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Re: MR as ontological, Fechner
- From: "Judith Rosen" <***>
- Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2003 10:13:24 -0500
John K. wrote:
> In particular, Rosen identifies everything as being complex.
I need clarification on this statement, John. My father only identified
everything ALIVE as being complex. That's the only guarantee you will have--
that if it is alive, then you know without checking that it is complex. It
doesn't follow the other way. The notion that all of the material world is
complex was asserted by others--but imputed to Robert Rosen-- and was a
claim that I DISputed as being asserted by my father. His only assertion in
that direction was that atoms are complex as he uses the term. But he made a
clear distinction between systems that were complex because of their
organization and other systems, created out of atoms, of course, but which
had an organization that fell short of his definition of complexity. This
has been a source of misunderstanding all along with his work and has led to
some big disagreements! But it is true, nonetheless.
The question for most people seems to be; How can a system be non-complex if
it has other systems, complex systems, even living systems, in it's
organization as "components"? You actually phrased the answer beautifully in
an earlier post regarding how the global ecosystem is not an organism. So I
need clarification on what you mean by the above statement or I don't
understand.
Judith
He says
> that organisms are complex because they involve modeling relations in
> their existence (ontology). That is very clear in AS. I'm looking for
> references to make the logical connection to saying that complexity is
> generally explained that way for all "natural systems." If not, there is
> a problem with the theory, but Rosen didn't emphasize that connection
> except in discussing organisms. Still, there is no alternative
> explanation for complexity proposed. The means of detecting it
> (non-commutation of one's model of the subject system) and explaining it
> (the subject systems own internal model of "self and environment") are
> the same, which is a consistent theory since humans are "natural
> systems." But mechanisms either (a) do not contain internal models of
> themselves and their environment, or (b) contain internal models that
> have been forced to commute. Alternative (b) would be the most
> consistent interpretation. That also is what affords a translation into
> quantum process. (This summarizes the earlier discussion on MR as
ontology).
>
> So, it is clear that in the case of mechanisms - which are most of what
> science has studied to date - panpsychism would not apply, either
> because it is not there (option a) or because it has been
> short-circuited (option b). I tend to favor option b for explaining
> material existence as emerging from complex natural systems.
>
> Since this makes distinctions and explains origins formally, it is
> definitely not "panpsychism," where the "ism" refers to an already
> established philosophy that we can reference historically. If this is
> confusing, think of the word "positivism." This refers to a historical
> school of epistemology that you can look up in the library. But we can
> use the work "positive" in many new ways without being tarred with
> "positivism." Similarly, we can discuss psyche in nature.
>
> -jjk
>
> Dan Fiscus wrote:
>
> > Mike,
> >
> > Looks good on first scan. I'll read it. Reminds me of "teleomechanist"
> > school in Germany, de Chardin's "Heart of Matter", Bateson's "Mind
> > and Nature" and his "pattern that connects", plus the history and
> > ideas help for what I am into. Not to mention Rosen...
> >
> > Thanks for the article...
> >
> > Dan
> >
> > McIntyre, Mike S. wrote:
> >
> >> I have been following this discussion between Tim Gwinn and
> >> John Kineman with interest. I myself favor panpsychism, so
> >> naturally I tend to side with John's position here.
> >>
> >> Here is a link to an article about Gustav Theodor Fechner
> >> (1801-1887), written by Michael Heidelberger, which may be
> >> of interest in this context. Heidelberger describes Fechner's
> >> approach as a form of non-reductive materialism.
> >>
> >> http://www.homestead.com/dogbreedersguild/files/fechner.pdf
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >> Mike McIntyre
> >