Panpsych - was: MR as ontological, Fechner

["John M" <***>]

JohnK and list,

1. Panpsychism? rather Pansensitivity -
 I don't propose it as an 'ism' rather as a characterisation. A statment of
what we know anyway, just usually let it unmentioned.

I am strongly against the panpsych terminology - on the bases of the stupid
historical bagage John mentioned.
I proposed over the past ~12 years (on ~12 lists) "pansensitivity" instead
(not my formulation of the word) which eliminates the snide remarks on a
'nagging' Fe atom or a sobbing star. I received no refutations, but no
acceptance either. Maybe because I wrote it as part of my negative stance
against the use of the (elusive) word: "consciousness". (Attacking a tabu).

Pansensitivity we do experience, even in the 'inert' noble gases, and not
only in the material domain: also ideas, processes are sensitive.
To whatever. An electron to a positive charge, a photon to a refractive
index. GB Shaw to stupidity.

2. Complex
I gave up (with reservations) my opposition to using this word, if I
want to stay 'connected'. Find, however, that the distinctions-loaded
variations of "complexity" are counterproductive to conveying ideas
(especially Rosen-based ones to RR-heretics, even RRneophites).
I use complex as complex. Period.

As John correctly quoted (agreeing, I suppose):
> In particular, Rosen identifies everything as being complex.<
I would stop here, without the added "justifications" which may give rise to
convoluted (complex?) arguments.
Nothing is simple, only the utmost restricted models WE construct.
As part of the wholeness (nature) everything is as complex as far as far we
can include (consider?) ramifications. Unlimitedly, all the way,  to - as I
understand this expression - 'the natural systems'.

Sorry, if I sound unorthodox in my views.

With best regards

John Mikes

----- Original Message -----
From: "John Kineman" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2003 10:34 AM
Subject: Re: MR as ontological, Fechner


> Let me add a caveat on panpsychism. I mentioned it only to not throw it
> out automatically; I do not profess panpsychism as such. It has much
> historical bagage we would dispose of. My actual statement was pointing
> out the inconsistency of condemning panpsychism, while necessarily
> considering psyche and while having a scientific ethic that seeks
> generality. So, my position would be that we should be open without
> criticism to explore the generality of the psyche. I would not,
> therefore, assume that everything involves psyche, but would explore
> that hypothesis.
>
> In particular, Rosen identifies everything as being complex. He says
> that organisms are complex because they involve modeling relations in
> their existence (ontology). That is very clear in AS.  I'm looking for
> references to make the logical connection to saying that complexity is
> generally explained that way for all "natural systems." If not, there is
> a problem with the theory, but Rosen didn't emphasize that connection
> except in discussing organisms. Still, there is no alternative
> explanation for complexity proposed. The means of detecting it
> (non-commutation of one's model of the subject system) and explaining it
> (the subject systems own internal model of "self and environment") are
> the same, which is a consistent theory since humans are "natural
> systems." But mechanisms either (a) do not contain internal models of
> themselves and their environment, or (b) contain internal models that
> have been forced to commute. Alternative (b) would be the most
> consistent interpretation. That also is what affords a translation into
> quantum process. (This summarizes the earlier discussion on MR as
ontology).
>
> So, it is clear that in the case of mechanisms - which are most of what
> science has studied to date - panpsychism would not apply, either
> because it is not there (option a) or because it has been
> short-circuited (option b). I tend to favor option b for explaining
> material existence as emerging from complex natural systems.
>
> Since this makes distinctions and explains origins formally, it is
> definitely not "panpsychism," where the "ism" refers to an already
> established philosophy that we can reference historically. If this is
> confusing, think of the word "positivism." This refers to a historical
> school of epistemology that you can look up in the library. But we can
> use the work "positive" in many new ways without being tarred with
> "positivism." Similarly, we can discuss psyche in nature.
>
> -jjk
>
> Dan Fiscus wrote:
>
> > Mike,
> >
> > Looks good on first scan. I'll read it. Reminds me of "teleomechanist"
> > school in Germany, de Chardin's "Heart of Matter", Bateson's "Mind
> > and Nature" and his "pattern that connects", plus the history and
> > ideas help for what I am into. Not to mention Rosen...
> >
> > Thanks for the article...
> >
> > Dan
> >
> > McIntyre, Mike S. wrote:
> >
> >> I have been following this discussion between Tim Gwinn and
> >> John Kineman with interest.  I myself favor panpsychism, so
> >> naturally I tend to side with John's position here.
> >>
> >> Here is a link to an article about Gustav Theodor Fechner
> >> (1801-1887), written by Michael Heidelberger, which may be
> >> of interest in this context.  Heidelberger describes Fechner's
> >> approach as a form of non-reductive materialism.
> >>
> >> http://www.homestead.com/dogbreedersguild/files/fechner.pdf
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >> Mike McIntyre
> >