Re: MR as ontological, Fechner

["John Kineman" <***>]

Let me add a caveat on panpsychism. I mentioned it only to not throw it
out automatically; I do not profess panpsychism as such. It has much
historical bagage we would dispose of. My actual statement was pointing
out the inconsistency of condemning panpsychism, while necessarily
considering psyche and while having a scientific ethic that seeks
generality. So, my position would be that we should be open without
criticism to explore the generality of the psyche. I would not,
therefore, assume that everything involves psyche, but would explore
that hypothesis.

In particular, Rosen identifies everything as being complex. He says
that organisms are complex because they involve modeling relations in
their existence (ontology). That is very clear in AS.  I'm looking for
references to make the logical connection to saying that complexity is
generally explained that way for all "natural systems." If not, there is
a problem with the theory, but Rosen didn't emphasize that connection
except in discussing organisms. Still, there is no alternative
explanation for complexity proposed. The means of detecting it
(non-commutation of one's model of the subject system) and explaining it
(the subject systems own internal model of "self and environment") are
the same, which is a consistent theory since humans are "natural
systems." But mechanisms either (a) do not contain internal models of
themselves and their environment, or (b) contain internal models that
have been forced to commute. Alternative (b) would be the most
consistent interpretation. That also is what affords a translation into
quantum process. (This summarizes the earlier discussion on MR as ontology).

So, it is clear that in the case of mechanisms - which are most of what
science has studied to date - panpsychism would not apply, either
because it is not there (option a) or because it has been
short-circuited (option b). I tend to favor option b for explaining
material existence as emerging from complex natural systems.

Since this makes distinctions and explains origins formally, it is
definitely not "panpsychism," where the "ism" refers to an already
established philosophy that we can reference historically. If this is
confusing, think of the word "positivism." This refers to a historical
school of epistemology that you can look up in the library. But we can
use the work "positive" in many new ways without being tarred with
"positivism." Similarly, we can discuss psyche in nature.

-jjk

Dan Fiscus wrote:

> Mike,
>
> Looks good on first scan. I'll read it. Reminds me of "teleomechanist"
> school in Germany, de Chardin's "Heart of Matter", Bateson's "Mind
> and Nature" and his "pattern that connects", plus the history and
> ideas help for what I am into. Not to mention Rosen...
>
> Thanks for the article...
>
> Dan
>
> McIntyre, Mike S. wrote:
>
>> I have been following this discussion between Tim Gwinn and
>> John Kineman with interest.  I myself favor panpsychism, so
>> naturally I tend to side with John's position here.
>>
>> Here is a link to an article about Gustav Theodor Fechner
>> (1801-1887), written by Michael Heidelberger, which may be
>> of interest in this context.  Heidelberger describes Fechner's
>> approach as a form of non-reductive materialism.
>>
>> http://www.homestead.com/dogbreedersguild/files/fechner.pdf
>>
>> Regards,
>> Mike McIntyre
>