kineman <***>
To:	***
References:	<***> <***>

Let me add a caveat on panpsychism. I mentioned it only to not throw it
out automatically; I do not profess panpsychism as such. It has much
historical bagage we would dispose of. My actual statement was pointing
out the inconsistency of condemning panpsychism, while necessarily
considering psyche and while having a scientific ethic that seeks
generality. So, my position would be that we should be open without
criticism to explore the generality of the psyche. I would not,
therefore, assume that everything involves psyche, but would explore
that hypothesis.

In particular, Rosen identifies everything as being complex. He says
that organisms are complex because they involve modeling relations in
their existence (ontology). That is very clear in AS.  I'm looking for
references to make the logical connection to saying that complexity is
generally explained that way for all "natural systems." If not, there is
a problem with the theory, but Rosen didn't emphasize that connection
except in discussing organisms. Still, there is no alternative
explanation for complexity proposed. The means of detecting it
(non-commutation of one's model of the subject system) and explaining it
(the subject systems own internal model of "self and environment") are
the same, which is a consistent theory since humans are "natural
systems." But mechanisms either (a) do not contain internal models of
themselves and their environment, or (b) contain internal models that
have been forced to commute. Alternative (b) would be the most
consistent interpretation. That also is what affords a translation into
quantum process. (This summarizes the earlier discussion on MR as ontology).

So, it is clear that in the case of mechanisms - which are most of what
science has studied to date - panpsychism would not apply, either
because it is not there (option a) or because it has been
short-circuited (option b). I tend to favor option b for explaining
material existence as emerging from complex natural systems.

Since this makes distinctions and explains origins formally, it is
definitely not "panpsychism," where the "ism" refers to an already
established philosophy that we can reference historically. If this is
confusing, think of the word "positivism." This refers to a historical
school of epistemology that you can look up in the library. But we can
use the work "positive" in many new ways without being tarred with
"positivism." Similarly, we can discuss psyche in nature.

-jjk

Dan Fiscus wrote:

> Mike,
>
> Looks good on first scan. I'll read it. Reminds me of "teleomechanist"
> school in Germany, de Chardin's "Heart of Matter", Bateson's "Mind
> and Nature" and his "pattern that connects", plus the history and
> ideas help for what I am into. Not to mention Rosen...
>
> Thanks for the article...
>
> Dan
>
> McIntyre, Mike S. wrote:
>
>> I have been following this discussion between Tim Gwinn and
>> John Kineman with interest.  I myself favor panpsychism, so
>> naturally I tend to side with John's position here.
>>
>> Here is a link to an article about Gustav Theodor Fechner
>> (1801-1887), written by Michael Heidelberger, which may be
>> of interest in this context.  Heidelberger describes Fechner's
>> approach as a form of non-reductive materialism.
>>
>> http://www.homestead.com/dogbreedersguild/files/fechner.pdf
>>
>> Regards,
>> Mike McIntyre
>