When taken ontologically, as a description of a natural system itself, the "encoding" and "decoding" arrows must also be taken as system entailments (causal mappings), between the natural and formal system. A simple example is an engineer designing and testing a widget. The encoding and decoding cycle represents an iterative design cycle. Part of this cycle is Rosen's process of "realization," i.e., when a a formal system is realized by a natural one. Since the relationship is also referred to as functional, i.e., functioins exist in the formal system component, I referred to formal/functioinal entailment [of the natural system].====Well, there are two types of entailments : 1) causal and 2) inferential. Separately, there is the notion of functional organization. Complex systems and machines (but not mechanisms) are systems which admit relational (functional) descriptions. Functional units (components) are also context-dependant: they acquire their properties based on the system to which they currently belong.But I am still not sure what "functional entailment" means.====
Am I stating it incorrectly??? It means a causal mapping between a function and a natural system that realizes that function. For example, lets model the relationship between my own mind and my body using a modeling relation. The function "eat lunch" maps into realized actions that correspond with eating lunch. That's a decoding relation. I analyze the experience and change my concept of it. That's encoding. It is ontological because it is a description of what goes on causally within the whole natural system. Thus one can draw a picture of a Rosen MR diagram inside the natural system box of a similar diagram to represent this situation. In such a diagram, the larger FS box now represents our conversation where I have described it. So we are modeling the modeling process.====Again, I am unsure what "entailment with functions" means. In any case, there is no reversion to a mechanical view. See further below.====
Agreed. no problem here.====What I meant, and stated poorly, was that the system which has this emergent property of consciousness is not mechanistic. It is a complex system and thus not amenable to reductionism. (see further below)====
Reduction as a general process is never nullified except in complete absence of thought. For example, we are reducing to word-symbols and they to prior experiences. Physical/material reduction is eliminated, yes. "All the way down" means in successive MRs of MRs. Rosen indicated this possibility of modeling models. I understand that we might not want to call that a reduction to avoid confusion with traditional reduction, but nevertheless it is a reduction when considered ontologically. If the MR is applied only epistemologically, than it says nothing about complexity, only how to detect it in the first stage of reduction (the epistemological model itself).====From a Rosennean perspective, the reductionistic principle is nullified, and so there is no "all the way down".
I certainly would not argue with anyone who wanted to define it thus for their own purposes, but as a general statement one is certainly also free to apply these terms to any view or theory construction. Newtonian views certainly use hierarchical concepts, but so did Rosen. Rosen discussed "larger" and "smaller" systems. If the word "larger" is preferred to "higher," that's equivalent for me, so then no objection. Then "smaller" is "lower." Just semantics."Lower" levels of reality do not universally (or generally) determine or entail "higher" levels of reality, or vice versa. The 'higher'/'lower'/'up'/'down' terminology is just an artefact of the Newtonian paradigm.
Yes, "reductionism" refers to a historical philosophy (the "ism") that was indeed Newtonian and mechanistic. That does not preclude other forms of reduction on a different basis, but they are not well-established as "isms" and would have to claim another terms since this was already used for the Newtonian program. I admit the double usage is confusing, but it is an English language problem.===="Reductionism", in Rosennean terminology, implies Rosen's definition of 'mechanism': a system is amenable to reductionism IFF it is a Rosennean mechanism. Complex systems, on the other hand, are not amenable to reductionism.====
Yes, absolutely. The entailments make them complex.Also, the "smaller pieces" in this case are not parts, they are wholes themselves - fully entailed natural systems in Rosen's terms. So it is a very non-mechanical reduction. Mechanism separates the formal and material entailments.====I do not know what you mean by "fully entailed natural systems". Are you saying they are complex?
You were discussing panpsychism, which presumably refers to there being a psyche associated with all natural systems. So, any MR would qualify because the NS box would itself be representable by an MR. Below I show a "larger" system and the "smaller" system in the larger system NS box.. In this diagram the larger system commutation properties can indicate that the FS is complex (by impossibility of commutation, not attributable to error). The smaller system diagram is an explanation of why that happens, i.e., it is internally entailed with an FS.I am not familiar with the terms "formal and material entailments". Are you referring to Aristotelian formal cause and material cause?====
I argued elsewhere that all thinking involves some kind of reduction, it is reduction to what that is the concern.
Thus, to me, panpsychism (for lack of a better word) seems to me quite mechanistic, in that it proposes that these properties of life and consciousness exist not by virtue of being emergent properties of a complex system organization, but by virtue of being properties of all the atoms/etc. that make up an organism, which combine to form a sum total of that property for the organism. ======
Again, I agree it is a reduction, which no theory can escape, but it is not mechanical because the MR does not commute====What is this MR that you are referring to? What are the two systems in the MR? Why does it not commute?====
yes=====I am not sure, but I think I have a rough idea of what you are proposing. Basically, that 1) all reality is complex in the Rosennean sense by virtue of some kind of ontological MR
arbitrary term along with many others, but yes(psyche?)
any natural system - the only fundamental reality proposed (which is a theory-relative reality) is the MR itself.that is part of each piece of fundamental reality,
No. That is physical reduction to a Newtonian concept, "particles." The existence of particle-wave dualilty - the strange combination, would be explainable as a Rosen MR, out of which one (optionally) could view particles if one establishes a mechanistic FS, i.e., if one measures a state.and 2) any complex systems (including living organisms) admits reduction to fundamental (perhaps quantum?) particles.
No, I do not propose that it is outside the Rosen paradigm, or I wouldn't be on this list.If so, this would seem to fall outside/beyond the Rosennean paradigm of "complex". Complex systems do not admit reduction. This is an oft repeated theme of Rosen.
Perhaps somewhat, in taking the literal extension of Rosen's ideas to their logical implication. But I strongly feel that I would be doing Rosen a disservice to not credit him with this insight as well as the foundation for it. It is well known that even Einstein did not see the full extension of his theory, and did not accept the obvious conclusion when it was presented to him. But in this case, I find ample evidence in Rosen's writings to indicate that he did see this ontological view, but did not elaborate on it. Otherwise he would not have made such grave comments about applications of his theories to creating cybernetic life and the possible misuse by humanity, reminiscient of the Manhatten project. You don't get that kind of gravity from just a new model of the scientific process, unless it has ontological implications for the design of systems. And you don't get that if you can't state what the ontology is all about so that a cybernetic project can be accomplished.Perhaps you are reaching toward that next paradigm......
=LAgain, I am not understanding some terminology. What do you mean by "formal entailments"? =====