Re: Kay & thermodynamics

["Tim Gwinn" <***>]

John K.,

I was not as clear as I should have been, hopefully this summary will be
more better. :)  I also didn't intend to place you in a position of having
to defend Kay. It was just that you happened to be the one that mentioned
him, and so I began a thread in response. You can just take this as my
thinking out loud. :)

My remarks about opening a closed system were only to indicate that there is
no inevitability towards dissipation in any open system, regardless of how
much or how little it is opened. One can think of this as being like a work
function: knowing the start and endpoints are not enough, we need to know
the path to have any idea of the work done. In this case, the "path" is the
*way* in which the closed system is opened. That will determine the
resultant behavior of the open systems, not its "endpoints" ("how much" the
system is opened). In any case, the opening of a closed system will render
any attractors of the closed system moot.

My reason for bringing up that lack of inevitability towards dissipation is
that Kay's argument seems to rest on a tacit belief in a pervasive tendency
toward dissipation in any environment. In short, he relies upon a
thermodynamic "gradient" for his argument. (see "We have argued that life is
a response to the thermodynamic imperative of dissipating gradients." in S &
K's "Order from Disorder" at:
http://www.redfish.com/research/SchneiderKay1995_OrderFromDisorder.htm) But
if all ecosystems in nature are open, then this "gradient" (which shows up
universally only in closed systems) will be absent, and his argument fails.
So, its not a question of whether we can model the open ecosystem or not.

"Self-organized" is a pretty vague term. Many times its usage refers to
situations of apparent organization caused (driven by) external gradients.
"Self-organized" in the sense of Per Bak's sandpiles rely upon a
gravitational gradient, for example.

But these kinds of "self-organized" systems are not anything like complex or
living systems. And I think it is a far leap for Kay (and Schneider) to
suggest that this kind of external driver can "force" the arising and
maintaining of living organisms. My argument above essentially invalidates
the driver he proposes, which I think invalidates the rest of his thesis.

However, as I mentioned below previously, one could conceivably generalize
his concept by referring not to a specific thermodynamic process towards
dissipation as the external driver responsible for forcing life to occur,
but rather referring to any kind of thermodynamic flow toward some attractor
as the external driver. This would then work with open as well as closed
systems.

This might salvage his argument, it would seem. That would leave him with an
external driver which could then force the arising of living organisms. But
the driver force becomes subject to the vagaries of the various ecosystems
and whatever thermodynamic gradients of whatever degree towards whatever
attractors that may or may not exist in those ecosystems. So, the
universality and viability of these gradients as a driver force is called
into question. But, still, let us proceed.

Now comes the freezing experiment I mentioned previously. The core idea is
that the freezing experiment shows that the life processes of an organism -
its "livingness" - is not tied to dynamical considerations. Freezing the
organism to near absolute zero removes all the dynamics - the molecules,
etc. cease to move, and their velocity vectors go to zero. The life
processes, or aliveness, is not tied to the dynamics of the molecules and
other structural pieces that comprise it. This can be restated as that the
life processes cannot be described by state/phase sets (either classical or
quantum). All that state information is lost when it is frozen, and when it
is reheated, the molecules would only take up random state values unless
they are somehow otherwise constrained. However, Newtonian physics
(including extensions to QM) are based on states and state-descriptions. As
such, the life-process of an organism are not describable within the
paradigm of Newtonian/QM physics.
[George Kampis gives a good description of all this in his book
"Self-Organizing Systems in Biology and Cognitive Science", sec. 5.3.4].

In regards to Kay, his notion of "self-organized" is similar to Bak's, in
that it is catastrophe-based. [see
http://www.iaia-wnc.ca/pdf/Kayetalpaper.pdf ] By freezing an organism, any
thermodynamic gradient disappears, the dynamics disappear, and the results
should be truly catastrophic!! However, this is not what actually happens,
so this is why previously had said that these experimental results
"obliterate" Kay's argument.

Regards,
Tim






> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of John
> Kineman
> Sent: Sunday, August 17, 2003 1:27 AM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Kay & thermodynamics
>
>
> Hi Tim,
>
> Thanks again for helpful reply. I'm not at all an expert on Kay, so I'm
> speculating. It would be best to involve him, if that becomes feasible at
> some point. I only mentioned him originally because when I spoke with him
> he said he was familiar with Rosen and liked the ideas, but hadn't delved
> too far into it. He does come from an engineering / thermodynamics
> background, so it would not be unexpected to find a threshold between the
> two. Probably this discussion is reflective of a much broader dichotomy in
> the complexity community, where it seems to me many try to hold onto the
> traditional handles. Bar-Yam, for example (New England complexity group),
> is another complexiologist who, it seems to me, benefits greatly by
> remaining partly (or totally) mechanistic in his treatment. I tend to go
> the other way and as a result inhabit the edges of normal
> society. But I do
> believe some communication is possible between the two.
>
> The view that is sometimes expressed (not yours here, which have similar
> caveats to mine) where systems are "either complex or mechanical," though
> probably philosophically correct, seems impractical. While I agree that
> complexity isn't a scalar on the one hand (philosophically), it is dawning
> on me that the mixture of this oil in the holy water must still be
> quantified in some way, which usually ends up being statistical or
> probabalistic. In other words, while true that an ecosystem is
> theoretically capable of almost anything, they do tend to behave somewhat
> reasonably for some periods of time and have many stabilizing processes
> that can be understood. The thresholds for rapid change can sometimes be
> determined by experience, and as well the modes to which the system flips,
> which is Kay's point (even if  the thermodynamic model turns out
> to be just
> a metaphor). This leads to some concept of how long some changes might
> take, and perhaps some idea of the likely range of variability
> which we can
> learn from experience, i.e., through adaptive management. At least that is
> the hope of ecosystem management, without which we might as well abandon
> science-based management altogether and leave it to the politicians. Yet I
> agree that the capacity for surprise is always there, regardless
> of what we
> might think we know about probabilities, attractors, and ranges from prior
> experience or theory, so I also agree with your statement that complex
> systems are fundamentally unpredictable. Somehow there must be a practical
> approach that teeters between these two alternatives.
>
> The situation reminds me of the problem with quantum phenomena. On the one
> hand quantum realities that "determine" behavior are fundamentally
> unknowable (let's say for now, noting as-yet unsuccessful
> attempts to prove
> otherwise), and yet on the other hand probabilities for certain specific
> states may become known through experience. Is it possible there is
> something analogous in ecosystems?
>
> So, while
>
> >"Closed systems are so degenerate that they do not provide any
> information
> >about how the resulting open system will behave,"
>
> perhaps it is also true that certain closed sub-systems can be arbitrarily
> identified that correspond well enough to aspects of behavior we are
> particularly interested in. For example, it is entirely possible
> to predict
> growth rates of various species under given conditions. Even though they
> are complex systems, they must conform to physical limits. What
> is emerging
> in ecology now is the idea of dynamic and complex (much confusion
> about the
> difference) organisms operating within the boundaries of a physically
> limiting system. The boundaries may be more predictable than the internal
> dynamics. The boundaries can conform to classical theory rather
> well, being
> physiological limits based on physical environmental variables.
> While it is
> true that the climate system, for example, is also quite unpredictable
> (whether through complication/chaos or true complexity), we don't discuss
> the species limits outside certain boundaries of space and time where the
> climate regimes can be bounded. Then the unpredictability defaults to that
> of how likely are the climate and other bounding scenarios, and that may
> involve forecasting by analogy and prior experience, as well as factoring
> in human will in making certain decisions. In this way, SOMETHING can
> indeed be said, while it remains true that the entire system,
> taken without
> any boundaries, is unpredictable.
>
> Is that similar to saying:
>
> >  The way in
> >which the system was opened will determine much of the resulting
> behavior.
> >[EL 184-185]
>
> and
>
> >  However, importantly, a complex
> >system can be modeled temporarily and locally as a mechanism
>
> ???
>
> So, then we would not discuss "how" open a system is, but in what specific
> limits and for what purposes it can be considered closed??
>
>
>
> >Well, but if organisms are Rosennean complex, then their thermodynamic
> >qualities cannot be analyzed in terms of analyzing the thermodynamics
> >qualities of their parts, or their sub-systems. That would be
> >reductionistic, I think.
>
>
> Yes, by which I assume you mean mechanistic. Just a note on this,
> which may
> not be needed - 've noticed that the label "reductionistic" often surfaces
> in the Rosen discussions as a means of rejecting an idea. I've thought
> about this quite a lot and have concluded that all thinking, of any kind,
> is technically "reductionistic," but what Rosen is departing from is
> reduction to material and efficient causes alone. He argues to add formal
> cause, certainly, and a special kind of final cause. I agree with this
> fully, however the new view will also be reductionistic, just to different
> fundamentals. This is basic instrumentalism, which I subscribe to
> provisionally, retaining a certain belief in relative realism (that isn't
> so relevant here).
>
> To explain (probably unnecessarily) via my limited understanding, we think
> in terms of symbols that are based in prior experience. Percepts are
> apparently interpreted as external objects according to pre-learned (or
> genetic) templates. Every concept requires component elements on which it
> is based and a metaphysical world view comprised of those assumptions. All
> theory is thus based on a set of prior assumptions, without which we could
> not think at all. So the issue is to what are we reducing.
>
> "Reductionism," because it refers to recent history of science, criticizes
> physical/material reduction - the atomic theory. That mold was clearly
> broken by quantum phenomena. And, as I understand it, since the
> mechanistic
> paradigm is related closely with similar limitations of mathematics, this
> breaking of the mold is also confirmed by Goedel's incompleteness and the
> like. Statistical mechanics seems like an oxymoron to me, as statistics
> don't determine any dynamics, but rather the boundaries by which we can
> describe systems incompletely. Once you presume states, then you can have
> dynamics, it seems to me. But in any case SM remains part of the
> mechanical
> view, which we are rather limited to by our senses and participation in
> objective (thing-oriented) existence (and thus drawn to by our interests).
>
> Yet theory can be based on other assumptions, which is why I consider the
> fundamental implications of Rosen's ideas. If they differ from mechanism,
> they must embody different foundations, meaning that the ideas reduce to
> different theoretical "reals" (avoiding the argument about realism for the
> moment). So what are those theoretical "reals"? What is the Rosen world
> view based on? I think its the modeling relation itself. But what often
> gets discussed is what Rosen rejects of mechanism, which is not
> in itself a
> foundation for any alternative. Also, if the foundation is "complexity" in
> a form that leads to infinite unpredictability, that too isn't a useful
> foundation for theory development. Yet in the modeling relation I can see
> the possibilities for developing testable theories, something
> Rosen himself
> apparently expressed concern about.
>
> Anyway, my point/question is might our arguments be more effective if we
> embrace rather than criticize "reduction," and then point out a different
> way to reduce that is more appropriate for biology than physical
> reduction???
>
>
> >Organisms may be analizable as
> > > dissipative systems conforming to 2nd law thermo, except for their
> > > evolutionary history and present day capabilities to involve "creative
> > > acts."
> >
> >I think I disagree. As I understand it, the 2nd law applies only
> >statistically and only to the closed system as a whole. If we posit the
> >universe as a thermodynamically closed system (which I am highly dubious
> >of), then we can say that, statistically, the universe as a
> whole will tend
> >to dissipate toward equilibrium. This to me prescribes no specific
> >conditions toward dissipation upon any given small spatial
> region, such as
> >that occupied by an organism, or an organism within some ecosystem.
>
> Point taken. My understanding of this is that it is generally
> agreed by the
> physicists that local dissipation can lead to organizing
> processes which do
> not violate the general trend. Yet aside from specific systems
> that do this
> (dissipative systems, disturbances?), physical systems themselves follow
> the 2nd law even locally. So, again, regarding ecosystems, they will
> contain sub-systems that can be categorized as non-living and living, and
> thus conforming and not. The total system, like the human organism, may be
> considered complex because of its complex elements (although
> perhaps not as
> yet organismic), it, like the human organism, also contains sub-systems
> that behave classically. Of course our problem in exploring Rosen
> is to not
> allow science to look exclusively at the physical sub-systems, and thus
> ignore what is even more interesting about the organism -- the
> fact that it
> is organized into a living system. But to handle this in any practical
> case, I'm back to the mix of systems.
>
>
> >=========
> >On a broader level, one could take Kay's notion that (roughly)
> "tendency of
> >the ecosystem toward dissipation is a driving force for self-organization
> >within it" ought to be restated more generically as "tendency of the
> >ecosystem toward some attractor(s) is a driving force for self
> organization
> >within it".
>
> Yes, I tend to agree.
>
>
> >Stated this way, free of thermodynamic language, it seems
> >clearer to me that Kay's proposal is deeply Newtonian: 'force'
> is something
> >that comes from the environment and determines how the system
> (the organism)
> >behaves.
>
> I don't think he specifies what "determines" the attractors, but yes most
> of his examples seem to be of physical environmental controls, like lake
> turbidity, etc. The attractor itself, however, is comprised of organismic
> behaviors, trophic relationships, etc., which are not analized; so the
> non-Newtonian processes (which Kay does refer to), are probably there,
> mysteriously establishing the "attractor" (which isn't a real element as
> such, but a relatively stable mode of behavior). Would be interesting to
> ask Kay directly.
>
> >But complex system arise not from externally imposed dynamics
> but from what
> >Rosen calls "gravitational" aspects within the system. It is possible to
> >freeze some organisms to near absolute zero and essentially remove all
> >dynamics, then thaw them and have the organism resume
> functioning. This, to
> >me, in itself obliterates any argument for a Newtonian approach toward
> >organisms.
>
> Well, does it necessarily? After all you can stop a car and re-start it.
> That could be seen as Newtonian. I would have thought the
> argument could go
> the other way: If after freezing it cannot be restarted, then something
> must have been lost besides what can be re-built through Newtonian
> processes. Maybe this test isn't diagnostic either way??
>
> Are these not simple organisms that behave this way (human "diving reflex"
> etc. notwithstanding as these are at much higher temperatures)? I would
> tend to consider that all process is not stopped by freezing even at
> absolute zero (quantum process, for example). So it could be that
> with such
> organisms, the living aspect may not be so entangled with its macroscopic
> components that it is destroyed when they stop, or something like
> that. I'm
> not really clear on how this argument should be made.
>
> >And likewise, obliterates any argument for some external driving
> >force toward dissipation (or any other attractor) as the basis for either
> >the arising or maintenance of self-organized systems like living
> organisms.
>
> Yes, I agree fully to this, although I'm unclear as to how the freezing
> proves it. In any case, there are many arguments I am comfortable
> with that
> preclude a physical process from resulting in life, if for no other reason
> than the idea that you can get simplicity from complexity, but the other
> way around is merely simulation.
>
>
> Thanks for the dialog! Please take all I say with a grain of salt - I find
> this to be a very effective way to explore my own thoughts, hopefully not
> entirely at everyone else's expense.
>
> All the best.
>
> -jjk