Re: MR as ontological

["John Kineman" <***>]

Tim,,

We won't reach agreement, obviously, but to frame the problem more
clearly, let me answer with some questions and whatever:

> Positing consciousness
>or awareness as some fundamental property or stuff of nature does not seem
>at all logical to me.
>
>
>
Then why is positing un-consciousness more "logical?" Consciousness is
the first thing we are aware of about reality. Everything else is a
supposition (Descartes).
Isn't logic predicated on assumptions? And are we not then discussing
assumptions?

I would suggest that the two views are equally "logical," but based on
different assumptions. Rosen's thesis changes the traditional
assumptions about reality, IMO. The ultimate acceptance then depends on
how useful the view turns out to be in solving real-world problems and
questions. To determine that, we have to work with it. Part of that
working with it is to take it to its logical limits and see if that
reveals something interesting.

>I also find Penrose/Hameroff utterly unpersuasive. The claim of
>consciousness as based in quantum coherence in microtubules is to me a kind
>of last-refuge of the ardent reductionist who realizes the inadequacy of
>causal efficacy within a Newtonian framework, but who can see the only way
>out of this dilemma as necessarily residing in some deeper level of reality;
>in this case, the poorly understood nooks and crannies of sub-atomic
>physics.
>(For those interested, Hameroff's page is:
>http://www.consciousness.arizona.edu/hameroff/)
>

Is there not another way to see this? That looking at quantum processes
as a link to understanding consciousness is a way to seek consistency
with the mechanistic view - consistency that will be necessary for any
successful theory of consciousness. We are not talking about different
reality claims here, but different theory constructions. It is important
to relate the constructs because each one reveals solidly documented
phenomena that one's future thoughts must be reconciled with. Also,
while it is nice to think of Rosen's views as offering a better quantum
reality (as I suggest it might), I don't think that has been
well-developed yet. I would hope to avoid automatic rejections of
phenomena viewed from a classical (including QM) perspective, which is
clearly important within its limitations (as are all phenomena,
variously viewed). Rosen himself was victim of this "either-or" syndrome
and I believe it is important to emerge from that to a more synergistic
ethic.

>He was quite clear on the last page of Life Itself: "But complexity, though
>I suggest is the habitat of life, is not itself life. Something else is
>needed to characterize what is alive from what is complex." He then goes on
>to describe the relational organization as the additional factor.
>
>
Yes, as I said, the difference between the basic relationship, which is
complexity, and how that is then self-entailed, which is then
"necessary" for having "what is alive" (e.g., an organism), but perhaps
(emphasis), not sufficient.

>However, he does say cryptically in Essays (p. 28):
>"To be sure, what I have been describing [invariant graphical patterns,
>complex systems, etc.] are necessary conditions, not sufficient ones, for a
>material system to be an organism. That is, they really pertain to what is
>not an organism, to what life is not. Sufficient conditions are harder;
>indeed, perhaps there are none. If so, biology itself is more comprehensive
>than we presently know."
>
>
I think this is nothing more than a caveat to say, humbly, that he does
not claim to have solved the entire problem, and maybe the ultimate
explanation of life will prove impossible. Without saying this, his
formality would appear arrogant. But it says nothing about the
distinctions.

>Here I disagree with your division into "living/complex phenomena" and
>"organism". To me, the division is "complex phenomena" and
>"living/organism".
>
>
>
Then we would have to claim that everything living is an organism??? My
statement is that all organisms are living, and that everything living
is complex. But I would advise holding out the possibility that "life
itself" - defined according to principle - could preceed organisms. The
alternative view is that life emerges with the organization of an
organism - that life is associated with that type of organization, not a
more general one.

We should also keep the distinction between "what is alive" = a life
form, and "life itself" which refers to a principle or general phenomena
of which oganism is an instance. Rosen implies this distinction. So then
the question we have identified in this dialog is if life exists as a
general principle, or if it "emerges" (definition?) a part of the
organization of an organism.

>
>I do not see in what way the observation of a quantum state is to be
>considered the 'most primitive interaction' and the 'simplest case' unless
>one adopts a reductionist view of the world, where quanta are "primitives"
>of physical reality. Further, to the degree to which quantum phenomena are
>difficult to interpret, hotly argued, and poorly understood, it seems far
>from "the simplest case". :)
>
>
Yes, I was speaking from the view of a material reduction. From my own
interpretation of complexity, the most primitive interaction would be
between a whole and its parts. From Rosen's view, it is probalby a
causal mapping. From any view, it would be the most basic difference
that view identifies and is constructed on. This is basic instrumental
epistemology, accepting all views as having value as demonstrated.

>
>As far as I can see, the "formal system" you speak of with contextual
>information of a coordinate system is a formal system within the mind of the
>human observer.
>

> But then this is just another typical human modeling
>
>
>relation. I do not see in what way this demonstrates anything unique.
>

I did not equate "observer" with "human observer" necessarily. I am
speaking generally.

> At
>best, it seems to show that a concept of "space-time" as being a wholly
>objective framework is erroneous.
>
>
yes, I believe it does demonstrate that space-time is entirely
perceptual and relative. However, we then need to explain how it arises
that we perceive something as stable as, say, our living room. That is
doable by treating everything as an observer, which seems far better
than any of the alternatives I've seen.

>On a sidenote, if one accepts the complementarity principle of QM (which I
>accept only tentatively), then if one measures the momentum of a quantum
>entity, then we do not (and cannot) know its position. But this is a
>perfectly valid kind of interaction. Therefore, does spacetime not "emerge"
>in that interaction?
>
>
>
Yes! That's is my point. Space-time emerges from the interaction, which
is a complementarity but applied between formal and material domains. I
think Rosen gave us the tool for relating classical and complex
perspectives.


Thanks again,


J. Kineman