Re: Consistency vs. Correspondence

["Tim Gwinn" <***>]

Hi John,

 

That helps quite a bit, and was very informative.

 

Regarding 'consistency', I am inclined to say that "consistency is when both theories commute in their respective modeling relations with the same natural system (in the same context)".  How does that sound? I placed "in the same context" in parentheses, because I am not sure if that is the best phrase.  It seems appropriate where, for example, classical and relativistic theories are consistent, but only within certain limited contexts of gravity, velocities, etc. But I also wonder if there might be cases where the theory itself may, for example, dictate certain measurement processes that differ from that of another theory, such that the theories themselves alter the context of the system under study. In the latter case, consistency may not occur, due to a change in context that is unavoidably due to the theory itself. (No specific instances come to mind, it just occurred to me as a possibility that might arise when comparing theories.)

 

 

Rambling on a related topic......the thing that has always troubled me about instrumentalism is that it has always seemed unclear to me on what basis a theory's results are supposed to be "extendable" to other situations. Instrumentalism (as I understand it)  takes a theory to be neither true nor false, but instead as just "useful" or not to some degree. What "usefulness" exactly means varies, I gather, with the particular flavor of instrumentalism, but it seems to generally be around the notion of the ability to make "good" predictions that match the phenomena. 

 

If theory X is "useful" as a theory in situation Y, then what is it that allows or suggests that theory X can make any assertions about situation Z? And further, if theory X is "useful" as a theory in situation Y, then what is it that allows or suggests that some logical implication(s) of theory X can make any assertions about situation Z? This has always puzzled me - if a theory is just "useful", then what gives it any force of argument beyond the specific situation(s) in which it is "useful"? And even within the situations for which it is useful, does it have any force of argument?

 

In the cases above, particularly in the latter one about the logical implications of a theory being applicable elsewhere, this strikes me as a tacit assertion of what Rosen makes explicit: that inference in a theory and causality in the world are being related to each other. In the modeling relation approach, we say - when the MR commutes - that the causal structure of the natural system is congruent with the inferential structure in the model. This relationship and congruence of entailment structures also provides a basis for how it is that implications of theories can be proposed to say something about some other situation. In instrumentalism, I am unclear how, or if, that relationship (and its consequences for extending a theory to new situations) is codified.

 

This (congruence of entailments) as a requirement for being "useful" seems to be something that instrumentalism wants to disavow. Yet, it would seem that it must also (tacitly, at least) employ them if one is to engage in arguing or proposing that if a theory leads logically to some conclusion, then that also argues that the resulting implication structure will be mirrored in the causal reality it describes.

 

Just wondering out loud...

 

Regards,

Tim

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:***On Behalf Of John Kineman
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2003 5:02 PM
To: ***
Subject: Re: Consistency vs. Correspondence

Hi Tim and all who dare to read!

Thanks for trying to clarify this with me. Here's my take on the question of the meaning of consistency between theories, with many apologies for the length! I will try to be more brief in the future - philosophy of science is such an intricate and controversial topic with so many views written about it, it is hard to identify what aspects will be known commonly and well enough to reference them with fewer words. That requires knowing one's audience, which is next to impossible on a listserver. I don't mean to insult anyone by lecturing on the philosophy of science, about which I have studied but am certainly not a recognized expert. Everyone's pardon on this will be appreciated. :)

By "consistency" I mean something less than "correspondence" which is what Niels Bohr tried to prove between classical Newtonian theory and newly emerging QM at the time. The failure to do that led to the now famous Copenhagen convention, which in short (many variations of the story exist - so this is my best understanding of it) that agreement among physicists was to deal with the apparent loss of a "wholly consistent" (now meaning something more like Bohr's correspondence) reality by declaring that reality itself was at fault, not our theory. Thus we would, for at least several decades, view reality as stochastic, probabalistic, dual, and thus fragmented. Prior to this, both religion and science agreed that reality was a single, unified whole that was completely self-consistent and a closed causality. Science approached it as a whole that should also lend itself to a completely closed logical description of it. Religion (in the West) approached it as a single God who is omnicient and omnipresent. In science, natural law took the role of these properties. The fracturing of scientific reality may even be tracable to the evenual declaration (by some) that "God is dead," which many of us recall growing up. After Copenhagen wholeness was fractured in our world view. Since then, which I described as the "post-modern" era, it seems that there has been some recovery of wholeness. People like Prigogine, Bohm, and others proposed various ways of regaining a meta-theory of wholeness, recognizing still that a proximal theory (i.e., one aligned with our senses) cannot be whole, i.e., must have the appearance of duality. But what is behind the duality? That became the question, which some positivistic thinkers argued against on the basis that any meta-theory cannot be directly tested, so cannot be subject to positivistic rejection (their litmus test for valid science). Philosophers like Kuhn showed how "revolutions" occur in such meta-theories (world views) which underly all testible scientific theories. Even Popper admitted there must be "metaphysical research programs" at the foundation of science. Today, all the GUTS theories are in this category (IMO). They propose dimensions, multiple universes, etc. that can only be inferred from our lack of observational evidence of a closed calculable whole, which Rosen identifies with mechanism.

However, through all of this, even at its worse state just after Copenhagen, it was recognized that whatever new theory is produced to regain wholeness, there will always be the need to show "consistency" with phenomena that can be observed from the classical view. Niels Bohr said this best, perhaps, and was often quoted on that. It means that whatever deeper explanation I may have for events, I will still have experience through my senses - I will still see a world composed of objects that look and behave, approximately, classically. I will thus need to interpret the findings and predictions of alternative views into what it means in these terms, which we are all hooked on as a result of sensory perception.

So, theories themselves may be "incommensurable" meaning their theory structures cannot be reduced to each other - i.e., there is not a 1:1 "correspondence" as Bohr described it, or, in Rosen language, the two do not fully "commute." However, for multiple theories to remain valid, they must be shown to not have direct contradictions with other valid theories. In other words, they can predict different things, or the same things with different levels of accuracy, but they cannot both exist if they are in direct conflict about the same phenomena at the same scale. In this way Newtonian theory was "superceded" by the Lorentz/Einstein/Minkowsky/etc. relativity, but it was not rejected by it. The later was merely a "larger system" in Rosen's terms. Similarly quantum mechanics does not contradict any of these prior models of reality, if they are taken only as models and not reality itself. If it did, we should think there is something wrong with quantum mechanics (and indeed some problems are of great concern, like non-locality). So science as a whole is already operating very much in a Rosennean and Kuhnian mode, recognizing that it only produces models of reality, but recognizing that when models contradict each other directly, one has discovered a fundamental limitation of the model. Einstein gave a very clear account of this thinking process in arriving at special relativity. He said a clear paradox had been very carefully and methodically established in the Newtonian view regarding the constancy of the speed of light and the principle of inertial reference frames. Within the Newtonian view, one of these had to be wrong. But, he said, his reasoning was different. He said the essence of discovering the correct answer, i.e.,  a new meta-theory, or new assumptions about reality, was to "hold both of these to be true" and then to look for what new assumptions allow that to happen. In doing this, the new theory is also guaranteed to be "consistent" with the old, even though they can tell us very different things about different phenomena or at different scales and accuracy. This is the process of synthesis I subscribe to as well - it is the careful identification of paradox and resolution of that paradox through adoption of new assumptions about nature. One does not, however, jump to new assumptions willy-nilly - only the one that resolves a paradox that has been carefully established by good prior research will be "reasonable."

This is the sense in which I consider application of Rosen's MR to the ontology of life to be "reasonable" - because it resolves some very well established paradoxes between theories and disciplines. But only those concerned about those paradoxes will be interested or supportive. In physics there was a very strong ethic of seeking this kind of consistency (and even correspondence, if possible), but in other disciplines this process has been weak, and between disciplines it is almost absent. Part of the reason for that, I believe, is that other disciplines have been afraid to develop their own foundations, buying into the physical world view as a fundamental metaphysic for everything (good sales job on the part of the physicists). So the proposal for a broader uniting view does not appear as having necessity to any but a few scientists, more philosophers, more cyberneticists, and mostly the public (which sees science as a whole). When taking such a proposal to the public, one needs simple, if overly general, questions, like "physical or living?" "Physical or complex?" is a more technical question that skirts public interest, and accordingly it will get less attention. It will also be weakened by the erroneous claim that "complex" can be explained in physical terms. That is where most of the research money is now flowing, to the detriment of exploring deeper meta-models. The net effect of placing the discussion on this "safer" basis will be to shift the debate to how one formulates complexity and at what point progress with physical simulations of the complex will be sufficient for them to "emerge" with life. The effect of putting the argument on the basis of dead vs. living world views will be to question the foundation of all physical disciplines and legitimize some ecological, social and psychological theory foundations. That change would have tremendous impact on society and eventually even politics, as we move from machine to living system metaphores.

In any case, however, whether we speak of Rosen's ideas epistemologically or ontologically (the prior discussion), predictions of theory from that view must remain "consistent" (as above, i.e., not identical) with predictions of classical and post-classical theory predictions (that have been well confirmed). As Korzybsky, Rosen, Bohr, Khun, Popper, and many others have said, all scientific views and theories are limited descriptions of reality, not the reality itself. We are, perhaps, skewed in our impressions of science by a very visible and, IMO, arrogant minority in physics which claims to be working on reality itself. I see that as no different than the religious leader who claims to be representing the word of God (except that the religious leader at least COULD conceivably be right, the scientist, by design, could not be). In the deepest epistemological sense, such physics is not science; but it has been raised by some to the status of art and the public is enthralled. For us, however, we can ignore the entire issue of mechanical "nothing-butism." It is a vocal minority that has almost no effect in social science, has effect but very little relevance in ecology, is worshipped in environmental science to a degree, but is being overturned mostly by cyberneticists, philosophers, and psychologists (and to some degree physicists themselves, who dabble in all three). The only hooker is that the hard nosed physicist want us to wait until they fix it and call it the "new physics." Physics is constantly re-defined to retain its claim as the foundation of everything (a starting assumption, it seems). It suffered terrible fright at the prospect of having to include "mind" in physics, which it was prepared to do if necessary, but it was temporarily rescued from that fate by very clever meta-theories. Still, as it holds onto those approaches, its grip on reality is gradually slipping.

So, I see that the first step of something categorically different is a very simple and general one. It does not require precise definitions of mind and reflective consciousness vs. more general consciousness or awareness, etc. All that involves details that are much more precise than the basic change itself that moves us from a physical view to a complex one (I'll avoid the controversial labeling of that as a primitive life principle,  although I retain that as a popular description of it and to dramatize the magnitude of this paradigm change). Truly we don't know the difference between complex and living in a general sense and Rosen as much as said he too was unsure (see transcripts on Mikuleckey's web site). Still, Rosen was a careful scientist who was breaking revolutionary ground, but saw no need to inflame the critics with sensational language. I am less cautious (less patient?), but I also realize that we need a certain amount of professional conservatism, at least within the ranks.

So, my official view is that complexity is general, fundamentally descirbed by the modeling relation, which entails properties we normally associate with "mind," and that this is a radical departure from the reality concept based in materialism, i.e., it adds formalism to materialism to approximate wholism, and that this radical new concept about reality that incorporates psyche into it, is a necessity for all life. It is certainly the most important necessity of life for science to consider in its present state, and in that sense, it is unavoidable and entirely valid (IMO) to say that the transition is from a predominantly physical point of view of reality to a point of view that incorporates the critical principle for life - and hence a roughly "living" point of view (in principle). As radical as that is (I believe it is), I still insist on consistency (in the above sense) with prior physical views and theories, and recognize that the "new view" is based on a meta-model that is most appropriate for describing living phenomena, including psychological phenomena. In this view, as Rosen clearly states several times in LI and Essays, physics is a subset, not the superset.

In summary: The philosophy of science literature suggests that science is comprised of a set of different formalisms describing nature, which is Rosen's modeling relation. In that set, we should look for "consistency," not correspondence. We should look most intently for any direct contradiction between actual predictions derived from the different views via their associated theories. These help confirm or reject the theories, but not the meta-theory. Over time, if no valid theories can be confirmed, or if they turn out to be not of very much use, then the meta-theory fades into disuse. If a paradox results between confirmed results, then a new or bridging assumption is needed to broaden or unite the theories. That is a Kuhn revolution, or paradigm shift. Such assumptions should not be injected without a demonstrated need (parsimony applied to world views). To my knowledge there are no direct contraditions between the predictions of mechanistic theory and those from a Rosennean perspective, as they "predict" different kinds of phenomena. The mechanistic view can be derived from a simplification of the Rosennean view, but not the reverse. i.e., there is consistency but not correspondence. However, the "reality claims" of these views are very different, and one's automatic assumptions about the nature and origin of life will be drastically different depending on which perspective is taken. This is not inconsistency between the theories and their predictions, but in their assumptions, which cannot be directly tested in either case. In such a case, the broader reality concept, i.e., the Rosennean, should be taken as the best approximation of reality.



John Kineman

Tim Gwinn wrote:

Hi John K.,

 

I need to backtrack here, because I am perhaps misunderstanding you. This entire branch of the thread began where you posted:

 

> Is there not another way to see this? That looking at quantum processes

> as a link to understanding consciousness is a way to seek consistency

> with the mechanistic view - consistency that will be necessary for any

> successful theory of consciousness. We are not talking about different

> reality claims here, but different theory constructions.

 

I'm not trying to "trap" you in your words, I just am very confused. Specifically, the above remark that "consistency with the mechanistic view" will be "necessary".

 

But, below, you say that "incommensurable scientific theories are the norm".

 

Is, then, consistency among views necessary or not? Or, did you mean something else by "consistency" in the quote that I misinterpreted?

 

It was that "consistency" as "necessary" that initially led me to respond regarding the conflicts (incommensurabilities) between Newtonian and Rosennean paradigms, and then all the rest of this branch of this thread followed.

 

Hopefully, we are approaching better understanding of each other. :)

 

Regards,

Tim